2007 film "I Am Legend" DVD video:
Zoe Neville: Thirty minutes to what?
US Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Neville: They're sealing off the island.
Zoe Neville: Seal off the island? This island?
2007 film "I Am Legend" DVD video:
Zoe Neville: Jesus, Robert, did it jump? Is it airborne?
2007 film "I Am Legend" DVD video:
US Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Neville: He's announcing it.
President of the United States: [ radio transmission ] Make no mistake, Americans, this virus threatens the survival of not only our nation, but of every other nation - And so it is with great sadness, but even greater resolve that tonight I have signed an executive order initiating a military quarantine of New York City.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Vicksburg
Siege of Vicksburg
The Siege of Vicksburg was the final major military action in the Vicksburg Campaign of the American Civil War. In a series of maneuvers, Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and his Army of the Tennessee crossed the Mississippi River and drove the Confederate army of Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton into the defensive lines surrounding the fortress city of Vicksburg, Mississippi.
When two major assaults (May 19 and May 22, 1863) against the Confederate fortifications were repulsed with heavy casualties, Grant decided to besiege the city beginning on May 25. With no re-enforcement, supplies nearly gone, and after holding out for more than forty days, the garrison finally surrendered on July 4. This action (combined with the capitulation of Port Hudson on July 9) yielded command of the Mississippi River to the Union forces, who would hold it for the rest of the conflict.
The Confederate surrender following the siege at Vicksburg is sometimes considered, when combined with Gen. Robert E. Lee's defeat at Gettysburg the previous day, the turning point of the war. It also cut off communication with Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi Department for the remainder of the war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Vicksburg_(CG-69)
USS Vicksburg (CG-69)
Commissioned: 14 November 1992
USS Vicksburg (CG-69) is a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser serving in the United States Navy. She is named for the land Battle of Vicksburg fought during the American Civil War.
CG-69 was originally named Port Royal, but was changed during construction. She is the only Ticonderoga-class vessel to have a formal name change. CG-73 was later named Port Royal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicksburg_Campaign
Vicksburg Campaign
The Vicksburg Campaign was a series of maneuvers and battles in the Western Theater of the American Civil War directed against Vicksburg, Mississippi, a fortress city that dominated the last Confederate-controlled section of the Mississippi River. The Union Army of the Tennessee under Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant gained control of the river by capturing this stronghold and defeating Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton's forces stationed there.
The city had been under Union naval attack before. Admiral David Farragut moved up the river after he captured New Orleans and on May 18, 1862, demanded the surrender of Vicksburg. Farragut had insufficient troops to force the issue, and he moved back to New Orleans. He returned with a flotilla in June 1862, but their attempts (June 26–28) to bombard the fortress into surrender failed. They shelled Vicksburg throughout July and fought some minor battles with a few Confederate vessels in the area, but their forces were insufficient to attempt a landing, and they abandoned attempts to force the surrender of the city. Farragut investigated the possibility of bypassing the fortified cliffs by digging a canal across the neck of the river's bend, the De Soto Peninsula. On June 28, Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams, attached to Farragut's command, began digging work on the canal by employing local laborers and some soldiers. Many of the men fell victim to tropical diseases and heat exhaustion, and the work was abandoned by July 24.
JOURNAL ARCHIVE: 10/18/10 12:55 AM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anaconda_Plan
Anaconda Plan
Evaluation
Although almost a century and a half has elapsed since the end of the Civil War, the importance of the Anaconda Plan remains to some extent a matter of debate. Clearly, the war was not the relatively bloodless affair that General Scott promised in his original proposal. Most historians regard this as merely a modification of the basic strategy in the course of events. At least one serious historian, however, denies that there ever was anything like a coherent strategy for subduing the South. Rowena Reed[34] contends that the central government in Washington was unable to impose its will on the field commanders, so that the war was a series of independent campaigns, each of which was conducted according to the whims of whatever general happened to be in charge. According to her view, the Anaconda is a later, conceptual imposition of order on events for which order did not exist at the time that they took place.
For the historians who contend that a rational plan did exist, the debate, like the plan itself, has two parts. The importance of the campaign to capture the Mississippi River, and thereby lop off the Trans-Mississippi, is acknowledged. Virtually all present-day historians agree that the Union's Western campaign was at least as significant as that in the East. To the extent that fighting in the West before mid-1863 can be regarded as preparing for or culminating in the capture of Vicksburg, the Anaconda has been validated.
The worth of the blockade, however, remains controversial. No one seriously contends that it alone would have won the war for the North. But while it is conceded not to have been sufficient, the question remains: Was it necessary? That is, would the South have endured had not the blockade sapped the strength of the Rebel armies beyond the tipping point?
Those who deny the importance of the blockade advance two principal arguments. First, it was never very effective. Over the course of the war, more than three-quarters of all attempts to evade the blockade were successful. The one-quarter that did not get through can be written off as operational losses. Second and perhaps more important, the Southern armies were not hamstrung for lack of material, at least owing to the blockade. The supply problems they did face were in fact most often caused by the poor condition of their railroads.[35]
Those who believe that the blockade was decisive argue that the Southern forces were strangled at the end. They point out that the collapse of the Army of Northern Virginia, which in 1865 was virtually all that remained of the Confederacy, followed soon after the loss of Wilmington to the Union. The timing, they contend, was not merely coincidental. Furthermore, the defeat of its armies was not the only way the South lost. The purpose of the blockade was not only to capture the ships that attempted to evade it, but also to discourage others. The blockade runners may have been numerous, but they were built for speed rather than the ability to carry cargo. The more conventional cargo vessels, and their spacious holds, went elsewhere. Unable to sell goods (particularly cotton) on the world market, the Confederate government was already strained financially as early as 1862. As its economy steadily degenerated, it suffered from a general loss of confidence on the part of its citizens.
[JOURNAL ARCHIVE 18 October 2010 excerpt ends]
