https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/washington-bill-to-overhaul-sheriff-eligibility-advances-to-house-drawing-concern-and-outcry-from-spokane-county-sheriff/293-6e798d99-681f-4ee1-9d5e-24062ca86a19
Channel 2 KREM CBS Spokane
Local News
Washington bill to overhaul sheriff eligibility advances to House, drawing concern and outcry from Spokane County Sheriff
Spokane County Sheriff John Nowels says this legislation, if passed, would take away the voice of voters.
Author: Cristian Garza
Published: 7:42 PM PST February 13, 2026
Sheriff John Nowels has been against the bill since it was introduced, saying it's about state control of what local elected officials can do rather than the voters who put them in office.
"There could have been conversations with the legislature about what minimum qualifications could you put in place. I am personally not opposed to say, you know, to apply for sheriff you have to have certain qualifications, but they should not be exhaustive and they should be very, very special and easy to attain," Sheriff Nowels said.
previously, here
by me, Kerry Burgess, 01/24/2026 5:03 PM
I just saw a video of village-idiot Jacob Frey
How many more village-idiots such as Jacob Frey are going to be installed in the USA by those anti-USAmericans?
Not For Merit.
by me, Kerry Wayne Burgess, posted by me: November 16, 2025
The reference to the state of Tennessee was the reason I first thought of Burchett when I scanned that headline.
Luna makes sense as a peddler of UFO-bunk because of her expert skills at collecting garbage on US Air Force airport runways.
Burchett is because he has the same birthdate as the fictional-character "Dr. Ellie Arroway"
None of those people will accept they are nothing but Useful Fools.
Not For Merit.
by me, Kerry Burgess, 11/17/2024 3:48 PM
Not For Merit.
Stargate (1994)
Dr. Daniel Jackson, archaeologist: And knowing this, I think, we have to begin to reevaluate everything we've come to accept about...
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-reviews/predator-review-1987-movie-1009677/
The Hollywood Reporter
‘Predator’: THR’s 1987 Review
On June 12, 1987, John McTiernan’s Predator, starring Arnold Schwarzenegger as the leader of a special forces team that’s dropped into the jungle on a rescue mission and comes face to face with an alien hunter who makes trophies out of men’s spinal columns, hit theaters.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/soviet-union-thought-watched-operation-154426828.html
Yahoo! News
WE ARE THE MIGHTY
What the Soviet Union thought as it watched Operation Desert Storm
Blake Stilwell
Sat, February 14, 2026 at 7:44 AM PST 10 min read
Moscow’s theory didn’t survive first contact with reality. The ground war began on Feb. 24, 1991, and it was essentially over by the 28th. The famous 100 hours number wasn’t just a headline.
Soviet observers watched Iraqi air defenses get blinded and dismantled in layers. They watched command posts go quiet. They watched armored formations get shredded, sometimes without ever seeing what hit them. And they watched a massive Coalition force move fast through open desert, at night, in bad weather, then show up on Iraq’s flank as if it had teleported.
From 10/26/1984 ( premiere USA film "The Terminator" ) To 2/24/1991 ( ) is 2312 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 3/2/1972 ( the launch from planet Earth of the United States Pioneer 10 uncrewed spacecraft ) is 2312 days
From 11/14/1964 ( premiere USA TV series episode "The Outer Limits"::"I, Robot" ) To 3/8/1990 ( as Kerry Burgess my official US Navy documents includes: "Armed Forces Identification Card" illustrated here with _DSC00619.jpg ) is 9245 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 2/24/1991 ( ) is 9245 days
From 9/25/1942 ( from The Daily Princetonian publication, Princeton University: Navy Accepts Offer by Dodds To Use Princeton for Training ) To 2/24/1991 ( ) is 17684 days
17684 = 8842 + 8842
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 1/17/1990 ( United States NASA announces the selection of the Group 13 Astronauts ) is 8842 days
From 3/27/1964 ( premiere USA TV series episode "The Twilight Zone"::"I am the Night - Color Me Black" ) To 7/19/1989 ( the United Airlines Flight 232 crash in Sioux City Iowa ) is 9245 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 2/24/1991 ( ) is 9245 days
From 5/19/1943 ( from The Princeton Bulletin publication, Princeton University: War Service Committee To Forward Student Mail ) To 2/24/1991 ( ) is 17448 days
17448 = 8724 + 8724
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 9/21/1989 ( the Hurricane Hugo makes landfall near Charleston, South Carolina, USA - my homeport at the time while active-duty enlisted US Navy - and destroys the pickup-truck vehicle belonging to me Kerry Burgess ) is 8724 days
From 7/21/1969 ( disguised, my biological brother Thomas Reagan the United States Navy Commander circa 1969 was United States Apollo 11 Eagle spacecraft United States Navy astronaut landing and walking on the planet Earth's moon - his 1st of his 6 Earth-Lunar lunar-landings with USA Project Apollo, strictly in planning and preparation for his personal activities in this solar-system's deep-space 1975-1977 ) To 2/28/1991 ( ) is 7892 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 6/12/1987 ( premiere USA film "Predator" ) is 7892 days
https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/app/conflictCasualties/gulf
USA military official
Persian Gulf War
The Persian Gulf War began on August 2, 1990, when approximately 100,000 Iraqi Army troops crossed the Kuwaiti border. The United Nations Security Council swiftly condemned Iraq, passing Resolution 660 demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. After consulting with Saudi King Fahd, on August 6, 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces to the Arabian Peninsula. Named DESERT SHIELD, the initial phases of operations focused on deterring an invasion of Saudi Arabia and preparing to liberate Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's failure to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 678 of November 1990, which set January 15, 1991, as the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, provided the impetus for the next phase of the campaign. The offensive war, Operation DESERT STORM, began on January 17, 1991, with air operations against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and selected targets inside Iraq. On February 28, 1991, a mere 100 hours after the coalition launched its ground offensive, U.S. Central Command liberated Kuwait and halted offensive operations. With the approval of the UN Security Council, a formal cease-fire took effect on April 11, thus ending the Persian Gulf War.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war
USA Department of State
The Gulf War, 1991
on August 2, 1990, a force of one hundred thousand Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and overran the country in a matter of hours. The invasion of Kuwait led to a United Nations Security Council embargo and sanctions on Iraq and a U.S.-led coalition air and ground war, which began on January 16, 1991, and ended with an Iraqi defeat and retreat from Kuwait on February 28, 1991.
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0734577/quotes/
IMDb
The Twilight Zone
I Am the Night - Color Me Black
Quotes
Radio Announcer: ...and still the phenomenon remains unexplained, except for the reports that now come in of similar occurrences here in the United States and elsewhere. At two o'clock this afternoon, a dark cloud suddenly appeared over a street in Dallas, Texas. The mayor of West Berlin verified the fact that a rectangular area over the Berlin Wall has suddenly gone dark. In Budapest, European newspapermen passed over censorship an article about several square blocks, including a political prison, which were suddenly thrown into darkness early this morning. In Birmingham, Alabama... an area in Shanghai... the entire northern section of Vietnam... a section of Chicago, Illinois... the darkness continues to make itself known.
IMDb
Predator (1987)
Quotes
Mac: [to Blain's corpse] Here we are again, bro... Just you and me. Same kind of moon, same kind of jungle. Real number 10, remember? Whole platoon, 32 men chopped into meat... We walk out, just you and me, nobody else. Right on top, huh? Not a scratch... Not a fuckin' scratch. You know, who ever got you, they'll come back again. And when he does, I'm gonna cut your name right into him... I'm gonna cut your name into him!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/soviet-union-thought-watched-operation-154426828.html
Yahoo! News
WE ARE THE MIGHTY
What the Soviet Union thought as it watched Operation Desert Storm
Blake Stilwell
Sat, February 14, 2026 at 7:44 AM PST 10 min read
When Operation Desert Storm ended in 1991, it blew the Soviet Union’s collective mind—and Moscow’s hangover has never ended.
The hardest pill the Soviet general staff would have to swallow was that Iraq was fighting with Soviet doctrine: Soviet gear, Soviet training, and a Soviet-style air defense concept. The Russians expected Baghdad to be a stress test for American air power and a preview of how a U.S. coalition (like NATO) might bleed in a big, messy land war.
Instead, the Coalition ran an air campaign that looked like large-scale surgery, then wrapped the ground war up in about 100 hours. To Soviet eyes, it wasn’t just that their client got beaten. It felt like their whole model of modern war got exposed as outdated for the entire world to see.
The U.S.-led coalition didn’t just beat Saddam Hussein’s army. It made a public demonstration of how wars would be fought after the Cold War. And the Soviet general staff, already dealing with a collapsing economy and a political system eating itself alive, had to sit there and take notes.
Those notes were not comforting.
The Meat Grinder Never Materialized
On paper, Iraq appeared to be a formidable opponent. It had a large army (the fourth-largest in the world), extensive armor, robust air defenses, and years of experience fighting Iran. Much of its gear and training had Soviet fingerprints all over it. Viewers from Moscow could reasonably believe this would turn into a long, bloody grind once the ground war started.
To the Soviets, the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait could’ve taken weeks. Maybe months
In Moscow’s prewar mental script, air power could hurt you, slow you down, and make life miserable, but it couldn’t decide the war by itself. The decisive fight would still be the ground campaign, and that ground campaign (the Russians believed) would punish an all-volunteer American force.
That belief was doctrine, rooted in how the Red Army was designed to fight NATO. The model was a system of armor and infantry massed and protected by air defenses, backed by artillery, with enough depth to absorb punishment and keep moving.
So when early reports suggested Iraqi formations were unraveling fast, it was easy to dismiss them as confusion, exaggeration, or wishful thinking. Fog of war happens. Propaganda happens. And in a fast-moving conflict, both sides always claim the other one is panicking.
Moscow’s theory didn’t survive first contact with reality. The ground war began on Feb. 24, 1991, and it was essentially over by the 28th. The famous 100 hours number wasn’t just a headline.
Soviet observers watched Iraqi air defenses get blinded and dismantled in layers. They watched command posts go quiet. They watched armored formations get shredded, sometimes without ever seeing what hit them. And they watched a massive Coalition force move fast through open desert, at night, in bad weather, then show up on Iraq’s flank as if it had teleported.
The “Left Hook” Landed
The Coalition’s main ground move should’ve looked familiar to Soviet planners on a map. It was a huge left hook through the desert, a deep envelopment that punished an opponent who expected the main blow to land elsewhere. In theory, that kind of maneuver was respectable. In practice, it happened with a tempo and coordination that Iraq didn’t match.
U.S. forces pushed wide, moved quickly, and kept units aligned across featureless terrain in bad visibility, often operating at night and in poor weather. Iraqi forces didn’t respond like a machine built to fight a mobile, combined-arms campaign. They reacted late, inconsistently, or not at all, and by the time they realized where the main threat actually was, the Coalition was already on their flank and behind key positions.
For Soviet observers, the bigger shock wasn’t that a left hook happened. It was that it worked so cleanly, so quickly, and alongside an air campaign that had already shredded the opponent’s ability to see, communicate, and coordinate.
In the air, Iraqi pilots and air defenders faced a problem that goes beyond courage or competence. When you’re dealing with electronic attack, radar suppression, stealthy aircraft, decoys, and constant pressure, the tactical experience can feel like everything is lying to you. Contacts appear and vanish. Radars behave strangely. Warning receivers chirp, then go quiet, then scream again.
Soviet doctrine was comfortable with a certain kind of war. It assumed time, mass, and a hierarchy that could grind its way through chaos. What Desert Storm showcased was a style of fighting that tried to prevent the opponent from ever getting organized enough to grind back.
For a staff raised on artillery math and tank counts, this suddenly became an was an existential crisis.
The Highway of Death
If the first day broke Moscow’s theory, the images from the days that followed broke its spirit. The Soviet Union learned that the Cold War wasn’t a stalemate.
As Iraqi troops and vehicles fled Kuwait City north on Highway 80, American air power hit the retreating column for hours with industrial precision. When satellite images filtered back to Moscow, Soviet analysts saw what looked less like a battle scene and more like a mass grave. A massive number of vehicles were jammed and incinerated, tanks with turrets blown off, trucks seemingly melted into the road.
Western media called it the “Highway of Death.” In Moscow, it was something else altogether, a demonstration of what happens when one side can find, track, and hit what it wants, while the other side can’t do anything about it.
Iraq’s loss wasn’t only about tanks burning. It was about the Coalition’s ability to make the battlefield transparent enough to turn a large movement of units into a vulnerability. Once you can consistently detect movement, share targeting information quickly, and strike with precision, the old comfort of massing a large force of armor starts to look less like deterrence and more like a liability.
Hunting Ghosts
Initially, Moscow’s copium was to blame the Iraqis. Iraq must have been incompetent. Iraqi troops were undisciplined. They misused Soviet doctrine. They didn’t fight the way they were supposed to fight. It’s not entirely wrong. Iraq had major problems in training, leadership, morale, logistics, and initiative. But it also misses what Desert Storm put on display, the thing the USSR didn’t want ot accept: This wasn’t just a mismatch of soldiers.
It was a mismatch of systems.
Soviet analysts started digging. They looked for a single decisive advantage: one ghost, one superweapon, one electronic trick that blinded radar, one wonder weapon that explained the whole thing. But if there was one thing that made the swift destruction of the Iraqi Army possible, it was one thing that was actually many things. Iraq was actually fighting a network.
Victory in the Gulf began with something that might have sounded like science fiction in 1991, but is used today to deliver food: the Global Positioning System. GPS wasn’t just navigation. It was the quiet enabler that let U.S. forces maneuver at speed, at night, in sandstorms, and hit with accuracy that made older platforms perform like something new.
The real gut punch was identifying America’s “all-seeing eye,” the E-8 JSTARS, a radar and battle management platform that could scan enormous swaths of ground and track moving vehicles, then push that data across the force. The Americans fused sensors, shooters, and communications into a single integrated system. JSTARS sees movement, passes targets digitally, AWACS sorts the air picture, and shooters arrive already knowing where to look.
That’s why the “Highway of Death” looked like a conveyor belt of destruction.
It’s also why this hit Moscow so hard. Soviet doctrine was hierarchical. Reports went up, orders came down, and time lag was baked in. The Americans, in this view, were operating a network in which platforms were tools and speed was the real weapon.
What the Russians Learned
A RAND assessment published in 1992 laid out how Russian military thinkers were digesting Desert Storm, and the lessons weren’t subtle. First and foremost, they saw Desert Storm as proof that modern war had changed dramatically from the model they’d expected. It didn’t change bits and pieces, the Gulf War changed the foundation of Soviet military thinking.
Although the air war came first, the USSR saw air power as the main event, not the opening act. The idea that air forces could create victory conditions with comparatively low friendly losses hit hard, especially for a military culture raised on mass and attrition. The Soviets also had to confront an ugly truth about tanks and armies under hostile skies. If the other side controls the air, armored forces become endangered. It’s a simple matter of exposure.
Soviet-style command-and-control also appeared too rigid for the American tempo. Centralized control might keep order, but it also slows adaptation. Desert Storm highlighted speed, flexibility, and coordination across services as more than buzzwords. Fixed defenses weren’t the comfort blanket they used to be. Hardened shelters, static nodes, and predictable infrastructure became targets. Stealth and precision made hiding harder.
And then there was coalition warfare.
Soviet analysts didn’t just notice the Coalition existed. They noticed how it functioned. They saw victory tied not only to weapon performance, but also to a command system that could coordinate air, land, maritime forces, national goals, and political will without collapsing into chaos.
The Fall of the “Evil Empire”
By late 1991, the Soviet Union was nearing its end for reasons far bigger than any battlefield lesson. Desert Storm just delivered a clear warning before the hammer and sickle flag came down: if you can’t keep up with the pace of information, your armored force isn’t a shield. It’s a list of targets waiting for a network to find.
Moreover, victory on the battlefield would henceforth be determined by who sees first, who shares fastest, who decides quickest, and who can keep operating when their networks get attacked.
That conclusion carried an uncomfortable second layer. Iraq wasn’t just a client state getting embarrassed. The Soviet Union, and later Russia, used similar hardware as the Iraqis did in Kuwait, and had some similar habits of command. So the nightmare wasn’t Iraqi conscripts losing tanks. It was Soviet conscripts losing them the same way in a war against NATO.
Desert Storm didn’t just end a war in the desert. It helped start the argument over what modern war even is, and Moscow has been arguing with that reality ever since.
{from: https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/soviet-union-thought-watched-operation-154426828.html}
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_immigration_raids_and_arrests_in_the_second_Trump_presidency
List of immigration raids and arrests in the second Trump presidency
From Wikipedia
Donald Trump's 2024 presidential campaign and subsequent presidential administration have emphasized the issue of immigration in the United States, with promises of mass deportation being a notable component of Trump's rhetoric. Trump and his administration have sought to increase federal coordination in immigration enforcement and remove obstacles to the deportation and removal of immigrants from the United States. Shifts in enforcement have resulted in more aggressive, "showy sweeps" and violent confrontations as compared to more targeted operations in past administrations.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Running_Man_(2025_film)
The Running Man (2025)
From Wikipedia
the second adaptation of the 1982 novel by Stephen King following the 1987 film. It stars Glen Powell as Ben Richards, a competitor on a lethal reality television show.
Production
In February 2021, Paramount Pictures announced a film based on the novel was in development. Wright was attached to direct, having developed a story with Michael Bacall, who wrote the screenplay. The adaptation would not be a remake of the original film but a "much more faithful" adaptation of the novel.
In April 2024, Glen Powell was cast in the lead role.
Principal photography began in the United Kingdom on 4 November 2024.
"Bat*21" (1988)
US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Iceal Hambleton: Birddog, Bat two one, over. Birddog, Bat two one, how do you read, over. Birddog, this is Bat two one, come in. I'm on the sixth hole, Birddog, do you copy? Birddog, this is Bat two one.
https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1412974/bio/
IMDb
Glen Powell
Biography
Born October 21, 1988 Austin, Texas, USA
Credits
The Running Man (2025) as Ben Richards
Devotion (2022) as Tom Hudner
Top Gun: Maverick (2022) as Lt. Jake 'Hangman' Seresin
Top Gun: Maverick (2022)
Quotes
Lt. Jake 'Hangman' Seresin: He's not cut out for this mission.
"Cosplay Maverick": That's enough.
Lt. Jake 'Hangman' Seresin: You know it. You know I'm right.
IMDb
The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951)
Quotes
Klaatu: I don't want to resort to threats, Mr. Harley. I merely tell you that the future of your planet is at stake.
From 7/8/1976 ( Richard Nixon, 37th president of USA federal government 1969-1974, is formally disbarred from practice of law ) To 10/21/1988 ( ) is 4488 days
4488 = 2244 + 2244
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 12/25/1971 ( George W. Bush the purveyor of illegal drugs strictly for his personal profit including the trafficking of massive amounts of cocaine into the United States confined lawfully to federal prison in Mexico for illegally smuggling narcotics in Mexico leading to his desertion and conspiracy to desert from his military obligations, of which he and fellow traitors had already falsified his record of flight, of which he was never qualified or capable of controlled flight in any USA jet-aircraft ) is 2244 days
From 9/28/1951 ( premiere USA film "The Day the Earth Stood Still" ) To 10/21/1988 ( ) is 13538 days
13538 = 6769 + 6769
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 5/15/1984 ( scheduled from 05/21/1983 - as me, Kerry Wayne Burgess, I began active service for an enlistment period of six years as a US Navy enlisted seafarer ) is 6769 days
From 9/28/1951 ( premiere USA film "The Day the Earth Stood Still" ) To 10/21/1988 ( ) is 13538 days
13538 = 6769 + 6769
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 5/15/1984 ( Ronald Reagan, 40th President of USA federal government 1981-1989: Proclamation 5194 - Missing Children Day, 1984 ) is 6769 days
From 9/17/1974 ( the US Navy F-14 Tomcat fighter jet aircraft enters active service in the US Navy fleet and my biological brother US Navy Commander Thomas Reagan is the first US Navy F-14 Tomcat Commander Air Group ) To 10/21/1988 ( ) is 5148 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 12/7/1979 ( premiere USA film "Star Trek: The Motion Picture" ) is 5148 days
From 8/1/1980 ( premiere USA film "The Final Countdown" ) To 10/21/1988 ( ) is 3003 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my known birth date in Antlers, Oklahoma, USA, as Kerry Wayne Burgess ) To 1/22/1974 ( Nike registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office the iconic logo on Nike shoes ) is 3003 days
IMDb
Bat*21
Release info
United States October 21, 1988
IMDb
The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951)
Quotes
Bobby Benson: [indicating grave marker during a visit to Arlington] That's my father. He was killed at Anzio.
Klaatu: Did all those people die in wars?
Bobby Benson: Most of 'em. Didn't you ever hear of the Arlington Cemetery?
Klaatu: No, I'm afraid not.
Bobby Benson: You don't seem to know much about anything, do you, Mr. Carpenter?
Klaatu: Well, I'll tell you, Bobby, I've been away a long time. Very far away.
- by me, Kerry Wayne Burgess, posted by me: 3:59 PM Pacific-timezone USA Saturday 02/14/2026
