http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_B._McVay_III
Charles B. McVay III
Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III (July 30, 1898 – November 6, 1968) was a career naval officer and the Commanding Officer of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) when it was lost in action in 1945 and rescue efforts were delayed, resulting in massive loss of life. In the wake of the incident he was blamed for it. After years of mental health problems he committed suicide.
In 1978, the events surrounding McVay's court-martial were dramatized in The Failure to ZigZag by playwright John B. Ferzacca. Actor Stacy Keach portrayed McVay in the 1991 made-for-television movie Mission of the Shark: The Saga of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, which depicted the ordeal of the men of the Indianapolis during her last voyage.
Education and career
Charles Butler McVay III was born in Ephrata, Pennsylvania on July 30, 1898 to a Navy family. His father, Charles Butler McVay Jr., had commanded the tender Yankton during the cruise of the Great White Fleet (1907–1909), was an admiral in the United States Navy during World War I, and served as Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet the early 1930s. Charles III was a 1920 graduate of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. Before taking command of the Indianapolis in November 1944, Captain McVay was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., the Allies' highest intelligence unit. Earlier in World War II, he was awarded the Silver Star for displaying courage under fire.
Captain McVay led the ship through the invasion of Iwo Jima, then the bombardment of Okinawa in the spring of 1945, during which Indianapolis anti-aircraft guns shot down seven enemy planes before the ship was struck by a kamikaze on March 31, inflicting heavy casualties, including 13 dead, and penetrating the ship's hull. McVay returned the ship safely to Mare Island in California for repairs.
Sinking of the Indianapolis
Later that year, Indianapolis received orders to carry parts and nuclear material to be used in the atomic bombs which were soon to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Tinian. After delivering her top secret cargo, the ship was en route to report for further duty off Okinawa.
Early in the morning of July 30, 1945, she was attacked by the Japanese submarine I-58 under Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto. Commander Hashimoto launched six torpedoes and hit the Indianapolis twice, the first removing over forty feet of her bow, the second hitting the starboard side at frame forty (below the bridge). The Indianapolis immediately took a fifteen degree list, capsized and sank within 12 minutes. Of the crew of 1,196 men, 879 men died. It was the worst disaster at sea during the entire war for the US Navy.
Delayed rescue
About 300 of the 1,196 men on board died in the initial attack. The rest of the crew, more than 880 men, were left floating in the water trying to survive without lifeboats until the rescue was completed four days (100 hours) later. Because of Navy protocol regarding secret missions, the ship was not reported "overdue" and the rescue only came after survivors were spotted by pilot Lieutenant Wilber (Chuck) Gwinn and co-pilot Lieutenant Warren Colwell on a routine patrol flight. It has been part of folklore that most of the casualties of the survivors in the water were due to shark attacks; however, most died from injuries sustained aboard the ship, dehydration, exhaustion, and the result of drinking salt water. Only 316 men survived. The tale was introduced to a new generation by way of Quint's monologue in the 1975 movie Jaws.
The seas had been moderate, but visibility was not good. Indianapolis had been steaming at 15.7 knots (29 km/h). When the ship did not reach Leyte on the 31st, as scheduled, no report was made that she was overdue. This omission was officially recorded later as "due to a misunderstanding of the Movement Report System". It was not until 10:25 on August 2 that the survivors were sighted, mostly held afloat by life jackets, although there were a few rafts which had been cut loose before the ship went down. They were sighted by a plane on routine patrol; the pilot immediately dropped a life raft and a radio transmitter. All air and surface units capable of rescue operations were dispatched to the scene at once.
Future U.S. Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor Jr. was commander of the destroyer escort Cecil J. Doyle. After receiving the location from the seaplane, without orders, Captain Claytor took the initiative to speed to the area to check the reports of men floating in the water. As he approached at night, he turned searchlights on the water and straight up on low clouds, lighting up the night and exposing his ship to possible attack by Japanese submarines, but rescuing almost 100 survivors of the sunken cruiser. Destroyers Madison and Ralph Talbot were ordered from Ulithi, and the destroyer escort Dufilho with attack transports Bassett and USS Ringness from the Philippine Frontier to the rescue scene, searching thoroughly for any survivors.
Upon completion of rescue operations, August 8, a radius of 100 miles (160 km) had been combed by day and by night. However, the effort was able to save only 316 of the crew of 1,196 men.
Controversy
Captain McVay, commander of Indianapolis, was wounded but survived and was among those rescued. He repeatedly asked the Navy why it took five days to rescue his men, and he never received an answer. The Navy long claimed that SOS messages were never received because the ship was operating under a policy of radio silence; declassified records show that three SOS messages were received separately, but none were acted upon because it was thought to be a Japanese ruse.
There was much controversy over the incident. In November 1945, McVay was court-martialed and convicted of "hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag." Several circumstances of the court-martial were controversial: One very obvious circumstance was that McVay's orders were to zigzag at night under his discretion. McVay himself is on record as describing visibility as intermittently poor, which would make McVay's decision to stop zigzag maneuvers more reasonable. Hashimoto, the Japanese submarine commander that sunk the Indianapolis, was on record as describing visibility at the time as fair (which is corroborated by the fact that he was able to target and sink the Indianapolis in the first place.) American submarine experts testified that "zigzagging" was a technique of negligible value in eluding enemy submarines. Hashimoto also testified to this effect. Despite that testimony, the official ruling was that visibility was good, and the court held McVay responsible for not continuing to zigzag.
An additional point of controversy is evidence that the admirals in the United States Navy were primarily responsible for placing the ship in harm's way. For instance, Captain McVay requested a destroyer escort for the Indianapolis, but his request was denied because the priority for destroyers at the time was escorting transports to Okinawa, and picking up downed pilots in B-29 raids on Japan. Also, naval command assumed McVay's route would be safe at that point in the war. Many ships, including most destroyers, were equipped with submarine detection equipment, but the "Indianapolis" was not so equipped, which casts the decision to deny McVay's request for an escort a tragic mistake.
On 24 July 1945, just 6 days prior to the sinking of the Indianapolis, the destroyer Underhill had been attacked and sunk in the area by Japanese submarines. Yet McVay was never informed of this event, and several others, in part due to issues of classified intelligence. McVay was warned of the potential presence of Japanese subs, but not of the actual confirmed activity.
After the torpedo attack, no rescue was initiated, because of the Navy's failure to track the Indianapolis; as she was the flagship of the 5th fleet, this failure amounted to gross mismanagement of the resource by the Navy. The rescue operation started only when a bomber pilot on routine patrol spotted the crew.
McVay's conviction for "failure to zigzag" came despite the direct testimony by the commander of I-58, Mochitsura Hashimoto, stating that zigzagging would have made no difference.
Finally, although 700 ships of the U.S. Navy were lost in combat in World War II, McVay was the only captain to be court-martialed[citation needed]
It was widely felt that he had been a fall guy for the Navy. Despite the fact McVay was promoted to rear admiral when he retired in 1949, the conviction effectively ended McVay's career in the Navy.
On 6 November 1968, McVay committed suicide by shooting himself with his service revolver at his home in Litchfield, Connecticut, holding in his hand a toy sailor given to him by his father. He was found just outside of his back porch by his gardener. Though a note was not left, McVay was known by those close to him to have suffered from loneliness, particularly after losing his wife to cancer. McVay also struggled throughout his life from vicious letters and phone calls he periodically received from grief-stricken relatives of dead crewmen aboard the Indianapolis.
Exoneration
USS Indianapolis survivors organized, and many spent years attempting to clear their skipper's name. Many people, from son Charles McVay IV, to author Dan Kurzman, who chronicled the Indianapolis incident in Fatal Voyage, to members of Congress, long believed Capt. McVay was unfairly convicted. Paul Murphy, president of the USS Indianapolis Survivors Organization, said: "Capt. McVay's court-martial was simply to divert attention from the terrible loss of life caused by procedural mistakes which never alerted anyone that we were missing."
