"Space: Above And Beyond"
"Pilot"
24 September 1995
Episode 1 Season 1 DVD video:
01:08:25
United States Marine Corps squadron aviation officer: Ten-hut!
United States Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Fouts: Be seated. The information you're about to receive is classified level red. I don't need to remind you of the consequences of divulging class red information. Fifty-Eighth, because of you we've caught a break - a major break. Within the wreckage of the alien recon vehicle you recovered during your HIST was an encoded transmission detailing the enemy's projected battle objectives. Subsequently, all enemy movements have been anticipated. Fearing that the captured information may be deceptive we have not shown our hand... until now. The Earth is here. The enemy intends to attack with extreme intent two-thirds of its forces, at the Groombridge 34 Star System Naval base in 71 hours. This is known as point "G." The Earth forces, the greatest mobilization of military might since the 20th century, will surprise attack from behind enemy positions at two points, point "F," here, and point "H," here. The Marines will participate with the 8th Air Wing. This will be possible due to fortuitous projected wormhole opening in the Galileo regions. From the captured information, we have ascertained their planes are faster, with a greater rate of climb; ours are more maneuverable and better armed. It evens out. Surprise has been their best weapon. Now its ours.
United States Marine Corps second lieutenant Cooper Hawkes: It's too easy. Sir, if the plans weren't planted then they at least would assume we have them.
Fouts: No doubt their intelligence informed them we would be unable to decipher the transmission. And, in fact, it has taken fifty Quantum Charno computers interlinked on four continents to decode the enemy's complex language. And, as mentioned, their movements have since been in accord with the captured plans.
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/22/world/us-warships-set-to-begin-escorts-of-gulf-tankers.html
The New York Times
ARCHIVES 1987
U.S. WARSHIPS SET TO BEGIN ESCORTS OF GULF TANKERS
By JOHN H. CUSHMAN JR. and SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES
, Page 00001
The New York Times Archives
A convoy of three Navy warships and two Kuwaiti tankers stood ready today to enter the Strait of Hormuz and traverse the Persian Gulf, inaugurating an expanded and more active American military presence.
The Pentagon refused to say exactly when the ships would sail, but dispatches by a group of reporters accompanying the convoy indicated that it would get under way Wednesday.
The operation is being characterized by the Reagan Administration as an effort to prevent the Soviet Union, which has leased three tankers to Kuwait, from seizing the diplomatic and military initiative in the gulf. Moscow Is Critical of Move
As the convoy prepared to sail, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement sharply criticizing Washington's expansion of its naval force in the gulf and its plan to escort Kuwaiti tankers flying the American flag.
Tankers traversing the Persian Gulf have increasingly been targets in the Iran-Iraq war, which broke out nearly seven years ago.
On Monday, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the conflict.
Iran and Iraq, as expected, gave sharply diverging reactions today to the Security Council resolution, with Iraq portraying it as positive and Iran calling it unjust. [ Page A10. ] Gorbachev Proposes Talks The Soviet press agency Tass said today that Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, had written to President Reagan to propose Soviet-American talks on the gulf situation, but the White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, appeared to rule out such talks.
The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Boris D. Pyadyshev, said the message expressed the Soviet leader's willingness to conduct talks ''in any format.''
Asked if the United States would be willing to talk directly to the Soviet Union about peace measures in the gulf, Mr. Fitzwater said: ''Well, I think it's fair to say we believe the U.N. forum is the correct one, and we don't contemplate any other forums at this time.''
Mr. Fitzwater, however, characterized the letter as ''generally positive.''
The Soviet Union joined with the United States in the unanimous passage of the Security Council resolution. But Mr. Pyadyshev did not say whether Moscow would support sanctions to enforce the measure. The United States has said it intends to introduce a measure within two months calling for an arms embargo against either side if either refuses to comply with the cease-fire.
Both the White House and the Soviet Embassy declined to release a text of the Soviet leader's letter.
Mr. Pyadyshev's statement, made public by Tass, said of the American naval deployments in the gulf: ''This concentration of naval forces is devoid of all sense and could be a detonator for a major conflict.'' Opposition in Congressn
The provision of military escorts to Kuwaiti tankers has provoked considerable Congressional opposition, but efforts by some lawmakers to postpone the operation failed.
Today, as the operation was about to begin, the Senate adopted a symbolic amendment to a trade bill, calling upon the Administration to search for alternative means of keeping oil flowing through the Persian Gulf.
The amendment, which would not bind the Reagan Administration, suggests that it would be better for Kuwait to charter American ships than to fly the American flag on vessels owned by Kuwait.
The tankers have been re-registered to fly the American flag to qualify for United States military protection.
Military commanders in the gulf could decide to sail during darkness to avoid detection, or to wait until daylight to insure visibility as the ships moved through the strait into the gulf. Two-Day Voyage to Kuwait
According to two reports by the pool reporters, the two tankers were flying the American flag on Tuesday.
The Navy plans to use the destroyer Kidd, the cruiser Fox, and the frigate Crommelin as escorts accompanying the ships on the two-day voyage to Kuwait, the pool reporters said.
The Pentagon, under rules worked out with news organizations to provide pool coverage of military operations, was withholding from publication other reports filed by the pool reporters until the ships moved through the gulf.
Today, the Fox and the Kidd stood warily by the 43,604 ton Gas Prince, a tanker built to carry liquefied petroleum gas, and the 210,068 ton Bridgeton, a crude-oil carrier, during ceremonies to raise the American flags on the ships.
Navy helicopters warned ships and aircraft to stay clear of the tankers, which until this week were known by Arabic names.
Under a complex commercial transaction, ownership of the tankers has been shifted to an American corporation, Chesapeake Shipping Inc. But that company is indirectly owned by the Kuwait Oil Tanker Co., and it holds contracts calling for the ships to carry Kuwaiti oil products.
The Gas Prince will continue, as in the past, to travel between Kuwait and Japan, while the Bridgeton is expected to carry crude oil to transfer points outside the gulf, where the oil will be discharged into other vessels for distrubution around the world. France to Escort Its Tankers
PARIS, July 21 (Reuters) - France announced today that it would provide naval escort for two of its tankers sailing in the Persian Gulf this week.
France, which cut off diplomatic relations with Iran Friday, warned its ships Monday to avoid the gulf because of increased tension.
A version of this article appears in print on July 22, 1987, on Page A00001 of the National edition with the headline: U.S. WARSHIPS SET TO BEGIN ESCORTS OF GULF TANKERS.
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/11/nation/na-main11
Los Angeles Times
Bush Commits 21,500 More Troops
'MISTAKES': He says past policies have not worked and changes are needed.
STRATEGY: The new troops will try to secure sections of Baghdad.
WARNING: He makes clear that the U.S. commitment 'is not open-ended.' / REACTION: Democrats are nearly unanimous in condemning the plan.
January 11, 2007 Maura Reynolds, Peter Spiegel and Faye Fiore Times Staff Writers
WASHINGTON — A subdued President Bush, presenting his long-awaited new blueprint for Iraq, acknowledged for the first time Wednesday that his previous strategy had failed and said that averting defeat required more than 20,000 additional American troops and a different relationship with the government in Baghdad.
In a striking concession, Bush said that the last year in Iraq had turned out to be the opposite of what he had expected -- an explosion of sectarian violence instead of growing national unity among the Iraqi people and a winding-down of American military involvement.
He said the reversal occurred in part because there had not been enough troops to provide security in Iraqi neighborhoods -- a strong criticism of his policy since the earliest days of the invasion.
"Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me," Bush said.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35502
The American Presidency Project
Ronald Reagan
XL President of the United States: 1981 - 1989
Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Members of the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio
January 11, 1988
Thank you very much. And thank you, Vice President Akers, officers and members of the City Club, Mayor Voinovich. I thank you all very much. And a special hello to Clevelanders Herb and Jody Weinberg, who are the parents of my Assistant Press Secretary, Mark Weinberg. It's great to be in Cleveland today, home of the Browns. And congratulations on your big victory. When I was at Camp David on Saturday, I heard a lot of barking— [laughter] —and it wasn't coming from Nancy's dog. [Laughter]
From 8/24/1962 ( John Kennedy - Executive Order 11046 - Authorizing Award of the Bronze Star Medal ) To 1/10/2007 is 16210 days
16210 = 8105 + 8105
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 1/11/1988 ( as Kerry Burgess my official United States Navy documents includes: Sea Service Deployment Ribbon USS Wainwright (CG-28) 88 Jan 11 - 88 Jul 11 ) is 8105 days
From 8/18/1973 ( The Killian Document ) To 1/10/2007 is 12198 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 3/27/1999 ( premiere US film "The Yellow Badge of Courage" ) is 12198 days
From 5/4/2005 ( the incident at the police department City of Kent Washington State after my voluntary approach to report material criminal activity directed against my person and I am secretly drugged against my consent ) To 1/10/2007 is 616 days
616 = 308 + 308
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 9/6/1966 ( Lyndon Johnson - Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising and Codifying the Government's Personnel Legislation ) is 308 days
From 4/21/1954 ( James Morrison ) To 6/29/1995 ( the Mir space station docking of the United States space shuttle Atlantis orbiter vehicle mission STS-71 includes me Kerry Wayne Burgess the United States Marine Corps officer and United States STS-71 pilot astronaut and my 3rd official United States National Aeronautics Space Administration orbital flight of 4 overall ) is 15044 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 1/10/2007 is 15044 days
From 9/24/1995 ( premiere US TV series "Space: Above and Beyond" ) To 1/10/2007 is 4126 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 2/18/1977 ( the United States space shuttle Enterprise OV 101 captive-inert flight #1 ) is 4126 days
From 11/18/1996 ( premiere US film "Star Trek: First Contact" ) To 1/10/2007 is 3705 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 12/25/1975 ( premiere US film "The Hindenburg" ) is 3705 days
From 1/6/1950 ( Louis Freeh ) To 3/16/1991 ( my first successful major test of my ultraspace matter transportation device as Kerry Wayne Burgess the successful Ph.D. graduate ) is 15044 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 1/10/2007 is 15044 days
From 6/27/1994 ( the US NASA Stargazer Pegasus rocket failure ) To 1/10/2007 is 4580 days
4580 = 2290 + 2290
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 2/9/1972 ( premiere US film "Boys in the Sand" ) is 2290 days
From 5/30/1957 ( premiere US film "The D.I." ) To 1/10/2007 is 18122 days
18122 = 9061 + 9061
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 8/24/1990 ( premiere US film "Men at Work" ) is 9061 days
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24432
The American Presidency Project
George W. Bush
XLIII President of the United States: 2001 - 2009
Address to the Nation on Military Operations in Iraq
January 10, 2007
Good evening. Tonight in Iraq, the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that will determine the direction of the global war on terror and our safety here at home. The new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course in Iraq and help us succeed in the fight against terror.
When I addressed you just over a year ago, nearly 12 million Iraqis had cast their ballots for a unified and democratic nation. The elections of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections would bring the Iraqis together and that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops.
But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al Qaida terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq's elections posed for their cause, and they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shi'a Islam, the Golden Mosque of Samarra, in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq's Shi'a population to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shi'a elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people, and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.
It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted Members of Congress from both parties, our allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefited from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.
The consequences of failure are clear. Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.
The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis. Only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people, and their Government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.
Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents, and there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.
Now, let me explain the main elements of this effort. The Iraqi Government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi Government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations, conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints and going door to door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.
This is a strong commitment, but for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them, five brigades, will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.
Many listening tonight will ask why this effort will succeed when previous operations to secure Baghdad did not. Well, here are the differences. In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time we'll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighborhoods, and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated.
I have made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi Government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people, and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this. Here is what he told his people just last week: "The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation."
This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the Government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a want to live together in peace, and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible.
A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks it has announced.
To establish its authority, the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's Provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi Government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to reenter their nation's political life, the Government will reform de-Ba'athification laws and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's Constitution.
America will change our approach to help the Iraqi Government as it works to meet these benchmarks. In keeping with the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, we will increase the embedding of American advisers in Iraqi Army units and partner a coalition brigade with every Iraqi Army division. We will help the Iraqis build a larger and better equipped army, and we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq. We will give our commanders and civilians greater flexibility to spend funds for economic assistance. We will double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. And Secretary Rice will soon appoint a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better results for economic assistance being spent in Iraq.
As we make these changes, we will continue to pursue Al Qaida and foreign fighters. Al Qaida is still active in Iraq. Its home base is Anbar Province. Al Qaida has helped make Anbar the most violent area of Iraq outside the capital. A captured Al Qaida document describes the terrorists' plan to infiltrate and seize control of the Province. This would bring Al Qaida closer to its goals of taking down Iraq's democracy, building a radical Islamic empire, and launching new attacks on the United States, at home and abroad.
Our military forces in Anbar are killing and capturing Al Qaida leaders, and they are protecting the local population. Recently, local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on Al Qaida. And as a result, our commanders believe we have an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists. So I have given orders to increase American forces in Anbar Province by 4,000 troops. These troops will work with Iraqi and tribal forces to keep up the pressure on the terrorists. America's men and women in uniform took away Al Qaida's safe haven in Afghanistan, and we will not allow them to reestablish it in Iraq.
Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We'll interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria, and we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.
We're also taking other steps to bolster the security of Iraq and protect American interests in the Middle East. I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region. We will expand intelligence sharing and deploy Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies. We will work with the Governments of Turkey and Iraq to help them resolve problems along their border. And we will work with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.
We will use America's full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States need to understand that an American defeat in Iraq would create a new sanctuary for extremists and a strategic threat to their survival. These nations have a stake in a successful Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors, and they must step up their support for Iraq's unity Government. We endorse the Iraqi Government's call to finalize an international compact that will bring new economic assistance in exchange for greater economic reform. And on Friday, Secretary Rice will leave for the region to build support for Iraq and continue the urgent diplomacy required to help bring peace to the Middle East.
The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation; on the other side are extremists who kill the innocent and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy by advancing liberty across a troubled region. It is in the interests of the United States to stand with the brave men and women who are risking their lives to claim their freedom and to help them as they work to raise up just and hopeful societies across the Middle East.
From Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are sick of the violence and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield the future of that country to the extremists, or will we stand with the Iraqis who have made the choice for freedom?
The changes I have outlined tonight are aimed at ensuring the survival of a young democracy that is fighting for its life in a part of the world of enormous importance to American security. Let me be clear: The terrorists and insurgents in Iraq are without conscience, and they will make the year ahead bloody and violent. Even if our new strategy works exactly as planned, deadly acts of violence will continue, and we must expect more Iraqi and American casualties. The question is whether our new strategy will bring us closer to success. I believe that it will.
Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and grandfathers achieved. There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship. But victory in Iraq will bring something new in the Arab world: a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people. A democratic Iraq will not be perfect, but it will be a country that fights terrorists instead of harboring them, and it will help bring a future of peace and security for our children and our grandchildren.
This new approach comes after consultations with Congress about the different courses we could take in Iraq. Many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States, and therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq's borders and hunting down Al Qaida. Their solution is to scale back America's efforts in Baghdad or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. We carefully considered these proposals, and we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi Government, tear the country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale. Such a scenario would result in our troops being forced to stay in Iraq even longer and confront an enemy that is even more lethal. If we increase our support at this crucial moment and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.
In the days ahead, my national security team will fully brief Congress on our new strategy. If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable people have different views, and they will voice their criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to scrutiny. And all involved have a responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed.
Acting on the good advice of Senator Joe Lieberman and other key Members of Congress, we will form a new, bipartisan working group that will help us come together across party lines to win the war on terror. This group will meet regularly with me and my administration; it will help strengthen our relationship with Congress. We can begin by working together to increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps, so that America has the Armed Forces we need for the 21st century. We also need to examine ways to mobilize talented American civilians to deploy overseas, where they can help build democratic institutions in communities and nations recovering from war and tyranny.
In these dangerous times, the United States is blessed to have extraordinary and selfless men and women willing to step forward and defend us. These young Americans understand that our cause in Iraq is noble and necessary and that the advance of freedom is the calling of our time. They serve far from their families, who make the quiet sacrifices of lonely holidays and empty chairs at the dinner table. They have watched their comrades give their lives to ensure our liberty. We mourn the loss of every fallen American, and we owe it to them to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.
Fellow citizens, the year ahead will demand more patience, sacrifice, and resolve. It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom. Yet times of testing reveal the character of a nation, and throughout our history, Americans have always defied the pessimists and seen our faith in freedom redeemed. Now America is engaged in a new struggle that will set the course for a new century. We can and we will prevail.
We go forward with trust that the Author of Liberty will guide us through these trying hours. Thank you and good night.
NOTE: The President spoke at 9:01 p.m. in the Library at the White House.
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181990/releaseinfo
IMDb
Boys in the Sand (1971)
Release Info
USA 29 December 1971 (New York City, New York) (premiere)
USA 9 February 1972 (Los Angeles, California)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Freeh
Louis Freeh
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Louis Joseph Freeh (born January 6, 1950) is an American attorney and former judge who served as the fifth Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from September 1993 to June 2001.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boys_in_the_Sand
Boys in the Sand
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Boys in the Sand is a landmark American gay pornographic film. The 1971 film was directed by Wakefield Poole and stars Casey Donovan. Boys in the Sand was the first gay porn film to achieve crossover success and one of the earliest porn films of any genre to gain mainstream credibility
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20061108&slug=webrumsfeld08
The Seattle Times
Wednesday, November 8, 2006
Rumsfeld quitting; will be replaced by former CIA head
By The Associated Press
WASHINGTON – President Bush said today that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was resigning and named former CIA Director Robert Gates to replace him at the Pentagon.
Bush seemed stoic about the election, proclaiming: "This isn't my first rodeo."
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0100135/quotes
IMDb
Men at Work (1990)
Quotes
Mike: Hey, it's not what it looks like. We're respectable peace officers.
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0100135/releaseinfo
IMDb
Men at Work (1990)
Release Info
USA 24 August 1990
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0100135/fullcredits
IMDb
Men at Work (1990)
Full Cast & Crew
Charlie Sheen ... Carl Taylor
Emilio Estevez ... James St. James
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050283/releaseinfo
IMDb
The D.I. (1957)
Release Info
USA 30 May 1957 (Chicago, Illinois)
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050283/fullcredits
IMDb
The D.I. (1957)
Full Cast & Crew
Jack Webb ... Gunnery Sgt. Jim Moore
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050283/quotes
IMDb
The D.I. (1957)
Quotes
TSgt Moore: Out on that drill field yesterday, you people were miserable. You people ain't even a mob. A mob's got a leader. You people are a herd. I'm gonna get me a sheep dog!
2016September15_Chloe55_DSC00735.jpg
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Star_Medal
Bronze Star Medal
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Bronze Star Medal, unofficially the Bronze Star, is a United States decoration awarded to members of the United States Armed Forces for either heroic achievement, heroic service, meritorious achievement, or meritorious service in a combat zone.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58985
The American Presidency Project
John F. Kennedy
XXXV President of the United States: 1961 - 1963
Executive Order 11046 - Authorizing Award of the Bronze Star Medal
August 24, 1962
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. The Bronze Star Medal, with accompanying ribbons and appurtenances, which was first established by Executive Order No. 9419 of February 4, 1944, may be awarded by the Secretary of a military department or the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to the Coast Guard when not operating as a service in the Navy, or by such military commanders, or other appropriate officers as the Secretary concerned may designated to any person who, while serving in any capacity in or with the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard of the United States, after December 6, 1941, distinguishes, or has distinguished, himself by heroic or meritorious achievement or service, not involving participation in aerial flight-
(a) while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States;
(b) while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or
(c) while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.
2. The Bronze Star Medal and appurtenances thereto shall be of appropriate design approved by the Secretary of Defense, and shall be awarded under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe. Such regulations shall, so far as practicable, be uniform, and those of the military departments shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
3. No more than one Bronze Star Medal shall be awarded to any one person, but for each succeeding heroic or meritorious achievement or service justifying such an award a suitable device may be awarded to be worn with the medal as prescribed by appropriate regulations.
4. The Bronze Star Medal or device may be awarded posthumously and, when so awarded, may be presented to such representative of the deceased as may be deemed appropriate by the Secretary of the department concerned.
5. This order shall supersede Executive Order No. 9419 of February 4, 1944, entitled "Bronze Star Medal". However, existing regulations prescribed under that order shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this order, remain in effect until modified or revoked by regulations prescribed under this order by the Secretary of the department concerned.
JOHN F. KENNEDY
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 24, 1962
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Earnest_Will
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Operation_Earnest_Will
https://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/military_service/Earnest%20Will.jpg
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0106400/quotes
IMDb
The Beverly Hillbillies (1993)
Quotes
[the Clampetts were flipped off by an irate motorist]
Jed Clampett: Now why you suppose he's doing that?
"Space: Above And Beyond"
"Pilot"
24 September 1995
Episode 1 Season 1 DVD video:
US Marine Corps Sergeant Major Frank Bougus: Why are you here?
Vanessa Damphousse: Sir, to find a direction, sir.
US Marine Corps Sergeant Major Frank Bougus: A direction? Are you lost?
Vanessa Damphousse: Sir, I suffer from a sense of disconnection -
US Marine Corps Sergeant Major Frank Bougus: Answer the question.
Vanessa Damphousse: Sir, yes, I am, sir.
US Marine Corps Sergeant Major Frank Bougus: Well, do I look like a road map to you?
Vanessa Damphousse: Sir, no, sir.
US Marine Corps Sergeant Major Frank Bougus: I am a road map.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27835
The American Presidency Project
Lyndon B. Johnson
XXXVI President of the United States: 1963-1969
438 - Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising and Codifying the Government's Personnel Legislation.
September 6, 1966
ELEVEN YEARS ago, the Hoover Commission recommended that we bring all the laws governing Federal employees into a single, logical, easily understandable code.
That was a large order. There were some, in fact, who said it would be easier to map the moon.
I am happy to report that, for once, the lawyers are ahead of the scientists. They have already done for our complicated personnel laws what the scientists are trying to do for the moon: they have given us the big picture.
The overlap, the duplication, the inconsistencies, the double exposures have been eliminated.
We have the total picture. That picture extends from the Revised Statutes of 1874, through the Civil Service Act of 1883 and to all the civil service laws passed over the last 80 years. For the first time, we can have a clear and well-defined picture of all our laws affecting training, pay, vacations and sick leave, employee insurance, and all the other matters so important to Government employees and their families.
It has taken more than a decade to assemble that picture, and it has taken the work of many dedicated and talented people. Chairman Macy tells me that in his nearly 25 years in the Federal Government, he has seen no better example of wholehearted cooperation among all the many agencies which worked on this project. That includes the Civil Service Commission itself, every one of our departments and agencies, and the capable staffs and members of both the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary.
This bill is a milestone in Federal personnel administration. It is a single package of clear-cut law that is vital to efficient Government operations. It is also a document of personal concern to our Government employees and their families.
So I am particularly pleased that the drafters of this document kept in mind the worker and his livelihood. They wrote in words that will be readily understandable to the more than two million men and women who make up our Federal Government.
This codification I am about to sign is only part of a larger task. There are many other similar jobs to be done. But the one we are signing here today sets a standard of excellence for all of us to imitate. It shows what can be done, and I hope that everyone confronted with a similar task will use it as his model.
Note: The bill revising, codifying, and enacting into positive law existing legislation relating to Government organization and to its civilian officers and employees is Public Law 89-554 (80 Stat. 378).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War_troop_surge_of_2007
Iraq War troop surge of 2007
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Security situation
For the first few months of the surge, violence increased. However, by the fall of 2007, the security situation had improved significantly. U.S. military deaths fell from a peak of 126 in May 2007 to 23 in December, and during the period after the surge (June 2008 to June 2011), the monthly average was less than 11. In May 2007, over 1,700 Iraqi civilians were killed, compared to approximately 500 in December. The average from June 2008 to June 2011 was approximately 200.
On September 10, 2007, David Petraeus delivered his part of the Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq. He concluded that "the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met." He cited recent consistent declines in security incidents, which he attributed to recent blows dealt against Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the surge. He added that "we have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq." He argued that Coalition and Iraqi operations had drastically reduced ethno-sectarian violence in the country, though he stated that the gains were not entirely even. He recommended a gradual drawdown of US forces in Iraq with a goal of reaching pre-surge troop levels by July 2008 and stated that further withdraws would be "premature".
While Petraeus credited the surge for the decrease in violence, the decrease also closely corresponded with a cease-fire order given by Iraqi political leader Muqtada al-Sadr on August 29, 2007.
From: Kerry Burgess
To: Kerry Burgess
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2007 6:59:51 PM
Subject: FBI Seattle
https://www.cia.gov/cgi-bin/comment_form.cgi
Thank you
Your question or comment has been successfully submitted.
Thank you for taking the time to contact the Central Intelligence Agency.
This page is generated automatically when our server successfully processes your submission. It is your assurance that your message has reached us; you do not need to phone or fax us for further confirmation.
A reminder: we cannot answer inquiries about the status of job applications and, because of the volume of queries we receive and the small size of our staff, we may not be able to respond to you as quickly as both we and you would like. We will not respond to you at all if an answer is not appropriate or required and, generally, if the answer to your query is available on our Web site.
Posted: 2007-05-14 02:35
Last Updated: 2007-05-14 02:47
Last Reviewed: 2007-05-14 02:35
As part of my official United States federal undercover assignment, I have discovered serious criminal activity in the Seattle, Washington, area. I believe the Seattle FBI and other Justice departments employees are actively supporting an insurrection against the United States of America.
http://www.nasa.gov/audience/formedia/features/astronautreport.html
NASA
Astronaut Health Reviews
Findings of NASA Safety Review Following Astronaut Health Reviews -- Aug. 29, 2007
A NASA safety review has found no evidence to support claims that astronauts were impaired by alcohol when they flew in space. NASA chief of Safety and Mission Assurance Bryan O'Connor conducted the month-long review to evaluate allegations included in the Astronaut Health Care System Review Committee's report
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/30/science/sci-astronauts30
Los Angeles Times
NASA: Astronauts didn't fly drunk
The Nation
An investigation finds no instance in which a crew member was impaired at launch.
August 30, 2007 John Johnson Jr. Times Staff Writer
NASA said Wednesday that it had found no evidence that any of its astronauts ever flew while inebriated, or even showed up for work impaired, as was recently alleged by an outside investigative panel.
In particular, Administrator Michael D. Griffin said a sensational account of an unnamed astronaut flying drunk on a Russian Soyuz flight was false.
"I'm saying I think our guys are doing a heck of a job, and these allegations are untrue," Griffin said at a briefing in Washington.
Griffin's remarks came with the release of a 45-page internal review of the much-publicized allegations, made last month by a panel that criticized the culture of NASA's astronaut corps in the wake of the Lisa Marie Nowak case.
Nowak, a space shuttle astronaut, was arrested this year in Orlando, Fla., and accused of stalking and attacking a rival for the affections of a male astronaut. This week she announced plans to mount an insanity defense.
As a result of Nowak's arrest, Griffin asked an outside panel to look into astronaut health and safety issues to see whether NASA should be doing more to make sure its astronauts were not going into space suffering from debilitating mental or physical problems.
The panel, citing anonymous reports, identified "some episodes of heavy use of alcohol by astronauts in the immediate preflight period."
From: Kerry Burgess
To: hotline@dodig.mil
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2007 7:51:34 PM
Subject: FBI Seattle
As part of my official United States federal undercover assignment, I have discovered serious criminal activity in the Seattle, Washington, area. I believe the Seattle FBI and other Justice departments employees are actively supporting an insurrection against the United States of America. Several attempts on my life have been made as I contribute to the investigation and I request the arrest of all Seattle FBI and Justice department employees on charges of providing material support to an insurrection against the United States of America. I also request any of support available to me against forces hostiles to this U.S. Navy officer as I contribute to an investigation of domestic and international terrorist activity in King County, Washington.
Sincerely,
Kerry W. Burgess
official United States federal undercover identity (an identity completely compromised by forces hostile to the United States of America)
From: Kerry Burgess
To: inspector.general@usdoj.gov
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2007 6:56:06 PM
Subject: FBI Seattle
As part of my official United States federal undercover assignment, I have discovered serious criminal activity in the Seattle, Washington, area. I believe the Seattle FBI and other Justice departments employees are actively supporting an insurrection against the United States of America. Several attempts on my life have been made as I contribute to the investigation and I request the arrest of all Seattle FBI and Justice department employees on charges of providing material support to an insurrection against the United States of America. I also request any of support available to me against forces hostiles to this U.S. Navy officer as I contribute to an investigation of domestic and international terrorist activity in King County, Washington.
Sincerely,
Kerry W. Burgess
official United States federal undercover identity (an identity completely compromised by forces hostile to the United States of America)
http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20070904/NEWS/709040339/B-52-mistakenly-flies-nukes-aboard/
AirForceTimes
B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard
Sep. 4, 2007 - 08:22PM Last Updated: Sep. 4, 2007 - 08:22PM
A B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with six nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the incident.
The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber's wings.
Advanced Cruise Missiles carry a W80-1 warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and are specifically designed for delivery by B-52 strategic bombers.
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hero-security-guard-wrongly-accused-as-bombing-suspect-dies
HISTORY
ON THIS DAY
Crime
Aug 29, 2007:
Hero security guard wrongly accused as bombing suspect dies
Richard Jewell, the hero security guard turned Olympic bombing suspect, dies at age 44 of natural causes at his Georgia home.
On July 27, 1996, during the Summer Games in Atlanta, a pipe bomb with nails went off in crowded Centennial Olympic Park, killing one woman and injuring 111 other people. Shortly before the explosion, Richard Jewell, who was working as a temporary security guard in the area, discovered a suspicious-looking backpack abandoned beneath a park bench. Jewell alerted police to the backpack, which held a bomb, and moved people out of harm’s way before it exploded. In the aftermath of the bombing, Jewell was praised as a hero for his actions. However, three days later, the media reported that Jewell was being investigated as a suspect in the case. Although he was never arrested or charged with any crime, for the next three months, Jewell faced intense scrutiny from both law enforcement officials and the media, who combed through his background and tracked his movements. Even after the Justice Department officially cleared Jewell of any involvement in the bombing in late October 1996, some people still viewed him with suspicion.
Jewell later filed libel lawsuits against several major media companies and reached settlements with CNN and NBC, among others. Before his death on August 29, 2007, Jewell, who suffered from diabetes and other health problems, worked as a sheriff’s deputy in Georgia. In 2006, during the 10-year anniversary of the Atlanta Olympics, Georgia governor Sonny Perdue publicly commended Jewell for saving lives at Centennial Park.
In May 2003, police in North Carolina captured Eric Rudolph, the real person responsible for the Olympic bombing, as well as the bombings of several abortion clinics and a gay bar. Rudolph, who eluded law enforcement authorities for years by living in the Appalachian wilderness, eventually pled guilty to his crimes and was sentenced to life in prison.
From 10/28/1967 ( Julia Roberts ) To 8/29/2007 ( Bill Gates-Microsoft-Nazi-Corbis causes the United States Air Force atomic weapons incident with the objective of atomic destruction in the United States and Bill Gates-Microsoft-Nazi-Corbis-George Bush continue to actively plan to produce atomic destruction in the United States of America for the purpose of murdering as many United States of America citizens as possible and for the purpose of ongoing protection to organized crime and to protect other severe illegal commerce activity ) is 14550 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 9/3/2005 ( William Rehnquist dead ) is 14550 days
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/close-calls/
NTI
Close Calls with Nuclear Weapons
September 18, 2014
Nuclear weapons are different.
If a nuclear weapon exploded in a major city, the blast center would be hotter than the surface of the sun; tornado-strength winds would spread the flames; and a million or more people could die. Survivors would have no electricity, phones and hospitals would be overwhelmed…if they were still standing.
The opportunities for catastrophe are wide and terrifying with more than 16,000 nuclear weapons in the world today. The possibility of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized launch is real. The scenarios below show how close we've come.
More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia still keep nearly 2,000 nuclear weapons ready for immediate launch against each other. This dangerous "prompt-launch status" means leaders in a crisis would have just minutes to check facts and decide whether to use nuclear weapons. Command and control systems are not perfect. People make mistakes. Sabotage can happen. Technology has flaws and systems fail.
A nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia could end human life on earth—and could be triggered by a false warning planted by a cyber-terrorist. We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons themselves.
Seven more countries—in addition to the U.S. and Russia—have nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, China, France, the United Kingdom, Israel and North Korea. Any one of these countries could be the cause of a catastrophe.
How long will we continue to rely on luck?
Who's Minding the Nukes?
On August 29, 2007, at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, 12 cruise missiles were scheduled to be flown to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to be decommissioned. Instead, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were strapped onto one of the wings of a B-52 bomber not certified to carry nuclear weapons. The nuclear missiles were flown by pilots who did not know they were carrying nuclear weapons to an airbase that did not know they were coming. Once in Louisiana, the weapons sat on the tarmac overnight unguarded. By the time the mistake was discovered by a maintenance crew, the six thermonuclear weapons had been missing for a day and a half and no one in the U.S. Air Force noticed. A former head of the nation’s strategic command said: “I have been in the nuclear business since 1966 and am not aware of any incident more disturbing.”
From 10/28/1967 ( Julia Roberts ) To 9/3/2005 is 13825 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 9/9/2003 ( Edward Teller deceased ) is 13825 days
https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Rehnquist
Encyclopædia Britannica
William Rehnquist
CHIEF JUSTICE OF UNITED STATES
William Rehnquist, in full William Hubbs Rehnquist, original name William Donald Rehnquist (born October 1, 1924, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.—died September 3, 2005, Arlington, Virginia), 16th chief justice of the United States, appointed to the Supreme Court in 1971 and elevated to chief justice in 1986.
From 6/23/1927 ( The Cleanliness Institute established ) To 9/3/2005 ( William Rehnquist dead ) is 28562 days
28562 = 14281 + 14281
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 12/8/2004 is 14281 days
See also: http://hvom.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-oily-american.html
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63904
The American Presidency Project
George W. Bush
XLIII President of the United States: 2001 - 2009
Statement on the Resignation of Anthony J. Principi as Secretary of Veterans Affairs
December 8, 2004
As a valuable member of my Cabinet, Tony Principi has served as a tireless advocate for 25 million veterans. He has insisted on results, and he has gotten results. Under Tony's leadership, we have honored our veterans for their service and sacrifice by increasing and improving health care services, working to eliminate the waiting list for medical care, and cutting the disability claims backlog. I appreciate his efforts to improve access to health care for low-income veterans and those with service-related disabilities. As we fight the war on terror, Tony has played a vital role in helping to streamline the transition from military to civilian status for our newest veterans.
I thank Tony for serving our veterans and our country with integrity and dignity. He is a good man and a good friend. I am grateful to Tony, Liz, and the entire Principi family.
http://www.murray.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsroom?ID=1fe5cbb7-b10d-4440-958f-e9a0f7c78211
United States Senator Patty Murray
Newsroom
Murray Sends Letter to President Asking Him to Address VA Shortfall in Tuesday Address to Nation
Jun 27 2005
Senators urge Bush to ‘provide a full accounting’ of the cost of caring for our veterans
(WASHINGTON, D.C.) – At a press conference with local and state veterans’ leaders in Seattle today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.)
................................................................................
Murray’s Remarks at Seattle press conference:
That’s why today I am sending a letter to the President asking him to come clean
from the journal of Kerry Burgess: 12/31/07 10:32 PM
You stand like a chicken.
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1154ap_scotus_year_end.html?source=mypi
Last updated December 31, 2007 9:03 p.m. PT
Roberts urges higher pay for judges
By PETE YOST
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
WASHINGTON -- Chief Justice John Roberts urged Congress to raise the pay of federal judges in a year-end report that emphasized improving communications with Capitol Hill and the White House.
"The separate branches may not always agree," the chief justice wrote, adding that each should strive "to know and appreciate where the others stand."
From 2/6/1911 ( my biological maternal grandfather Ronald Reagan ) To 4/18/1988 ( the United States Navy Operation Praying Mantis ) is 28196 days
28196 = 14098 + 14098
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official Deputy United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 6/8/2004 is 14098 days
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72651
The American Presidency Project
George W. Bush
XLIII President of the United States: 2001 - 2009
Message to the Congress on the Death of President Ronald Reagan
June 8, 2004
To the Congress of the United States:
By this Message, I officially inform you of the death of Ronald Reagan, the fortieth President of the United States.
Ronald Reagan was a great leader and a good man. He had the confidence that comes with conviction, the strength that comes with character, the grace that comes with humility, and the humor that comes with wisdom.
Through his leadership, spirit, and abiding faith in the American people, President Reagan gave our Nation a renewed optimism. With his courage and moral clarity, he enhanced America's security and advanced the spread of peace, liberty, and democracy to millions of people who had lived in darkness and oppression. As America's President, he helped change the world.
The sun has now set on Ronald Reagan's extraordinary American life. Just as he told us that our Nation's best days are yet to come, we know that the same is true for him.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Kerry Burgess ironman coeur dalene idaho June-27-2004 wtc mcsd .jpg
From 9/11/2001 to 2/6/2004 is 878 days
DSC05275.jpg
DSC05276.jpg
DSC05277.jpg
DSC05278.jpg
DSC05279.jpg
From: Kerry Burgess
Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2006 8:55 PM
To: Kerry Burgess
Subject: Re: Journal June 18, 2006
Kerry Burgess wrote:
Brief nap until the jabbering morons woke me up. Had a dream that Nancy Pelosi wanted to talk to me. Met with her in some place like the downstairs cafeteria, although the place looked different in the dream. Somebody was jabbering away as I was trying to talk to her. She was taking notes on a computer. I was feeling annoyed at having to explain this again, to have to talk more. What more do they need to know? It seems like she had been traveling in Florida, and that we were somewhere in Florida. The scraggly hecklers woke me up before I could find out more.
[JOURNAL ARCHIVE 18 June 2006 excerpt ends]
From 2/6/1911 ( my biological maternal grandfather Ronald Reagan ) To 5/7/1992 ( the first launch of the United States space shuttle Endeavour orbiter vehicle mission STS-49 includes me Kerry Wayne Burgess the United States Marine Corps officer and United States STS-49 pilot astronaut and my 1st official United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration orbital flight of 4 overall ) is 29676 days
29676 = 14838 + 14838
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 6/18/2006 is 14838 days
From 10/7/1953 ( premiere US TV series "Life with Elizabeth" ) To 5/23/1994 ( premiere US TV series episode "Star Trek: The Next Generation"::series finale episode "All Good Things..." ) is 14838 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 6/18/2006 is 14838 days
[ See also: http://hvom.blogspot.com/2016/02/endeavour.html ]
album: "We Were Dead Before The Ship Even Sank" (2007)
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/modestmouse/florida.html
AZ
MODEST MOUSE
"Florida"
Although we often wondered
It was no thing of wonder
The shit that flew from our minds
Grass stains and fresh fruit
Reminds our shoes of horse glue
On this ridiculous climb
With great tunnel vision
We built ourselves a mission
To ride out motives decide
Oh, with vague description
Of what we have been missing
So why would anyone try?
It was always worth it
That's the part I seem to hide
And the busy ant empire
Put all your clothes inside
I wasn't always cargo
I was once kind of my own
I guess I'll pack up my mind
It took so much effort
Not to make an effort
Oh, what a flawless design
It was always worth it
That's the part I seem to hide
And the busy ant empire
Put all your clothes inside
Even as I left Florida
(yee-ha)
sts-58.jpg
STS-58_launch.jpg
sts-58_2.jpg
from my private journal as Kerry Burgess: 9/26/2006 3:06 PM
As I was trying to go to sleep last night, I had a thought that I have a doctorate in computer science from Princeton. I can’t think of any supporting clues that point specifically to that accomplishment though. There is one memory from working in the lockbox at that bank in Charlotte, but I’m not sure what it means. I also wonder about the B.A. and I had thoughts that I studied music as well at Princeton.
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/sts-58/mission-sts-58.html
NASA
STS-58 (58)
COLUMBIA (15)
Pad 39-B (27)
58th Shuttle Mission
15th Flight OV-102
Launch: October 18, 1993 10:53 a.m. EDT.
Landing: November 1, 1993.
On Saturday, the payload crew members will devote much of their time to metabolic studies of the 48 rodents on board the Spacelab science workshop.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modest_Mouse
Modest Mouse
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Modest Mouse is an American indie rock band formed in 1992 in Issaquah, Washington (a suburb of Seattle)
From 2/6/1911 ( my biological maternal grandfather Ronald Reagan ) To 6/7/1945 ( premiere US film "To the Shores of Iwo Jima" ) is 12540 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 3/3/2000 is 12540 days
From 4/21/1926 ( my biological paternal grandmother Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II ) To 12/20/1994 ( in Bosnia as Kerry Wayne Burgess the United States Marine Corps captain this day is my United States Navy Cross medal date of record ) is 25080 days
25080 = 12540 + 12540
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 3/3/2000 is 12540 days
From 8/7/1964 ( the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - United States HJ Res 1145 ) To 12/7/1998 ( my first day working at Microsoft Corporation as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and the active duty United States Marine Corps lieutenant colonel circa 1998 ) is 12540 days
From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 3/3/2000 is 12540 days
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000303&slug=4008076
The Seattle Times
Friday, March 3, 2000
BUSINESS BRIEFS
Bush says he opposes breaking up Microsoft
Seattle Times staff: Seattle Times news services
STONY BROOK, N.Y. - Republican presidential front-runner George W. Bush said he opposes breaking up Microsoft
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0413508/releaseinfo
IMDb
The Yellow Badge of Courage (1999)
Release Info
USA 27 March 1999 (Los Angeles, California) (Hollywood, California) (premiere)
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/25/1085393/-Dan-Rather-got-it-right-George-W-Bush-DID-go-AWOL#
DAILY KOS
WED APR 25, 2012 AT 01:33 PM PDT
Dan Rather got it right George W. Bush DID go AWOL
byLefty Coaster
I always suspected something like this was the case. The new issue of Texas Monthly delves into the long neglected story of George W. Bush less than stellar military career in the Texas Air National Guard. The Texas Monthly lays out the surprisingly complicated mechanizations that led to the Junior Bush landing this plumb spot in the T.A.N.G.
That George W. got special treatment at a time when draftees were likely to end up slogging through the jungles of Viet Nam shouldn't come as too much of a surprise to anyone who knows how America routinely gives special treatment to the offspring of the 1%.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Earnest_Will
Operation Earnest Will
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Operation Earnest Will (24 July 1987 – 26 September 1988) was the American military protection of Kuwaiti-owned tankers from Iranian attacks in 1987 and 1988, three years into the Tanker War phase of the Iran–Iraq War. It was the largest naval convoy operation since World War II.
Background
See also: Iran–Iraq War § The "Tanker War" and the "War of the Cities"
The so-called "Tanker War" phase of the Iran–Iraq War started when Iraq, which had expanded its air force with new, Exocet-equipped French and Soviet aircraft, attacked the oil terminal and oil tankers at Iran's Kharg Island in early 1984. Saddam's aim in attacking Iranian shipping was, among other things, to provoke the Iranians to retaliate with extreme measures, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz to all maritime traffic, thereby bringing American intervention. Iran limited the retaliatory attacks to Iraqi shipping, leaving the strait open.
Becoming landlocked after the Battle of al-Faw, and due to the blockade of Iraqi oil pipelines to Mediterranean Sea by Iran's ally Syria, Iraq had to rely on its ally, Kuwait (and other Gulf Arab allies to a lesser extent) to transport its oil. After increasing attacks on Iran's main oil export facility at Kharg Island by Iraq, Iran started to attack Kuwaiti tankers carrying Iraqi oil from 13 May 1984 (and later attacking tankers from any Gulf state supporting Iraq). Attacks on ships of non-combatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, with both nations attacking oil tankers and merchant ships of neutral nations in an effort to deprive their opponent of trade.
Besides concerns about the intensified Tanker War, the superpowers feared that the possible fall of Basra, which was now under threat, might lead to a pro-Iranian Islamic republic in largely Shia-populated southern Iraq. During the first four months of 1987, Kuwait turned to the superpowers, partly to protect oil exports but largely to seek an end to the war through superpower intervention. In December 1986, Kuwait's government asked the Reagan administration to send the U.S. Navy to protect Kuwaiti tankers against Iranian attacks. U.S. law forbade the use of navy ships to escort civilian vessels under a foreign flag, so the Kuwaiti ships were re-registered under the U.S. flag. Even before Earnest Will formally began, it became clear how dangerous Persian Gulf operations would be. On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage fired two Exocet missiles at the guided missile frigate USS Stark, killing 37 sailors and injuring 21. Iraqi officials said that the targeting of the U.S. warship was accidental.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988-05/tanker-war
U.S. Naval Institute
The Tanker War
Proceedings Magazine - May 1988
The Iran-Iraq War, which began in September 1980, now ranks as one of the longer interstate conflicts of the 20th century. In a strict military sense, it has been primarily a land conflict. Compared with the often bloody fighting on land, where an uneasy stalemate has developed, the "tanker war" in the waters of the Gulf has been a mere sideshow . The tanker war, however, has attracted considerable international interest because it has involved the shipping of many countries. It is seen as having the potential both to affect world oil exports and prices, and to draw other countries into the conflict.
The tanker war is a campaign of economic attrition and political intimidation. Iraq attacks ships serving Iranian ports—largely to reduce Iran's oil exports, which go entirely by sea and which help finance Iran's war effort. Because Iran destroyed Iraq's oilterminal early in the war, no tankers steam to or from Iraq, and Iraq's oil exports now travel by overland pipeline. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, however, support Iraq's war effort. Iran thus wages its own war on shipping serving the Arab side of the Gulf to reduce Iraq's imports of war material, and to intimidate the Gulf states supporting Iraq.
Iran trapped or destroyed many Iraqi ships in port in the early stages of the war. But Iraq started the tanker war in the Gulf proper in 1981 by initiating attacks on ships steaming to or from Iranian ports at the extreme northern end of the Gulf. Iraq continued these attacks into 1984 without a parallel Iranian response at sea. In March of that year, however, Iraq increased the rate of its attacks and expanded their geographic scope by attacking ships serving more southerly Iranian points, particularly the oil-loading complex at Kharg Island. Two months later, Iran initiated its own attacks, and the tanker war became a two-way affair.
Table 1 provides the most widely published counting in the United States of the number of ship attacks by each belligerent. On a cumulative basis, Iraq has accounted for about three-fifths of the attacks. In 1987, however, Iran drew roughly even with Iraq in the number of ships attacked for the first time in the tanker war.
https://www.thenation.com/article/i-was-part-of-the-iraq-war-surge-it-was-an-utter-disaster/
The Nation
I Was Part of the Iraq War Surge. It Was a Disaster.
The 2007 surge strategy wasn’t a success—and it’s not a template to follow.
By Danny Sjursen MARCH 9, 2017
The other day, I found myself flipping through old photos from my time in Iraq. One in particular from October 2006 stood out. I see my 23-year-old self, along with my platoon. We’re still at Camp Buerhing in Kuwait, posing in front of our squadron logo splashed across a huge concrete barrier. It was a tradition by then, three and a half years after the invasion of neighboring Iraq, for every Army, Marine, and even Air Force battalion at that camp to proudly paint its unit emblem on one of those large, ubiquitous barricades.
This article originally appeared at TomDispatch.com.
Gazing at that photo, it’s hard for me to believe that it was taken a decade ago. Those were Iraq’s bad old days, just before General David Petraeus’s fabled “surge” campaign that has since become the stuff of legend, a defining event for American military professionals. The term has permanently entered the martial lexicon and now it’s everywhere. We soldiers stay late at work because we need to “surge” on the latest PowerPoint presentation. To inject extra effort into anything (no matter how mundane) is to “surge.” Nor is the term’s use limited to the military vernacular. Within the first few weeks of the Trump administration, The Wall Street Journal, for instance, reported on a deportation “surge.”
For many career soldiers, the surge era (2007–11) provides a kind of vindication for all those years of effort and seeming failure, a brief window into what might have been and a proof certain of the enduring utility of force. When it comes to that long-gone surge, senior leaders still talk the talk on its alleged success as though reciting scripture. Take retired general, surge architect, and former CIA director Petraeus. As recently as 2013, he wrote a Foreign Policy piece entitled “How We Won in Iraq.” Now “win” is a bold word indeed. Yet few in our American world would think to question its accuracy. After all, Petraeus was a general, and in an era when Americans have little or no faith in other public institutions, polls show nearly everyone trusts the military. Of course, no one asks whether this is healthy for the republic. No matter, the surge’s success is, by now, a given among Washington’s policy elite.
Recently, for instance, I listened to a podcast of a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) panel discussion that promoted a common set of myths about the glories of the surge. What I heard should be shocking, but it’s not. The group peddled a common myth about the surge’s inherent wisdom that may soon become far more dangerous in the “go big” military era of Donald Trump.
CFR’s three guests—retired General Raymond Odierno, former commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq and now a senior adviser to JPMorgan Chase; Meghan O’Sullivan, former deputy national security adviser under President George W. Bush; and Christopher Kojm, former senior adviser to the Iraq Study Group—had remarkably similar views. No dissenting voices were included. All three had been enthusiastic promoters of the surge in 2006–07 and continue to market the myth of its success. While recognizing the unmistakable failure of the post-surge American effort in Iraq, each still firmly believes in the inherent validity of that “strategy.” I listened for more than an hour waiting for a single dissenting thought. The silence was deafening.
ESTABLISHING THE BONA FIDES OF VICTORY IN WASHINGTON, IF NOT IRAQ
With the madness of the 24-hour news cycle pin-balling us from one Trump “crisis” to another, who has time for honest reflection about that surge on its 10th anniversary? Few even remember the controversy, turmoil, and drama of those days, but believe me, it’s something I’ll never forget. I led a scout platoon in Baghdad and my unit was a few months into a nasty deployment when we first heard the term “surge.” Iraq was by then falling apart and violence was at an all-time high with insurgents killing scores of Americans each month. The nascent central government, supported by the Bush administration, was in turmoil and, to top it all off, the Sunni and Shia were already fighting a civil war in the streets.
In November 2006, just a month into our deployment, Democrats won control over both houses of Congress in what was interpreted as a negative referendum on that war. A humbler, more reticent or reflective president might have backed off, cut his losses, and begun a withdrawal from that country, but not George W. Bush. He doubled down, announcing in January 2007 an infusion of 30,000 additional troops and a new “strategy” for victory, a temporary surge that would provide time, space, and security for the new Iraqi government to reconcile the country’s warring ethnic groups and factions, while incorporating minority groups into the largely Shiite, Baghdad-based power structure.
Soon after, my unit along with nearly every other American already in theater received word that our tours had been extended by three months—15 months in all, which then seemed like an eternity. I sat against a wall and chain-smoked nearly a pack of cigarettes before passing the word on to my platoon. And so it began.
Less than nine months later, the administration paraded General Petraeus, decked out in full dress uniform, at congressional hearings to plug the strategy, sell the surge, and warn against a premature withdrawal from Iraq. What a selling job it proved to be. It established the bona fides of victory in Washington, if not Iraq.
The man was compelling and over the next three years violence did, in fact, drop. The additional troops and “new” counterinsurgency tactics were, however, only part of the story. In an orgy of killing in Baghdad and many other cities, the two main sects ethnically cleansed neighborhoods, expelling each other into a series of highly segregated enclaves. The capital, for instance, essentially became a Shiite city. In a sense, the civil war had, momentarily at least, run its course.
In addition, the US military had successfully, though again only temporarily, convinced many previously rebellious Sunni tribes to switch sides in exchange for money, support, and help in getting rid of the overly fundamentalist and brutal terror outfit, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). For the time being, AQI seemed to the tribal leaders like a bigger threat than the Shiites in Baghdad. For this, the Sunnis briefly bet on the US without ever fully trusting or accepting Shiite-Baghdad’s suzerainty. Think of this as a tactical pause—not that the surge’s architects and supporters saw (or see) it that way.
Which brings us back to that CFR panel. The most essential assumption of all three speakers was this: The US needed to establish “security first” in Iraq before that country’s government, set in place by the American occupation, could begin to make political progress. They still don’t seem to understand that, whatever the bright hopes of surge enthusiasts at the time, no true political settlement was ever likely, with or without the surge.
America’s man in Baghdad, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, was already in the process of becoming a sectarian strongman, hell-bent on alienating the country’s Sunni and Kurdish minorities. Even 60,000 or 90,000 more American troops couldn’t have solved that problem because the surge was incapable of addressing, and barely pretended to face, the true conundrum of the invasion and occupation: Any American-directed version of Iraqi “democracy” would invariably usher in Shia-majority dominance over a largely synthetic state. The real question no surge cheerleaders publicly asked (or ask to this day) was whether an invading foreign entity was even capable of imposing an inclusive political settlement there. To assume that the United States could have done so smacks of a faith-based as opposed to reality-based worldview—another version of a deep and abiding belief in American exceptionalism.
A SURGE BELIEVER AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER?
Sadly, that panel still epitomizes respectable thought on the Iraq surge and what followed from it. Here’s the problem: Republican (and some Democratic) policymakers, along with supposedly “outside the box” military commanders, confused new tactics with an effective strategy, which, in the wake of the disastrous decision to invade, may have been a contradiction in terms. Add in an additional myth—that the US military turned on a dime in 2007, empowering a set of truly creative, open-minded thinkers, who brought America to the edge of victory—and you have the makings of the surge legend.
While surge-era generals like Petraeus and Odierno and younger colonels like John Nagl and Peter Mansoor were intelligent, competent officers, when it came to Iraq their strategic insights and worldview remained surprisingly narrow and conventional. Their bedrock belief was that somewhere in the Iraqi chaos there just had to be an American military solution. Enamored with the magical efficacy of counterinsurgency tactics, they bet wrong on the capacity of the US government or its military to transform the chaotic, unmovable facts on the ground in Iraq.
This might matter little today if senior officers who led the Army and Marine Corps during the surge hadn’t found their way into key positions in the Trump administration. To take one example, new National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster is something of a legendary figure in the US Army. A hero of the First Gulf War of 1991, he taught history at West Point, commanded a regiment in Iraq in the post-invasion years, fought national-level corruption in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, and recently led the Army Capabilities Integration Center—the organization charged with developing the Army’s future concepts and force modernization.
A classic soldier-scholar with a doctorate in history, he authored a well-regarded book on the Vietnam War. I count myself among his many admirers. Nonetheless, his elevation to a policy-making position should raise troubling questions, since he, too, is a surge admirer. In 2005–06, then-Colonel McMaster commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, Iraq, a city wracked by insurgency and riven with sectarian divisions. According to surge lore, he oversaw a miracle turnaround of the situation in that dangerous city, previewing the Petraeus surge to come.
It’s a story that briefs well and McMaster’s unit did indeed achieve some notable successes during its one-year deployment, but—and this is a big “but”—those gains proved fleeting. The Sunnis of that city were never reconciled with the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government nor were their grievances addressed, so violence returned. In 2014, just three years after the departure of US troops from Iraq, Tal Afar became one of the first Iraqi cities conquered by the militants of the new Islamic State.
Remember that the whole purpose of the surge had been to provide time and space for Iraqi national reconciliation. That never truly occurred—not in Tal Afar or elsewhere. McMaster’s own academic expert, Army reservist Ahmed Hashim, recognized the essential issue back in 2006: “The problem is, what happens when this unit leaves? It’s only a one-year vision, and then we rotate out.”
THE REAL-WORLD COSTS OF STRATEGIC FAILURE
Difficult as it is to predict the future, there’s something ominous about seeing Generals H.R. McMaster, James Mattis, and John Kelly, all holdovers of sorts from the surge generation, take key positions in Donald Trump’s administration where they will once again face surge-like issues and dilemmas in the Greater Middle East. The question is: Has their thinking on such problems developed since the surge era?
Keep in mind that a surprising number of military officers and policymakers still subscribe to the idea that just a little more effort, a couple of more years, a few thousand extra troops, a bit more political gumption, and it might all have spelled victory in Iraq. Such would’ve-could’ve-should’ve apologetics are, of course, historically dangerous. The German Wehrmacht carefully cultivated a similar “stab-in-the-back” myth to explain that it was the politicians, not the army, that had actually lost World War I. A decade later, many of those disgruntled German military professionals embraced the bellicose language of a certain well-known fascist demagogue.
In less drastic but still detrimental fashion, in the years after 1973, the new all-volunteer US Army grew increasingly estranged from the civilian population. This was, in part, because many veteran officers blamed America’s defeat in Vietnam on home-front antiwar protestors who were (gasp!) simply exercising their constitutional rights. Perhaps in place of self-serving, vindicating myths, an honest, critical, and realistic assessment of the past would better advance future strategy and operations.
Those Council on Foreign Relations panelists, the vast majority of my fellow military officers (in my experience), and a surprisingly bipartisan array of congressional representatives still perpetuate—and seemingly believe—not only the surge myth, but the stale, discredited ideologies at its root: American exceptionalism, this country’s supposed status as the globe’s “indispensable” nation, and the magical capabilities of our high-tech military.
Ironically, US military doctrine purports to value “critical” and “creative” thinking. Unfortunately, that emphasis hardly fits with the realities of promotion and command selection. A recent empirical analysis by faculty from West Point’s Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership concluded that “promotion and command boards may actually penalize officers for their conceptual ability.” In other words, more intelligent, educated, and skeptical officers—those with “higher cognitive ability,” according to the study—don’t fare so well in the competitive promotion game.
Which helps explain much, since truly critical thinkers would have challenged the various myths surrounding the surge and the unbalanced tactics that inspired the legend. The defense establishment has just given President Trump the “preliminary draft” for the “comprehensive strategy” he requested to beat ISIS. What will you bet that their suggestions are still infused with surge thinking?
Colonel Dale Eikemeier and Arthur Lykke Jr. have suggested that effective strategy involves the balancing of ends (desired outcomes), ways (methods), and means (available resources), while limiting risk. At least retrospectively, it boggles the mind that, in 2006–07, a plurality of political and military thinkers presumed Washington could successfully achieve such an equilibrium in Iraq by military means. As they defined them at the time, their desired outcomes were outrageous: halt a brutal sectarian civil war, defeat a nationalist-Islamist insurgency, facilitate a political settlement in an ethno-religiously divided synthetic state, and restore essential civil services. In what universe did policymakers expect our means—a finite professional (non-conscripted) army in an alien land with help from the State Department (whose staff globally is about the size of one army division)—to achieve such wildly inflated ambitions?
As for ways, the outrageous size disparity between that military and an undersized diplomatic corps ensured that either American methods would be almost purely military in nature or require that soldiers transform themselves into diplomats, social workers, and city councilmen. (In those days, it was called “nation building.”) Armed with eternal, can-do optimism, the Army tried a bit of both.
The band-aid momentarily stemmed the bleeding, but proved predictably incapable of healing the wound. In the process, the military’s sacrifice was substantial (960 dead in the surge’s first year alone), but the long-term results were negligible. The shocking imbalance between the three strategic “legs of the stool” (ends, ways, and means) guaranteed an unacceptable level of risk. American troops and Iraqi civilians bore the brunt of that peril. No surprise there. Still, it boggles the mind how few dissenting voices emerged from our military and political ranks at the time. Even more frightening is the continuing resonance of the surge myth 10 years later in the face of overwhelming evidence of Iraq’s turmoil and the ineffectiveness of foreign nation-building more generally. (See: Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya.)
Memory is a tricky thing. As historian Dale Andrade wrote, “No matter how the war in Iraq ends, it seems likely that it will soon replace Vietnam as the military’s new touchstone for lessons learned.” Under the circumstances, that’s scary. Just as the military and public misunderstood Vietnam, too many contemporary officers and politicians rely on a mythical rendering of the ongoing Iraq War. That memory will, in turn, deeply influence what Americans learn from the enduring campaigns in the Middle East and so tragically shape future US military strategy.
Now, look at that photo of mine one more time and consider the real-world costs of strategic failure. Four of those men are dead; one is paralyzed; and three of the others were wounded. That was 10 years ago, and as for the Middle East, it’s worse than we found it. Thought about a certain way, in the end it wasn’t the US military, but various terror groups that surged most effectively.
Call me a skeptic, but my sense is that those painted concrete barriers in the Kuwaiti desert will one day serve as so many American ziggurats, monuments to a profound failure of the imagination. Let’s hope the Council on Foreign Relations invites some genuinely creative, dissenting voices to its 20th anniversary panel commemorating the famous Iraq surge. But I won’t hold my breath.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/17/why-surge-iraq-actually-failed-and-what-that-means-today/0NaI9JrbtSs1pAZvgzGtaL/story.html
Boston Globe
Why the 2007 surge in Iraq actually failed
By Alex Kingsbury NOVEMBER 17, 2014
“We had it won, thanks to the surge. It was won.” — JOHN MCCAIN, SEPT. 11, 2014
THE GOALS of the Iraq surge were spelled out explicitly by the White House in Jan. 2007: Stop the raging sectarian bloodletting and reconcile Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in the government. “A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations,” then-President George W. Bush said.
In light of all that has happened since that announcement, it is jaw-dropping to still hear the surge described as a success. Yet the myth of its success is as alive as it is dangerous. It’s a myth that prevents us from grappling with the realities of the last effort in Iraq, even as we embark on another.
To believe in the myth of the surge is to absolve Iraqis of their responsibility to resolve their differences. It gives the US government an unrealistic sense of its own capabilities. And it ignores the roots of the conflict now stretching from Damascus to Baghdad.
“The surge didn’t ‘win’ anything. It bought time,” writes retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger in his new book, “Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.” It’s not surprising that those words of wisdom come from a retired officer. But it is a shame. Credible institutional memory is of great value and often in short supply. It’s an inoculant against the repetition of mistakes.
Much institutional knowledge about the conduct of the Iraqi surge, as learned on the frontlines by junior and non-commissioned officers, has been lost to attrition as the military shrinks. What remains is the mythology.
A former junior officer who served in Baghdad during the surge and now attends one of this city’s fine graduate schools recently told me that the gains he saw were akin to Potemkin villages. “I always thought that the Iraqis were just pretending to play nice so that we’d leave, and they could continue their civil war,” he said. Whatever their motivations then — and they are still not well understood — Iraqis are again at war with themselves.
This summer, the Iraqi army collapsed as the Islamic State insurgency swept across the Sunni heartland. Despite years of training, and billions of dollars worth of US weapons and materiel, Iraqi Army soldiers abandoned their uniforms, guns, and Humvees as they fled. The United States has sent more troops to Iraq and launched airstrikes.
But our mission is shackled to a conundrum: Why should Americans pick up weapons and fight the Islamic State if the other countries in the region, including the Iraqis themselves, won’t do the same? Why is the militant group an existential threat to us, yet not enough of a threat to spur its neighbors to take up arms? “We are not about to send American boys 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves,” Lyndon Johnson once promised in the fall of 1964.
For Americans, the myth of the victorious surge is so seductive because it perpetuates an illusion of control. It frames the Iraq War as something other than a geostrategic blunder and remembers our effort as something more than a stalemate. What’s more, it reinforces the notion that it’s possible to influence events around the world, if only military force is deployed properly. It’s a myth that makes victory in the current Iraq mission appear achievable.
Dispelling the myth of the successful surge begins by measuring it against its own metrics for success: violence and reconciliation.
There is far too little written on the Iraqi perspective, but their evaluation of the surge is illustrative: In 2008, only 4 percent of Iraqis said additional US forces were responsible for the decline in violence. They know their own country well.
Violence in Iraq began to decline before the surge started. Civilian deaths peaked in July 2006, at more than 3,250 per month, a full six months before the surge policy was even announced. This was the result of many factors, including the completion of the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad’s neighborhoods. Some 80 percent of the casualties in the Iraqi civil war pre-surge occurred within 30 miles of Baghdad.
As early February 2005 and more widely in 2006, Sunni tribes began turning against Al Qaeda, which entered the country for the first time on the heels of the US invasion. Also critical was the 2007 stand-down by militias — particularly the Mahdi Army under the control of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. A 2011 study published in the Small Wars Journal found these and other “intangible factors affect security more than the number of deployed coalition battalions.”
Other key factors included a greater unity of effort by American forces, better intelligence, and an overall renewed sense of mission under new leadership. The morale of US troops is almost never mentioned, but the shift from pessimism to cautious optimism that I remember between early 2007 and late 2008 was unmistakable.
The surge sent US troops into neighborhoods, which led to better intelligence gathering. But there were costs. No matter how brilliant the manual, counterinsurgency policy was implemented by average Americans. Brave and patriotic to be sure, and volunteers all. But putting 20-somethings on patrol as community policemen in a war zone, where they didn’t understand the language or culture, had serious and unintended consequences.
Many thousands of Iraqis were swept into an archipelago of US or Iraqi prisons for offenses — real or imagined. I remember watching the arrest of a student by a group of American soldiers. His offense was telling one American soldier, through an interpreter of dubious allegiances, a joke.
Thousands were arrested and held without trial. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was one of those arrested. He and a dozen others, radicalized during their incarceration, are now the leadership of ISIS, itself a reincarnation of the old Al Qaeda in Iraq militia. Accounts of the prisons describe them as “jihadi universities.”
Many of the Iraqis swept up into prisons were dangerous insurgents and locking them up meant that they couldn’t plant IEDs or shoot mortars. Others took cash payments to not fight and to man checkpoints rather than bomb them.
The American soldiers I traveled with hated paying the Sons of Iraq, men who’d been insurgents only a day earlier. But they hated fighting them even more. It all led to a lull in the killing, one of the surge’s key goals.
When the Iraqi government stopped the flow of money, the violence began anew.
Which brings us to the second and equally important goal of the surge: political reconciliation. This also failed — and in spectacular fashion.
The corrupt, viciously sectarian government of Nouri al-Malaki was prone to terrible abuses of any and all opponents. And Muslims weren’t the only ones in the crosshairs. “Christians are finished in Iraq,” wrote one former Human Rights Watch worker this fall, after an exodus of some 750,000 people that predated the rise of the Islamic State.
Days after he was elected, I wrote from Baghdad that, regardless of what the incoming president Barack Obama wanted, the Iraqi government wanted all US forces out by 2011. The Bush administration duly agreed in December 2008, as the surge wound down.
What follows from the surge mythology is the idea that a few thousand residual US troops could have prevented Maliki from indulging in his worst sectarian impulses, or held off the ISIS rout. Given the record of an occupying US force many times larger, which was unable to halt either rampant ethnic cleansing or civil war, such an extraordinary claim requires extraordinary evidence.
Iraqis had the responsibility to capitalize on the lull in violence. They failed. And it is the Iraqis who are paying the steepest price for it.
- posted by Kerry Burgess 3:39 PM Pacific Time Spokane Valley Washington USA Wednesday 04 July 2018
