The Nexus

http://www.chakoteya.net/movies/movie7.html

Star Trek Generations (1994)


[Enterprise sickbay]

CRUSHER: He's an El-Aurian, ...over three hundred years old. He lost his entire family when the Borg destroyed his world. Soran escaped with a handful of other refugees aboard a ship called the Lakul. That ship was later destroyed by some kind of energy ribbon, but Soran and forty-six others were rescued by the Enterprise-B.

RIKER: That was the mission where James Kirk was killed.

CRUSHER: I checked the passenger manifest of the Lakul. Guess who else was on board?

[Guinan's quarters]

GUINAN: Soran is a name I haven't heard in a long time.

PICARD: You remember him?

GUINAN: Yes.

PICARD: Guinan. It is very important that you tell me everything that you know. We think that Soran has developed a weapon, ...a terrible weapon. One that might even give him enough power to destroy...

GUINAN: Soran doesn't care about weapons or power. He just cares about getting back to the Nexus.

PICARD: What's the 'Nexus'?










From 11/17/1994 ( premiere US film "Star Trek Generations" ) To 9/27/2013 is 6889 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 9/12/1984 ( Ronald Reagan - Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on NATO Conventional Defense Capabilities ) is 6889 days



From 11/17/1994 ( premiere US film "Star Trek Generations" ) To 9/27/2013 is 6889 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 9/12/1984 ( Ronald Reagan - Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on the NATO Tactical Nuclear Posture ) is 6889 days



From 10/26/2010 ( premiere US TV series episode "Stargate Universe"::"Cloverdale" ) To 9/27/2013 is 1067 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 10/4/1968 ( premiere US TV series episode "Star Trek"::"The Paradise Syndrome" ) is 1067 days



From 1/3/1963 ( premiere US TV series episode "The Twilight Zone"::"In His Image" ) To 9/27/2013 is 18530 days

18530 = 9265 + 9265

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 3/16/1991 ( my first successful major test of my ultraspace matter transportation device as Kerry Wayne Burgess the successful Ph.D. graduate Columbia South Carolina ) is 9265 days



From 7/19/1957 ( premiere US film "Ghost of Honor" ) To 6/13/2005 is 17496 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 9/27/2013 is 17496 days



From 1/17/1991 ( the date of record of my United States Navy Medal of Honor as Kerry Wayne Burgess chief warrant officer United States Marine Corps circa 1991 also known as Matthew Kline for official duty and also known as Wayne Newman for official duty ) To 9/27/2013 is 8289 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 7/13/1988 ( premiere US film "The Dead Pool" ) is 8289 days


[ See also: http://hvom.blogspot.com/2015/07/you-do-not-exist.html ]










http://www.chakoteya.net/movies/movie7.html

Star Trek Generations (1994)


KIRK: You said history considers me dead. Who am I to argue with history?

PICARD: You are a Starfleet Officer. You have a duty...

KIRK: I don't need you to lecture me. I was out saving the galaxy when your grandfather was in diapers. Besides which, I think the galaxy owes me one. All right, ...I was like you once ...so completely blinded by duty and obligations that I couldn't see anything past this uniform. And in the end, what did it get me?










http://www.chakoteya.net/movies/movie7.html

Star Trek Generations (1994)


PICARD: What about Soran?

GUINAN: If he's still obsessed he could be a very, very dangerous man.

PICARD: Why would he destroy a star? ...Thank you, Guinan.

GUINAN: If you go, you're not going to care about anything. Not this ship, Soran, nothing. All you'll want is to stay in the Nexus. And you're not going to want to come back.










http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0111280/releaseinfo

IMDb


Star Trek: Generations (1994)

Release Info

USA 17 November 1994 (Hollywood, California) (premiere)










JOURNAL ARCHIVE: From:

Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2013 1:22 PM

To: Kerry Burgess


And I am going to send you over a new lease that has your move date as September 27th. Sorry to make you sign all over again. Though the current tenant is VERY grateful to have the extra few days. Thank you again!


[JOURNAL ARCHIVE 05 September 2013 excerpt ends]










http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40367

The American Presidency Project

Ronald Reagan

XL President of the United States: 1981 - 1989

Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on NATO Conventional Defense Capabilities

September 12, 1984

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to section 1104(b) of the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 9894), this report contains my views and recommendations on improving NATO conventional defense capabilities. These views and recommendations take into consideration the findings in Secretary Weinberger's report on "Improving NATO's Conventional Capabilities." I have reviewed that report and endorse its recommendations. It is the product of thorough research and contains a candid assessment of NATO's achievements to date and additional needs for the future.

Few disagree with the pressing need to improve NATO's conventional forces in order to enhance deterrence and defense. The quality of NATO's equipment and the readiness and skill of the forces manning that equipment have improved significantly over the last several years. The absolute defense capabilities of NATO forces are substantially greater today than three or four years ago. However, the measure of adequacy in deterrence and defense is not any static or absolute ability, but a dynamic relationship to the threat opposing that defense. The Warsaw Pact threat has increased by an even greater qualitative and quantitative increment, creating the necessity that NATO be ever more efficient and effective.

In analyzing the requirements for conventional force improvements, we must remember that NATO's principal objective is not to fight and win a war, but to ensure that a war in Europe does not occur. Further improvements in conventional capability would augment a vital element of overall deterrence and lessen pressure for early escalation to nuclear confrontation. At the same time, as the DOD report concludes, conventional forces cannot totally supplant the nuclear dimension of deterrence. NATO must also continue to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, as outlined in Secretary Weinberger's report on NATO's Nuclear Posture.

NATO's strategy must be based on the geographic and political realities of NATO, and the fact that NATO, as a defensive alliance, concedes the initiative at the outset of conflict. In this context, flexible response and forward defense provide. the only viable deterrent and defense strategy for the Alliance. NATO's task is to do a better job of providing the forces and the doctrine to support the strategy.

The United States can be proud of our leadership by example over the last several years. We must continue to pursue those programs we have already begun, while seeking even more effective ways to enhance conventional defense- The support of Congress, in providing the funding for operations and maintenance costs, readiness, sustainment improvements, new equipment, force structure, research and development, and other defense programs, is essential to our efforts. However, the United States cannot fill the gap alone. Every member of the Alliance most participate in improving conventional forces. The Allies recognize the need, and now must make the additional sacrifices needed to improve further NATO's military capabilities. The recent debate in the U.S. Senate will provide reinforcement to those Allies trying to assume their proportional burden. We will continue to prod all Allies to make better contributions to NATO defense.

Secretary Weinberger's report and the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe's (SACEUR's) independent assessment spell out the most important areas that need improvement. I agree with their recommendations. We must carefully balance our efforts, both by program area (such as readiness) and by task (such as defense against a first echelon). We must ensure that defense efforts and resources provide the most effective product for defense. We must critique the application of resources until we are satisfied that they are producing the optimum defense capability possible. No one can afford wastefully duplicative development programs, nor pursue programs that have only a limited military need. In sum, we must have a military strategy and an investment strategy. And these strategies should encompass our own programs and those of Allies—in closer integration and cooperation than ever before.

The fundamental and inescapable reason for American cooperation and leadership is that a strong NATO defense is in our basic national self-interest, and we simply cannot succeed by ourselves. The plans and programs in the current United States defense budget and five-year defense plan support these objectives. While we will continue to review plans and modify requests to fit new opportunities and requirements, enduring Congressional willingness to support required defense programs is essential if we are to improve NATO's conventional defense. No plan, no matter how well conceived, can succeed if the resources to achieve it are insufficient or inconsistent. We and our Allies have recognized NATO's conventional defense problems, and have taken the first steps toward recovery. Now, we must accelerate our efforts.

Making the changes necessary to supplement existing plans or to replace those which become obsolete requires bold thinking and leadership. We will continue to consult closely and frequently with our NATO Allies and with the U.S. Congress on new and better ways to use defense resources. There is no "instant" solution to any of the existing problems. Solutions will be achieved only by a long-term commitment. Nonetheless, we must start down the right paths, which are presented in Secretary Weinberger's report.

United States programs emphasize the need to provide the strategic lift to rapidly supplement in-place forces and to augment the thin strategic reserves available to SACEUR. We are working with Allies to ensure that Europe is prepared to receive these reinforcements and get them to where they can be most effective. We have stressed the need to increase the funding levels in the unglamorous but tremendously cost-effective Infrastructure Program. For example, by providing shelters and other supporting capabilities for aircraft, we can substantially improve the survivability and hence the capabilities of our Air Force.

Improving NATO's deterrent and defense posture will also require the Alliance to move in entirely new directions and to modify existing projects. "Exploitation of Emerging Technologies" is a fine example of new directions. This initiative, proposed by the United States in mid-1982, has already stimulated identification of projects for accelerated development. Although it will still be several years before this initiative contributes directly to NATO's defense capabilities, this effort marks an important first step in using the West's major advantage: its technological base.

In the short term, we must improve the deterrent capability of the conventional leg of NATO's deterrent Triad by increasing readiness and sustainability. Over the longer term, we must devote the necessary resources to provide all of the elements of an effective defense. This will require a clear understanding by the publics in all NATO countries of the nature and magnitude of the threat we all face.

I ask the Congress to join in the important endeavor of strengthening NATO's conventional defense.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN





http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40368

The American Presidency Project

Ronald Reagan

XL President of the United States: 1981 - 1989

Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on the NATO Tactical Nuclear Posture

September 12, 1984

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to section 1105(b) of the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 9894), this report contains my views on the DOD report on the tactical nuclear posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is the first of four reports required by the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act. It analyzes some of the most crucial problems facing U.S.-NATO defense policy, both because of the weapons involved and the essential role of nuclear weapons in NATO's deterrent posture.

I have reviewed Secretary Weinberger's very comprehensive report on the nuclear posture of NATO, and I strongly endorse the report's recommendations. I therefore urge the Congress to provide the necessary support so that the agreements reached within the Alliance for improving NATO's nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) can be sustained.

The military threat to the Alliance has not lessened since the last report in 1975. There have been significant improvements by both the U.S. and the Europeans in conventional and nonstrategic nuclear forces over the last several years. Nonetheless, the quantitative military balance has, in fact, worsened. Our goal remains not to match the Warsaw Pact system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead, but to maintain forces adequate for credible deterrence and defense. NATO can accomplish this objective by continuing force improvement, including both nuclear and conventional modernizations, and by developing more effective use of our defense resources. Meanwhile, we will continue to work to achieve equitable and verifiable arms reductions which would assist NATO to obtain greater stability and security at lower levels of defense effort.

In October 1983, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), as part of a theater-wide improvement of NATO's nuclear posture, decided to withdraw an additional 1,400 warheads over the next five to six years, in addition to the 1,000 warheads withdrawn in 1980. The basis for these decisions was a broadly supported Alliance study. This study was used as the cornerstone for the DOD report. Thus, the recommendations and intermediate steps outlined in the DOD report to improve NATO's nuclear posture are fully consistent with the views of our Allies.

I am fully aware of the views in the Congress that we should do more to improve our conventional forces. I intend to take a balanced approach to improving our capabilities in both areas. You have received a report from DOD which looks at conventional plans and requirements in detail. I shall be providing my views on how to pursue some of those recommendations soon. It is true that we need to continue to improve our conventional forces. However, it is essential that, in the process of examining conventional problems, we not lose sight of the very essential, significant contributions that credible, survivable, and stable NATO nuclear forces make to enhancing conventional defense or of the fact that such nuclear forces are presently our most credible deterrent to chemical attack.

I especially endorse those recommendations that improve the survivability of NATO's nuclear forces. Closely associated security improvements will also do much to improve the safety of our weapons in peacetime. I have placed significant emphasis on carrying out such improvements. I intend to encourage our Allies to take an equally serious view of the problem. We are working through several NATO organizations to obtain Allied assistance in and agreement to making needed improvements.

At Montebello, Defense Ministers agreed to make further stockpile reductions which leave the stockpile at its lowest level in the last twenty years. At the same time, the Allies agreed that NATO must pursue appropriate modernization programs so that this reduced stockpile will continue to constitute an adequate and credible deterrent. I will support both the stockpile level decision and the modernization programs which will ensure a credible deterrent. Present U.S. defense programs and budgets provide the means to implement these decisions. I ask for your support to ensure that they can be carried out in an orderly and timely fashion. The DOD report accurately documents the need, and outlines the remedial measures which we will be pursuing. The associated requirement to improve our target acquisition and communications capabilities is also well documented in the report.

As I mentioned earlier, NATO's nuclear posture correctly constitutes NATO's most effective deterrent against Soviet use of chemical weapons. We must do better than that, which is why the U.S. should develop a limited but modern chemical capability to serve as a direct deterrent against Soviet chemical use. U.S. defense budgets and programs include the necessary steps to sustain this deterrent.

NATO Allies are aware of the requirements for nuclear modernization and improvements in survivability and security. The U.S. will continue to provide the leadership and encouragement to stimulate the Allies to participate in their portions of future programs. As a result of the 1979 dual-track decision on LRINF, NATO is proceeding with deployments in the absence of a satisfactory negotiated arms reduction agreement which would make such deployments unnecessary. I stand fully committed to seek an equitable and verifiable arms reduction solution, and, as I have said many times, the U.S. is ready to recommend negotiations without preconditions at any time. Until such a negotiated solution is reached, however, the U.S. must provide the means to ensure that the nuclear posture of NATO does not deteriorate to such a degree that deterrence is threatened.

NATO's conventional, chemical, and nuclear forces are inextricably linked in achieving the Alliance's objective of deterrence and defense. If we are to maintain deterrence and live in peace and freedom, we must continue to improve each capability. Secretary Weinberger's report on NATO's nuclear posture has outlined the current situation and a practical way to proceed towards an enduring nuclear posture in NATO. I fully endorse his recommendations.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN










http://www.twiztv.com/scripts/battlestar/season2/galactica-212.htm

BATTLESTAR GALACTICA

2X12 - RESURRECTION SHIP (2)

Original Airdate (SciFi): 13-JAN-2006


Blackbird
===================================

Apollo is flying the blackbird up to the Resurrection Ship.

Apollo: Don't anyone look out of the window right now, please.



- posted by H.V.O.M - Kerry Wayne Burgess 08:30 AM Pacific Time Spokane Valley Washington USA Sunday 25 October 2015