http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-4th-circuit/1441869.html
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GLOVER v. SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
Lydia E. GLOVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 98-1130.
Argued Dec. 4, 1998. -- March 09, 1999
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
ARGUED: Marilyn Lynette Hudson, Andrews & Hudson, P.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Vance J. Bettis, Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: A. James Andrews, Andrews & Hudson, P.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant.
OPINION
After she was discharged for her deposition testimony in a federal employment discrimination suit, Lydia Glover sued her employer, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), for retaliation under section 704(a) of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to SLED, reasoning that Glover's conduct was not within the participation clause of section 704(a) because she testified unreasonably in her deposition. We hold that the participation clause shields even allegedly unreasonable testimony from employer retaliation, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.
I.
SLED hired Lydia Glover as a police captain in June 1994. Upon her hire Glover became the second-in-command to Major Jim Martin in SLED's Criminal Justice Information and Communications Systems (CJICS) section. Despite this relatively senior position, Glover had to complete a twelve-month probationary period before she became a permanent SLED employee.
Glover and Martin spent much of Glover's probationary term at daggers drawn. Martin criticized Glover for inferior work, for missing deadlines, and for failing to learn the operational aspects of CJICS. In March 1995 Glover wrote a memorandum to SLED Chief Robert Stewart criticizing Martin's management style and suggesting that he be moved to a different work location. Glover's memorandum described Martin as “moody, unpredictable, and overly critical” as well as “authoritarian and dictatorial.” Sensing that their relationship had badly deteriorated, Chief Stewart asked Glover and Martin to enter mediation.
At about the same time, Glover received a notice of deposition for a Title VII action that had been filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Jane Koball, a deputy marshal in South Dakota, had sued the United States Marshals Service for gender discrimination. Glover's connection to the case came from her own years in the Marshals Service-immediately before SLED hired her, Glover had been the United States Marshal for the District of South Carolina. During her nine-year career in that office she had served as chair of the Marshals Service Equal Employment Opportunity Advisory Committee and had met and counseled Koball.
Glover's deposition lasted the entire day of April 3, 1995. Her testimony was open and wide-ranging. With minimal prompting from the government's deposing attorney, Glover freely offered not only facts directly related to Koball's problems with the South Dakota marshals office, but also her impressions of the operations of the South Carolina marshals office. In particular, Glover perorated upon the perceived failings of her successor as the South Carolina U.S. Marshal, Israel Brooks. During the course of her testimony Glover accused Brooks of mismanagement, destruction of office documents, wasting funds, inappropriate behavior, dishonesty, and discrimination.
The parties offer different explanations for Glover's testimonial attack on Marshal Brooks. Glover asserts that she was merely responding to the questions of the deposing attorney. SLED, on the other hand, argues that Glover went out of her way through irrelevant and unresponsive answers to malign and disparage Brooks and other members of his office. In any event, the subject of Brooks and the state of the South Carolina marshals office occupies nearly one hundred pages of the 268-page deposition transcript.
Brooks eventually learned of Glover's deposition testimony and complained to SLED Chief Stewart. After reading the deposition transcript, Stewart reprimanded Glover for her testimony.
On June 16, 1995, Stewart informed Glover that he would not be retaining her after the expiration of her probationary period. Stewart cited three reasons for his decision. Two stemmed from the quality of her work during the first ten months of her tenure: first, that she had not developed an appropriate level of knowledge for her position, and second, that her priorities were inconsistent with those of the organization. Stewart's third criticism was that Glover's performance in her deposition had demonstrated poor judgment.
Stewart later admitted that he did not fire Glover solely for her job performance. Instead, he acknowledged that “the deposition caused [him] to go back and rethink the whole issue,” that he “took the deposition into consideration,” and that the deposition testimony “tipped the balance in favor of firing.”
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/probable%20cause
probable cause
(law) evidence sufficient to warrant an arrest
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-4th-circuit/1441869.html
FindLaw FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
GLOVER v. SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
Lydia E. GLOVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 98-1130.
Argued Dec. 4, 1998. -- March 09, 1999
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
Glover filed discrimination and retaliation charges against SLED with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Both agencies issued right-to-sue letters. Glover then filed this retaliatory discharge claim in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. On SLED's motion for summary judgment, the district court found that Glover had been terminated because of her deposition testimony. The court also found, however, that the specific testimony that led to Glover's termination was not protected “participation” under section 704(a), since it was “unresponsive, uncompelled, and gratuitous.” The district court therefore granted SLED's motion. Glover appeals, and we reverse.
II.
Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This provision has two parts: the opposition clause and the participation clause.
A plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that the two were causally related. Ross v.Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.1985). It is plain from the record that Glover suffered an adverse employment action and that there was a causal connection between that action and her deposition testimony. It is also plain that testifying in a deposition in a Title VII case generally constitutes protected activity under section 704(a)'s participation clause.1 In the absence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for Glover's termination, our inquiry would normally be at an end.
SLED contends, however, that an employee's conduct is only protected participation if that conduct is “reasonable.” To determine reasonableness, SLED asks us to import a balancing test into the participation clause. SLED finds guidance in our application of section 704(a)'s opposition clause. To determine whether conduct is protected opposition activity “[w]e balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing ․ discrimination, against Congress' equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel.” Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Glover's attacks on Marshal Brooks and his team were irrelevant to Koball's Title VII claim, SLED contends that her behavior was unreasonable and that it fails this balancing test. Under SLED's rationale, Glover's testimony thus does not constitute protected “participation.”
We are willing to assume for the purposes of this case that Glover's testimony was unreasonable. SLED still cannot prevail. Reading a reasonableness test into section 704(a)'s participation clause would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine the objectives of Title VII.
The plain language of the participation clause itself forecloses us from improvising such a reasonableness test. The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in a protected proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Glover was fired because she “testified” in a Title VII deposition. The term “testify” has a plain meaning: “[t]o bear witness” or “to give evidence as a witness.” Black's Law Dictionary 1476 (6th ed.1990).
Moreover, those who testify in Title VII proceedings are endowed with “exceptionally broad protection.” Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n. 18 (5th Cir.1969). “The word ‘testified’ is not preceded or followed by any restrictive language that limits its reach.” Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11thCir.1997). In fact, it is followed by the phrase “in any manner”-a clear signal that the provision is meant to sweep broadly. Id.; see also United States v. Wildes, 120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir.1997)(“ ‘[A]ny’ is a term of great breadth.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 118 S.Ct. 885, 139 L.Ed.2d 873(1998). Congress could not have carved out in clearer terms this safe harbor from employer retaliation. A straightforward reading of the statute's unrestrictive language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive employer action.
http://www.usmarshals.gov/district/sc/general/history.htm
U.S. Marshals Service
District of South Carolina
History
The United States Marshal Office in South Carolina was established on September 24, 1789. The Eastern and Western Districts of South Carolina were formed on February 21, 1823, when Congress divided the South Carolina District. On October 07, 1965, the Eastern and Western Districts merged and became what is now known as the District of South Carolina. The following is a listing of Marshals for the District of South Carolina.
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
District Marshals Date Vice
Glover, Lydia August 01, 1985 (C) Whitworth (Retired)
Brooks, Israel March 11, 1994 (C) Glover (Term Expired)