Task Force on Women Business Owners

http://www.lyricstime.com/c-w-mccall-convoy-lyrics.html

lyricstime.com


C.w. Mccall

Convoy


Yeah, breaker one nine
This here's the Rubber Duck
You got a copy on me Pig Pen, c'mon

Uh, yeah, Ten-Four Pig Pen, fer sure, fer sure
By golly it's clean clear to Flag Town, c'mon
Yeah, its a big Ten-Four there Pig Pen
Yeah, we definitely got the front door, good buddy
Mercy sakes alive, looks like we've got us a convoy

It was the dark of the moon
On the sixth of June
And a Kenworth pullin' logs
Cab over Pete with a refer on
And a Jimmy haulin' hogs
We was headin' for bear
On 'I-1-0
'Bout a mile out Shakey Town
I says, Pig Pen this here's the Rubber Duck
And I'm about to put the hammer down

'Cause we got a little 'ole convoy
Rockin' through the night
Yeah, we got a little 'ole convoy
Ain't she a beautiful sight
C'mon and join our Convoy
Ain't nothin' gonna get in our way
We gonna roll this truckin' convoy
'Cross the USA
Convoy
Convoy

Yeah, breaker Pig Pen this here's the Duck
And uh, you wanna back off them hogs
Uh, ten-four 'bout five mile or so
Ten-Roger them hogs is gettin' intense up here

By the time we got into Tulsa Town
We had eighty-five trucks in all
But they's a road block up on the clover leaf
And them bears was wall to wall
Yeah, them smokies as thick as bugs on a bumper
They even had a bear in the air
I says, callin' all trucks
This here's the Duck
We about to go a huntin' bear

'Cause we got a little 'ole convoy
Rockin' through the night
Yeah, we got a great big convoy
Ain't she a beautiful sight
C'mon and join our Convoy
Ain't nothin' gonna get in our way
We gonna roll this truckin' convoy
'Cross the USA
Convoy
Convoy

Uh, you wanna give me a ten-nine on that Pig Pen
Uh, negatory Pig Pen you're still too close
Yeah, them hogs is startin' to close up my sinuses
Mercy sakes, you'd better back off another ten

Well, we rolled up Innerstate fourty-four
Like a rocket sled on rails
We tore up all of our swindel sheets
And left 'em settin' on the scales
By the time we hit that Shy Town
Them bears was a gettin' smart
They'd brought up some reinforcements
From the Illinois national guard
There's armored cars and tanks and jeeps
And rigs of every size
Yeah, them chicken coops was full of bears
And choppers filled the skies
Well, we shot the line
We went for broke
With a thousand screamin' trucks
And eleven long haired Friends of Jesus
In a Chartreuse microbus

Yeah, Rubber Duck 'tis Sod Buster
C'mon there
Yeah, Ten-Four Sod Buster
Listen, you wanna put that microbus
In behind that suicide jockey
Yeah, he's haulin' dynamite
And he needs all the help he can get

Well, we laid a strip for the Jersey Shore
Prepared to cross the line
I could see the bridge was lined with bears
But I didn't have a doggone dime
I says, Pig Pen this here's the Rubber Duck
We just ain't a gonna pay no toll
So we crashed the gate doin' 98
I says let them truckers roll
Ten-Four

'Cause we got a mighty convoy
Rockin' through the night
Yeah, we got a mighty convoy
Ain't she a beautiful sight
C'mon and join our Convoy
Ain't nothin' gonna get in our way
We gonna roll this truckin' convoy
'Cross the USA
Convoy
Convoy










http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-05/local/me-5169_1_persian-gulf

Los Angeles Times


Now, Something Worse in the Gulf Than War : What if You Do Everything Right and End Up Killing 300 Civilians?

July 05, 1988 TOM CLANCY Tom Clancy is the author of "Red Storm Rising" and the coming "Cardinal of the Kremlin."

I heard of the latest Persian Gulf incident from National Public Radio while driving home from Nashville, Tenn. The collective deaths of even 300 terrorists would give most of us cause for momentary grief at the wastage of human life. The extinction of a similar number of civilian lives, many of them children's lives, is a horror differing from the Holocaust in scale but not in substance. And we all ask ourselves in that moment when our eyes close and breath goes out in a sigh, "What went wrong?"

What went wrong is simply that there is a war under way in and around the Persian Gulf. The world has evolved rules for the conduct of war, and though it may seem that the very concept of rules for the dreadful thing that we call war is lunacy, we have here an example of why they did in fact come about--there are worse things than war.

The U.S. Navy is in the gulf for a reason so simple as to be irrelevant in these modern, sophisticated times. It's called freedom of the seas. That was the first mission of the U.S. Navy after independence. A flag officer named Preble led a small fleet of warships to the Mediterranean to restrain the Barbary pirates from attacking American shipping. Later the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy exterminated piracy in U.S. waters and ruthlessly enforced a ban on the slave trade. This was done because the collective will of mankind wishes the sea to be free for the passage of all and the pursuit of peaceful trade.

In time of war things are more complicated. It is customary for belligerent nations to deny maritime trade to one another, extending even to ships of non-belligerent nations. In 1914 it came about that merchant ships were subjected to submarine attack without warning, ending the longstanding "Rules of Prize Warfare" that had made the interdiction of trade a fairly civilized process. Western nations were horrified by this development, but soon realized that technology made it inevitable.

In the Iran-Iraq War something new has been added. Iraq has attacked Iranian and otherwise-flagged tankers taking oil out . Both sides, of course, are selling oil, and are using the proceeds to buy weapons used in a war that may have ended a million lives for a few square miles of marshland on their mutual border. As terrible as that is, it isn't new. Neither is the extensive use of chemical weapons, a special horror largely ignored in the rest of the world. What is new are Iranian attacks against tankers of non-belligerent nations trading with other gulf states, and occasionally against those states as well. This is donein the belief that those other states are providing financial support to Iraq as a foil against the Islamic revolution in Iran, which may well be true. While Iran is unwilling to declare war against its neighbors, it seems to want to share with them the misery and costs of that war.

And that is why the U.S. Navy is in the Persian Gulf. The duty of sustaining the principle of freedom of the seas historically falls on the nation with the most powerful navy, and that's us. Unfortunately, we have handled the matter poorly.

We extended our protection only to American-flagged Kuwaiti tankers as if freedom of the seas were a superpower prerogative, even though we have entered wars to prove that it was not. Historians tell us that departure from principle in the name of expediency is always a mistake. For those who don't believe, here is renewed proof. The principle was not observed in full, and the Iranians gave it commensurate respect. Move and countermove have ensued. American sailors have died because we have ordered them to be a "presence" in a war zone. Our ships must live in a war zone, must defend themselves but may not take any decisive action to end the threats. When attacked, they take enough action to punish the attackers, but not those who gave the orders. This in a part of the world where human life is rather a cheaper currency than it is here. And so it goes on.

And so while the Vincennes was fighting yet another small engagement against Iranian gunboats, a new blip appeared on its radar screens. The aircraft was reportedly not in a designated airliner corridor.



http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-05/local/me-5169_1_persian-gulf/2

Los Angeles Times


(Page 2 of 2)

Now, Something Worse in the Gulf Than War : What if You Do Everything Right and End Up Killing 300 Civilians?

July 05, 1988 TOM CLANCY Tom Clancy is the author of "Red Storm Rising" and the coming "Cardinal of the Kremlin."

Put yourself in the captain's place. U.S. ships have been attacked by aircraft in the gulf, at the cost of American lives. You have one battle under way, and now there is a new potential threat. It's heading toward you at 450 knots. Not so long ago, another U.S. Navy cruiser shot it out with air and surface units at the same time. You try to warn the aircraft off. Your radar doesn't tell you what kind of aircraft it is because radar sets don't do that. If it's an airliner, you think, it ought to have its transponder on--but military aircraft can and have used airliner codes on their transponder boxes. Maybe the transponder was broken. Maybe it was switched off. A fighter-bomber can go faster than 450 knots, but that's about the right speed for a bomb or missile attack. You call him on a different frequency to warn him off. He's heading right toward you, and 450 knots means that he's closing the range on your ship at a rate of almost 9 miles per minute. Your lookouts are searching for him with their "big eye" spotting glasses, but they can't see him in the clouds and haze. Who is it? You're still calling him on the radio when it occurs to you that he's closer to you than the plane that put two Exocet missiles into the Stark.

What would you do now? You'd probably remember that the prime duty of a ship's captain is the safety of his ship. The captain of the Vincennes waited long enough that he fired two missiles at a range of nine miles, when those missiles can reach at least five times that distance. Probably you're still hoping to raise him. If you do, you can shut off the guidance radar and the missiles will self-destruct. But he doesn't answer, and the SM2MR missiles performed as designed. Then you find out that it's an airliner. You did everything right, and killed 300 civilians.

It is an overly respected Western tradition that when politicians can't decide what to do, people in uniform are sent to the troublesome spots to do the dying, and the killing. People in uniform don't ask very much of us, despite the fact that we ask a lot of them. What they deserve are clear orders and clear missions, but that doesn't happen very much. Because it didn't happen here, something worse than war did happen.

I wonder if Capt. Will C. Rogers III will have a decent night's sleep anytime soon. You see, he is a victim, too.










https://ethoslive.wordpress.com/2015/04/28/my-time-in-operation-earnest-will/comment-page-1/

Ethos Live


My Time in Operation Earnest Will

nsweditor / 2015-04-28

By Jim Gray, GMCM SWCC Ret.

Operation Earnest Will, part of the “Tanker Wars” between Iran and Iraq, began in July 1987, when the United States decided to protect Kuwaiti-owned tankers from Iran. This was accomplished by “reflagging” tankers under the American flag and providing naval convoy escort to and from Kuwait. In addition to the U.S. Navy ships, this campaign would also involve U.S. Special Operations Command in its first tactical commitment. U.S. Navy SEALs and Special Boat Units under NSW Task Units, and U.S. Army SOF’s Task Force 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) Night Stalkers all came together to provide critical, behind the scenes support for the more visible convoy; the largest since World War II.










From 10/28/1955 ( Microsoft Bill Gates the transvestite and 100% female gender as born and the Soviet Union prostitute and the cowardly International Terrorist violently against the United States of America actively instigates insurrection and subversive activity against the USA and United Nations chartered allies ) To 6/28/1978 ( Jimmy Carter - Task Force on Women Business Owners Remarks on Receiving the Report of the Task Force ) is 8279 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 7/3/1988 is 8279 days





http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-warship-downs-iranian-passenger-jet/print

HISTORY


JULY 03, 1988 : U.S. WARSHIP DOWNS IRANIAN PASSENGER JET

In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy cruiser Vincennes shoots down an Iranian passenger jet that it mistakes for a hostile Iranian fighter aircraft. Two missiles were fired from the American warship–the aircraft was hit, and all 290 people aboard were killed. The attack came near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when U.S. vessels were in the gulf defending Kuwaiti oil tankers. Minutes before Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down, the Vincennes had engaged Iranian gunboats that shot at its helicopter.

Iran called the downing of the aircraft a “barbaric massacre,” but U.S. officials defended the action, claiming that the aircraft was outside the commercial jet flight corridor, flying at only 7,800 feet, and was on a descent toward the Vincennes. However, one month later, U.S. authorities acknowledged that the airbus was in the commercial flight corridor, flying at 12,000 feet, and not descending. The U.S. Navy report blamed crew error caused by psychological stress on men who were in combat for the first time. In 1996, the U.S. agreed to pay $62 million in damages to the families of the Iranians killed in the attack.










http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/11/world/downing-of-flight-655-questions-keep-coming.html?pagewanted=all

The New York Times


Downing of Flight 655: Questions Keep Coming

This article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. It was written by Mr. Engelberg

Published: July 11, 1988

WASHINGTON, July 10— When dawn broke in the Persian Gulf on July 3, American commanders there were armed with a valuable piece of secret information, United States military officials say. Intelligence experts had broken the coded electronic signals that Iranian F-14 planes had recently used to identify themselves.

That intelligence breakthrough had enabled American warships to identify F-14 fighters from miles away, according to American military officials. And on July 3, Capt. Will C. Rogers 3d of the Navy ship Vincennes had every reason to believe that system was working well.

As a civilian Iranian Airbus took off on July 3, it was immediately spotted by the radar operators aboard the Vincennes as an unidentified aircraft leaving an airfield used jointly by military and civilian airplanes, the American officials said. Within minutes, the ship's system for breaking the identifying code had received two signals. One signal was appropriate to both civilian and military planes. The second signal could only have been sent by a military transmitter and appeared to have come from an F-14, the officials said.

But while Captain Rogers knew what had apparently been transmitted by the plane on coded military frequencies, he was not aware that the aircraft had been exchanging routine flight instructions with the civilian control tower that were broadcast on open radio channels, officials said. Conversations With Tower

The lack of information about the control tower is important because the Vincennes shot down the civilian Airbus on the mistaken belief that the coded signals were correct, and that the target was an Iranian F-14 fighter. Iran said this weekend that the plane's conversations with the tower began 17 minutes before take off and continued throughout the eight-minute flight.

Had these been provided to Captain Rogers, they would have prompted doubts about his conclusion he was firing on a fighter aircraft.

Determining the quality and accuracy of the welter of electronic information available to Captain Rogers is at the heart of the efforts to explain how an advanced Navy warship shot down a civilian airliner, killing all 290 people aboard.

While many questions remain, a reconstruction of events leading up to the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, based on interviews with military officers and Administration officials, discloses new information that supports conflicting explanations of the incident. The new information includes these details:

* The Vincennes used its system to read airplane identification codes at three points in the flight of the Airbus, a circumstance that some technical experts insist makes it unlikely that the Vincennes picked up a signal from a far-off plane and erroneously at-tributed it to the Airbus.

* On the other hand, the American listening post in Oman believes it detected an Iranian F-14 taking off from Bandar Abbas shortly after the Airbus, according to one well-placed American official. If this intelligence report is confirmed by other evidence, the presence of this aircraft would lend some credence to the theory that the military code came from another plane. The Pentagon insists this is highly unlikely since the Vincennes did not detect a separate flight.

* In a mock attack on the American fleet in a 1978 exercise, while Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi was still in power, the Iranian Air Force executed a maneuver in which three fighter planes were hidden beneath the radar image of a Boeing 707 jetliner. The planes flew just a few feet from the jetliner with their transponders turned off, allowing them to catch the American ships unaware. But despite this, Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told reporters that there is no ''pattern'' of the Iranians using F-14's in this manner. The Pentagon discounts the liklihood of this tactic being linked with the current incident.

* While it remains unclear why Flight 655 failed to respond to at least five radio warnings on the civilian emergency frequencies and seven on the military channels, American officials said they have learned that an Iranian military P-3 Orion aircraft flying nearby did monitor the warnings. The officials did not explain the basis for this assessment or say whether the Orion made any attempt to pass on the information to the Airbus. One experienced Navy officer said that Iranian aircraft over the gulf often heed the warnings by changing course, but do not acknowledge receiving them.

* The Vincennes was in voice communication, not a direct electronic link, with the John H. Sides, a Navy frigate that had a conflicting radar picture of the flight. The Sides, patrolling 17 miles from the Vincennes, reportedly saw a plane on radar at 12,000 feet and holding level; the more sophisticated radar aboard the Vincennes reportedly saw Flight 655 as descending in a threatening path appropriate for an attack. Military officers said Captain Rogers decided to rely on his own radar. The Pentagon has not said whether the identification information sent by the Airbus included information on the plane's altitude.

* Adding to the mystery, there were additional discrepancies pertaining to the two identifying signals that the Vincennes says were emanating from the civilian plane. Unlike the Vincennes, the Sides did not detect a military code emanating from the civilian Airbus. The civilian identifying signal it did pick up had a different number than the one detected by the Vincennes.

* The missiles were fired at virtually the last possible moment. As with any Navy ship, the Vincennes's missiles cannot be fired when the target is inside a certain distance. While military officers refused to disclose the minimum distance for the Vincennes, they said normal practice would be to leave enough time for two separate firings, what is termed ''shoot/look/shoot'' in military parlance. Captain Rogers waited so long, he had to fire both missiles at once.

* The Vincennes had limited equipment to send and receive the VHF frequencies used by control towers for long-distance radio communications. One possibility is that the Navy ship's VHF circuits were being used to communicate with the fleet about the engagement with Iranian gunboats just minutes before. The Main Questions Of the Investigation

With investigators beginning to pore over the combat tapes from the Vincennes, many aspects of the affair remain unclear. Navy officials said, however, that they are confident the computer data from the ship will resolve the uncertainties. They said, however, that there were no tapes from the data collected by the Navy ship, the Sides.

There are three essential issues that the investigation now underway will examine, according to military officials.

The first is whether Captain Rogers acted properly, given the information at his disposal.

The second is whether any of the information he used to make his decision was inaccurate or distorted, either because of human error or technical failure. Finally, the investigators will have to examine whether there was any data Captain Rogers should have had that he did not.

At the heart of the inquiry are the procedures used to distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft. The Navy has a number of tools to do this, including a system called IFF.

The IFF system is considered a relatively crude instrument by military experts. It is designed primary to distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft in a war and is not a finely tuned instrument for identifying all types of aircraft.

''IFF stands for identification friend or foe,'' said Norman Friedman, an author on naval radar systems. ''That means give me the right signal or you are the enemy. It is a cooperative system, which depends on other planes to send you the appropriate signals when interrogated. And in wartime you would have to accept some mistakes.''

''But in peacetime or a limited conflict the margin of acceptable error is much narrower. And the system is being used to in a more demanding way to get positive identifications of everything.''

This system sends out an electronic beam signal along a particular bearing at which a ship has spotted an unidentified plane. When the beam strikes the transponder carried aboard most aircraft, it triggers a special signal, which is sent back. The identification system measures the time it took to receive a response.

This allows it to calculate the distance of the transponder sending the signal. Factors That Can Skew Transponder Readings

Military experts said that problems can arise if there are several planes on the same bearing at different distances. If there are unusual atmospheric conditions, it is possible that a response from a plane far away could travel a long distance and be confused with a signal from a closer airplane.

The system is not as accurate in locating targets as the SPY-1 radar used by the Vincennes to track targets.

Shortly after Iran Air's Flight 655 took off at 10:47 A.M., the Vincennes sent an electronic beam toward the plane's transponder. According to the Pentagon, the answer was confusing, something that the Pentagon has publicly stated has not been seen before in the gulf.

The plane was detected as emitting a signal at a frequency called Mode 3. That made sense, because Mode 3 is used by all civilian aircraft as well as military planes. But it also appeared to be giving off an enciphered 4-digit code in Mode 2, a frequency reserved for the military.

The 4-digit code was decoded and military officers said the number that popped up from this transmission was the same as the 4-digit code previously associated with Iranian F-14 fighter aircraft. Officials disclosed, however, that the four numbers detected by the Vincennes were different from the code read the previous day when two F-14 aircraft had flown close to another Navy ship in the gulf.

The ability to read the Mode 2 identification signal had been a closely guarded secret. In his first briefing on the incident last Sunday, Admiral Crowe said the ship received ambiguous information. He declined to elaborate. Later in the week, with questions mounting, the Navy decided to make public the information about its capabilities to read the codes.

The assumption that a particular number is associated with a specific airplane is based on observation. The officers said the Iranians change codes on occasion, so it was possible that a number linked to an F-14 in the past could be reassigned to another military aircraft, for example an F-4 jet designed to attack ground targets.

The F-14 aircraft were designed for air-to-air combat. Pentagon officials have said they assume the Iranians could have added weapons for firing at ships or deployed standard bombs.

After crossing the Iranian land mass at 10:49, the jetliner was flying four to five miles west of the center line of an established air corridor to Dubai. But it was well within the boundaries of that corridor. The plane then adjusted its course to move toward the center of the corridor, a move that put it on a direct bearing toward the Vincennes, which was slightly east of the center line of the air corridor. It is not known if the flight recorder of the jetliner has been recovered. Aboard the Vincennes, Conflicting Information

Aboard the ship, Captain Rogers tried to understand the meaning of the double message being received.

There were a number of possibilities. Was the plane really an F-14? Was it a civilian plane that mistakenly had a military transmitter aboard? Were there two planes out there?

The identification system could offer no clarification and so the ship interrogated the transponder twice more. Both times the answer came back in both Mode 2 and Mode 3.

With the F-14 code blinking in the command center, Captain Rogers tried to contact the plane by radio. No answer was received and the Airbus continued to fly toward the Vincennes. The ship's radars showed that after reaching an altitude of about 9,000 feet, it began descending at a speed of about 450 knots per hour. This flight path would be unusual for an Airbus, even on a short flight, experts have said. But the frigate Sides had contrary data about the plane, placing it at 12,000 feet and flying level.

Military officials said Captain Rogers was uncertain about the identity of the target and was concerned that it might be a civilian jetliner.

When the plane was 20 miles from the ship, Captain Rogers consulted with the theater commander who was aboard another ship in the gulf. The captain was authorized to give one more warning and then fire on the aircraft.

Captain Rogers gave the warning, but he held his fire. Instead, Navy officials said officers on the ship remained concerned that the plane was a civilian jet. They began thumbing through an airline schedule to see if there were any regularly scheduled flights expected to leave Bandar Abbas at that hour.

Captain Rogers did not find Flight 655. Secondary System Showed No Readings

At some point in these four minutes, United States officials said Captain Rogers undoubtedly checked the ship's system for detecting radar from aircraft, the SLQ-32. That system picked up no sign that the plane had turned on its ''fire control'' radar, a necessary prelude to firing a missile.

The Pentagon has said that it is not clear what, if anything, the SLQ-32 picked up. But the absence of a reading would not necessarily be surprising. Attacking planes can wait until the last possible moment before ''illuminating'' a target with their own radar; civilian airliners in the gulf often do not turn on weather radar until reaching cruising altitude, according to a military officer.

Captain Rogers was nearly out of time to make his decision. With seconds to go before missiles would not be effective, he gave the order to fire the missiles. Guided by the radar system in the Aegis cruiser, the Standard missiles streaked toward the airplane at a speed of upward of one and a half times the speed of sound. An explosion was spotted from the ship's deck.

The Standard can only hit a target if the radar is locked on the target.

Almost immediately, Iran was claiming that the United States had shot down a civilian Airbus. As officials gathered for an early morning meeting in the State Department, they considered whether Iran was making a false claim to cover up an F-14 attack.

Then one official left the meeting to find an airline schedule. The mood turned grim as the official found Flight 655. ''We told the Pentagon: 'You'd better check this one out very carefully,' '' recalled one Administration official.

About 12 hours later, Admiral Crowe was briefing the nation on what he hoped would be a definitive explanation of the downing of Flight 655. Instead, his press conference has already proven to have provided the first of what has been a plethora of theories about what happened. What Really Happened? Some of the Theories

The hypothesis developed so far turns to a great extent on the question of whether the coded F-14 signals that American officials say the Vincennes detected came from a military plane in the area, the civilian Airbus, or were a mistaken reading.

Representative Les Aspin, the chairman of House Armed Services Committee, outlined the theory of a second aircraft after being briefed by Navy officials earlier this week.

Mr. Aspin said then that a plausible explanation was that the identification system on the Vincennes had picked up a coded signal from an Iranian F-14 that was on the ground at the Bandar Abbas airport. This signal was then erroneously attributed to the Iranian Airbus by the Vincennes, according to this theory.

A number of factors have been cited to support this idea. For one thing, the identification system frequently does not include the altitude of the interrogated aircraft and therefore it would not be known if the signal received came from a plane on the ground. Another piece of supporting evidence is that the frigate Sides only picked up the Mode 3 signals from the Iranian Airbus - Mode 3 signals come from civilian and military planes. It did not detect any Mode 2, or military, codes.

But other evidence counts against this theory. The Vincennes used its identification system to ''interrogate'' the Iranian Airbus three times and received the civilian signals and coded F-14 signals each time at three different bearings, American officials said. Because of this new evidence, Mr. Aspin has now backed away from this his initial assertion that this is the most likely explanation. ''Unfortunately, no theory stands out under scrutiny at this point,'' Mr. Aspin said Saturday.

At the same time, however, a senior military official said the two-airplane theory was getting a fresh look because of unconfirmed reports that the Italian frigate Espero and an installation in Oman picked up indications of an F-14 in the area shortly after the Airbus took off.

One variation on the two-aircraft theory is that environmental conditions in the gulf could have led the identification system on the Aegis to pick up a coded F-14 signal from far away. In a closed door briefing for members of Congress, some Navy briefers were adamant that the heat and humidity in the region cannot have such a large distorting effect on the readings of identification systems and said the system was used three times to ''interrogate'' the Airbus transponder.

Officials familiar with the area have previously complained about a phenomenon called ''ducting,'' in which mist and dust can distort electronic emmissions, making them appear to emanate at points as distant as two hundred miles from their actual origin. In a press conference late last month, Gen. George B. Crist, the commander of American forces in the region, cited an April 18 incident in which radar systems on United States ships picked up the firing of a Silkworm missile. Navy analysts now believe that the missile was fired in the northern gulf, 300 to 400 miles from an American ship that registered a reading that the firing was at close range. ''Just an off electronic environment in the gulf,'' General Crist said. ''That signal was ducted almost 300 to 400 miles and then picked up by our ship as a good signal.''

Still another variation of the theme that two aircraft were involved is the view that there was an F-14 hiding behind the Airbus.

American military officials said the Iranian Air Force had done the exercise in 1978 in which a Boeing 707 was used to mask an attack on the American fleet. A former military official said the idea came from Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord, a former senior American military official in Iran. The former official said the exercise involved three F-4's, one on each wingtip of the 707, the other behind the tail.










http://www.e-reading.org.ua/bookreader.php/79701/Clancy_-_Red_Storm_Rising.txt


Red Storm Rising (1986)

Tom Clancy


6 – The Watchers


Morris went aft, down the ladder to the Combat Information Center, or CIC. His executive officer would take the conn at the bridge, allowing the captain to control the ship's weapons and sensors from her tactical nerve center. All over the ship, men were running to stations. Watertight doors and hatches were dropped into place and dogged down to give the ship full watertight integrity. Damage-control parties donned emergency equipment. It took just over four minutes. Getting better, Morris noted as the "manned and ready" calls were relayed to him by the CIC talker. Since leaving Norfolk four days before, PHARRIS was averaging three GQ calls per day, as ordered by Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic. No one had confirmed it, but Morris figured that his friend's information had kicked over an anthill. His training routines had been doubled, and the orders for the increase of activity were classified as high as anything he had ever seen. More remarkably, the increased training tempos would interfere with maintenance scheduling, something not lightly set aside.

"All stations report manned and ready!" the talker finally announced. "Condition Zebra set throughout the ship."

"Very well," the tactical action officer acknowledged.

"Report, mister," Morris ordered.

"Sir, the navigation and air-search radars are in stand-by










https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klystron


Klystron

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A klystron is a specialized linear-beam vacuum tube, invented in 1937 by American electrical engineers Russell and Sigurd Varian, which is used as an amplifier for high radio frequencies, from UHF up into the microwave range.










http://www.chakoteya.net/NextGen/272.htm

Journey's End [ Star Trek: The Next Generation ]

Stardate: 47751.2

Original Airdate: Mar 28, 1994


[Bridge]

(Red alert)

RIKER: The Cardassian ship is powering its weapons










http://www.e-reading.org.ua/bookreader.php/79701/Clancy_-_Red_Storm_Rising.txt


Red Storm Rising (1986)

Tom Clancy


17 – The Frisbees of Dreamland


At the moment, a low-light television in his targeting systems showed them to be covered with Russian T-80 tanks, all heading west. Ellington evaluated the picture on his television screen. This could only be the second echelon of the army deployed to attack NATO. There was an SA-6 battery atop Hill 76 south of the bridges on the east bank, sited there to defend them. It had to be fully alert now. His earphones chirped constantly with noise from his threat receiver as the search radars from a score of air-defense batteries swept continuously over his aircraft. If only one of them got a good return . . . Pucker factor, Ellington reflected grimly.

"How's the Pave Tack?"

"Nominal," Eisly responded curtly. Pilot and back-seater were both under enormous stress.

"Illuminate," Ellington ordered. In the back seat, Eisly activated the Pave Tack target-illumination laser.

The elaborate Pave Tack gear was built into the Frisbee's drooping nosecone. Its lowermost part was a rotating turret containing a carbondioxide laser and television camera. The major used his joystick controls to center the TV picture on the bridge, then unmasked the infrared laser. An invisible dot appeared in the center of the north span's bridge deck. A computer system would keep it there until told to do otherwise, and a videotape recorder would make a visual record of the raid's success or failure.

"The target is lit," Eisly said. "Still no fire-control radars on us."

"Nemo, this is Shade 4. The target is lit."

"Roge."

Fifteen seconds later the first Aardvark screamed south a bare thirty feet over the water, popped up, and loosed a single GBU-15 Paveway laser-guided bomb before it turned hard to the east over Hohenroarthe. An optical-computer system in the bomb's nose noted the deflected infrared beam, centered it, and adjusted the fins accordingly.

South of the bridge, the SAM battery commander was trying to decide what the noise was. His search radar did not show the Frisbee. He had been told not to expect the presence of "friendly" aircraft-the safe travel lane was fifteen miles to the north, over the Frontal Aviation base at Mahlminkel. Maybe that's where the noise was coming from, he thought. No special alarm has been sent out-

"Red Storm Rising"

The northern horizon went bright yellow. Though he did not know it, four Luftwaffe Tornados had just made a single pass over Mahlminkel, leaving hundreds of explosive cluster munitions in their wake. A half-dozen Soviet Sukhoi attack fighters went up in flames, sending a fireball of jet fuel that rose up into the rain-filled sky.

The battery commander hesitated not at all-he shouted an order for his men to switch their fire-control radars from stand-by










https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=17&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjqqqTr_4jKAhUG7GMKHYPHAWwQFgiHATAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA476604&usg=AFQjCNGMpWjZRPDccqob9ZrqY6GL1IT8Dg&sig2=pyxRMILbQWGPVnojn8Azmg


page 2


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

SOME TACTICAL MISTAKES HAVE THEATER-STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES

by Patrick C. Rabun Captain, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War Col

Abstract

Some tactical mistakes have theater-strategic consequences. Few would disagree with this statement. In fact, many recent events help prove its validity. But, so what? Can anything be done about it? Yes! The Combatant Commander (COCOM) is in a unique position to address the challenges of tactical mistakes. COCOMs can take actions which may actually prevent tactical mistakes. Similarly, COCOMs often make the first critical evaluation of whether a tactical mistake warrants a response. Finally, COCOMs serve as a key interagency link in coordinating appropriate responses to the unique circumstances of any tactical mistake. An analysis of recent case studies reveals applicable guidelines.


USS VINCENNES. Iran and Iraq were at war in 1988, often attacking each other’s oil tankers with mines, small boats, or aircraft. USS Vincennes, one of the U.S. Navy’s new Aegis cruisers, was accelerated into a Persian Gulf deployment in order to protect neutral shipping. Once on station, the ship gained the nickname Robo-Cruiser, due to its automated combat system and the aggressive reputation of its Commanding Officer, Captain Will Rogers. Unfortunately, on 03 July 1988, USS Vincennes shot down commercial airliner Iran Air flight #655 (IR655) – believing it was an Iranian F-14 flying an attack profile. All 290 passengers and crew were killed. Newsweek later reported one of the more-negative assessments:

The destruction of IR655 was an appalling human tragedy. It damaged America’s world standing. It almost surely caused Iran to delay the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. It may have given the mullahs a motive for revenge and provoked Tehran into playing a role in the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103. For the Navy, it was a professional disgrace. The Navy’s most expensive surface warship, designed to track and shoot down as many as 200 incoming missiles at once, had blown apart an innocent civilian airliner in its first time in combat. What’s more, Newsweek has learned the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters at the time of the shoot-down – in clear violation of international law. The top Pentagon brass understood from the beginning that if the whole truth about the Vincennes came out, it would mean months of humiliating headlines. So the U.S. Navy did what all navies do after terrible blunders at sea: it told lies and handed out medals.










https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_C._Rogers_III


William C. Rogers III

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

William C. Rogers III, (born December 1938) is a former officer in the United States Navy, most notable as the captain of USS Vincennes, a Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser. While under his command, the ship shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in the Persian Gulf, killing 290 civilians and creating an international incident.


Bombing of Rogers' family minivan

Nine months after the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, on March 10, 1989, Rogers' wife Sharon escaped with her life when a pipe bomb attached to her minivan exploded, while she was driving. The van was registered in the name of Will Rogers III, and many people at the time of the bombing suspected that terrorism was involved. Five months later, the Associated Press reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had shifted focus away from terrorism towards the possibility of someone with a personal vendetta against Capt. Rogers.










From 10/28/1955 ( Microsoft Bill Gates the transvestite and 100% female gender as born and the Soviet Union prostitute and the cowardly International Terrorist violently against the United States of America actively instigates insurrection and subversive activity against the USA and United Nations chartered allies ) To 3/5/1979 ( the closest approach of the United States spacecraft Voyager 1 to the planet Jupiter ) is 8529 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 3/10/1989 is 8529 days



From 11/26/1976 ( my biological brother Thomas Reagan the civilian and privately financed astronaut in solar system deep space in his privately financed atom-pulse propulsion spaceship this day makes his first landing the Jupiter moon Callisto ) To 3/10/1989 is 4487 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 2/14/1978 ( Jimmy Carter - Federal Summer Employment Program for Youth Memorandum From the President ) is 4487 days



From 11/26/1976 ( my biological brother Thomas Reagan the civilian and privately financed astronaut in solar system deep space in his privately financed atom-pulse propulsion spaceship this day makes his first landing the Jupiter moon Callisto ) To 3/10/1989 is 4487 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 2/14/1978 ( Jimmy Carter - Labor Disputes in the Coal Industry Remarks on the Stalemate in the Negotiations ) is 4487 days



From 10/6/1981 ( premiere US TV movie "The Return of the Beverly Hillbillies" ) To 3/10/1989 is 2712 days

2712 = 1356 + 1356

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 7/20/1969 ( my biological brother Thomas Reagan the United States Navy Commander circa 1969 was United States Apollo 11 Eagle spacecraft United States Navy astronaut landing and walking on the planet Earth's moon ) is 1356 days





http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-10/news/mn-1361_1_pipe-bomb

Los Angeles Times


Bomb Blows Up Van Driven by Wife of Vincennes' Capt. : She Escapes Injury; Iran Link Sought

March 10, 1989 From Times Wire Services

SAN DIEGO — A bomb today destroyed a van driven by the wife of Capt. Will Rogers, commander of the cruiser Vincennes which mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner, killing all 290 people aboard.

Police immediately took security measures to guard the wife, Sharon Rogers, who was unhurt, and her husband, fearing they might be the targets of a terrorist attack in retaliation for the shooting down of the airliner.

The van had stopped at a red light in suburban La Jolla when the initial explosion occurred. Mrs. Rogers jumped out before the van burst into flames and ran up an embankment to ask construction workers for help.

A second explosion then destroyed the van, police said.

Mrs. Rogers was "just shook up. She had had a bunch of kids in the van yesterday and she was upset because anyone in the back of the van wouldn't have made it," said Police Officer George Sykes.

Police said initially that the woman had been taken to a hospital, but reported later she and her husband, who had not been riding in the van, were being kept for their own safety at a nearby police station.

Security Arrangements Made

"Some other security arrangements are being made," a police spokesman, Bill Robinson, added, without giving details. But neighbors of the Rogerses said police immediately searched the family's house and evacuated homes nearby, presumably precautions in case a bomb had been planted in the house.

Police said the remains of a pipe bomb that had been attached to the van's undercarriage were found in the ruins. They said they had no suspects, but the FBI and naval investigators were helping in the investigation.

"There was a vehicle that was observed in the area at the time of the detonation, and we're looking into that right now," said FBI spokesman Ronald Orrantia.

Rogers is still captain of the Vincennes, which mistakenly shot down an Iran Airbus in the Persian Gulf last July 3.

The crew of the Vincennes was said by naval authorities to have mistaken the airliner for what it believed was an attacking Iranian F-14 fighter.

A Navy investigative panel cleared Rogers of any culpability but recommended censuring Lt. Cmdr. Scott E. Lustig, who was coordinating the Vincennes' anti-aircraft systems.

Overruled by Carlucci

Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci later overruled that recommendation and Adm. William J. Crowe decided to take no action against any member of the ship's crew.

The Ronald Reagan Administration defended the decision but offered to compensate the victims' families. Tehran radio said at the time the attack would be "avenged in the same blood-spattered sky over the Gulf."

In Washington today, Navy officials at the Pentagon said they were unaware of any threats against Rogers or his family, but were awaiting additional reports from San Diego.

On Dec. 21 a Pan Am jetliner was blown out of the sky over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground.

Iran denied any involvement in that blast, but a telephone caller said a group called the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution blew up the plane to avenge the shooting down of the Iran Airbus.










http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/science/jupiter.html

NASA

Jet Propulsion Laboratory


NASA launched the two Voyager spacecraft to Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune in the late summer of 1977. Voyager 1's closest approach to Jupiter occurred March 5, 1979.










http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0082989/releaseinfo

IMDb


The Return of the Beverly Hillbillies (1981 TV Movie)

Release Info

USA 6 October 1981



http://www.nytimes.com/movies/movie/128478/Return-of-the-Beverly-Hillbillies/overview

The New York Times


Return of the Beverly Hillbillies (1981)


Review Summary

Ten years after the cancellation of the cornpone comedy series The Beverly Hillbillies, the property was revived -- mercifully briefly -- in the form of a two-hour movie. Originally titled Solving the Energy Crisis, The Return of the Beverly Hillbillies found Buddy Ebsen, Donna Douglas and Nancy Kulp recreating their sitcom roles as millionaire hillbilly Jed Clampett (who'd moved back to the hills after dividing up his fortune amongst his loved ones), his daughter Elly May (now the owner of a small petting zoo), and bank secretary-turned-government functionary Jane Hathaway. Max Baer Jr. took a pass on the project, thus the role of Jed's nephew Jethro Bodine-now a "sophisticated Hollywood producer"-was played by Ray Young. And with Irene Ryan (Granny) and Raymond Bailey (Milburn Drysdale) having passed on, their replacements were Imogene Coca, and former Hogan's Heroes regular Werner Klemperer as government bureaucrat C. D. Medford, Jane Hathaway's new boss. Also on hand was bluegrass musician Earl Scruggs, who with his late partner Lester Flatt has composed and performed the original Beverly Hillbillies theme song {&"The Ballad of Jed Clampett"}; Shug Fisher and Shad Heller, who'd appeared in several 1969 episodes of the original series; and two veterans from The Beverly Hillbillies' sister series Petticoat Junction, Linda Kaye Henning and Charles Lane. The plot, if anyone cares, finds the Clampetts joining forces with Miss Jane to solve the energy shortage, using Granny's "white lightning" as a fuel substitute. As the film draws to a close, it looks as if Miss Jane and her boss Mr. Medford are about to be hitched in a good ol' Ozark wedding. Originally telecast on October 6, 1981, Return of the Beverly Hillbillies was intended as the pilot for a full-scale revival of the earlier series, but this was not to be.










From 11/26/1976 ( my biological brother Thomas Reagan the civilian and privately financed astronaut in solar system deep space in his privately financed atom-pulse propulsion spaceship this day makes his first landing the Jupiter moon Callisto ) To 6/1/2003 is 9683 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 5/7/1992 ( the first launch of the US space shuttle Endeavour orbiter vehicle mission STS-49 includes me Kerry Wayne Burgess the United States Marine Corps officer and United States STS-49 pilot astronaut ) is 9683 days



[ See also: http://hvom.blogspot.com/2015/07/proof_24.html ]


http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63302

The American Presidency Project

George W. Bush

XLIII President of the United States: 2001 - 2009

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space

June 1, 2003










http://channel9.msdn.com/shows/History/The-History-of-Microsoft-1976/

The History of Microsoft - 1976 [ RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS US Title 18 ]


For Microsoft, 1976 was the first year with an official name, it was the first time Bill Gates raised the issue of piracy


November 26, 1976

The trade name, Microsoft, is registered with the Office of the Secretary of the State of New Mexico.










http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-07/news/mn-3265_1_san-diego

Los Angeles Times


Car Bombing Investigation Shelved : Mystery: Sources say it may never be known who planted device in van of ex-skipper of ship that shot down Iranian airliner. Terrorism largely ruled out.

March 07, 1991 ALAN ABRAHAMSON TIMES STAFF WRITER

SAN DIEGO — Authorities have shelved an investigation into the bombing of a van belonging to Navy Capt. Will Rogers III, former skipper of the guided missile cruiser Vincennes, and have all but ruled out the possibility that terrorists planted the bomb two years ago, sources have told The Times.

Sources in Washington and California said investigators remain unable to develop a lead solid enough to support charges in the bombing.

Sources also confirmed what they had hinted at before--that terrorism essentially has been discarded as a working theory in favor of the notion that the attack was the result of a personal grudge against Rogers or his family.

Because the March 10, 1989, attack was aimed at a van owned by Rogers, it whipped fears that international terrorism had arrived on U.S. soil, and it sparked an intensive investigation by the FBI, Naval Investigative Service in San Diego, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and, to a lesser extent, San Diego police.

Rogers' wife, Sharon, who was alone in the van at the time of the bombing, escaped injury.

Investigators believed the bomb may have been planted by Iranian extremists seeking to avenge Capt. Rogers' order in July, 1988, aboard the Vincennes, to shoot down an approaching Iranian airplane that turned out to be a civilian jetliner. Two-hundred and ninety people were killed. Rogers eventually was exonerated because the airliner had failed to respond to repeated warnings from the Vincennes.

Mike Bourke, assistant director of the Naval Investigative Service office in San Diego, said the case was still open. "The investigation is still pending, and I have no additional comment," he said.

FBI spokesman Ron Orrantia in San Diego did not return repeated phone calls to his office.

The prosecutor on the case, Assistant U.S. Atty. Larry Burns in San Diego, declined to comment.

However, four sources familiar with the investigation have told The Times of the virtual halt in the probe. They also stated more emphatically than they have in the past that the focus of the case has shifted away from suspicion of terrorism.

The sources asked to remain anonymous, saying that the last flurry of press reports on the case--around the first anniversary of the bombing--launched an intense internal drive at federal and Navy agencies to find out who had talked to reporters.

The sources said that, since the intensity of the investigation has slackened significantly, it is unlikely the case ever will be solved.

They added that virtually no work has been done since last spring.

It has been 18 months since a federal grand jury in San Diego issued subpoenas in the case and there's no indication an indictment is near, sources said.

The case has gone on for so long that some rewards for information no longer exist, said Laurie Weitzman, associate director of the Crime Stoppers tip hot-line program in San Diego.

"It's one of those very frustrating crimes," one source said. "But it's not at all unique. It's not unique that some crimes remain unsolved for very long periods of time or never get solved. Who killed Jimmy Hoffa?"

Although investigators hope for new leads, Will Rogers, who now teaches Navy tactics, said in a recent interview that he and his wife are trying to put the whole thing behind them.

"We're trying to rebuild our lives, and I don't see any point in revisiting this," Will Rogers said.

Because of concerns about terrorism, Sharon Rogers was dismissed within weeks of the bombing from La Jolla Country Day School, where she had taught for 12 years.

Unable for months after that to land a full-time job, she is back at work this school year, teaching at a northern San Diego County school, according to a friend of the family who asked to remain unnamed.

Nearly two years after the incident, after tracking countless tips, the FBI has not determined why the Rogers' van was attacked, sources said. The FBI assumed jurisdiction of the case only because of the possibility of terrorism and, at one time, ranked the bombing as one of its top priorities, they said.

In late 1989, The Times reported that the investigation was turning away from terrorism and attention was being focused on two American men, brothers with ties to Southern California.

Investigators zeroed in first on H. George Marxmiller, an out-of-work Eastern Airlines pilot who was in the midst of a bitter divorce. Will Rogers was listed as a witness in the Georgia divorce case, though the divorce was concluded without Rogers' testimony.

Marxmiller contacted the FBI in 1989 with allegations that Will Rogers was involved sexually with a friend of Marxmiller's wife. Marxmiller alleged that the affair provided Will Rogers with a motive to kill Sharon Rogers.

Rogers has said repeatedly that he has no clue why his name surfaced in the divorce case and has consistently declined to respond to Marxmiller's accusations.

Sources said Marxmiller failed a lie detector test about his knowledge of the bombing, prompting investigators to consider him a suspect in the case.

Marxmiller told investigators that he visited his brother, Tom Marxmiller, who was then living near Los Angeles, about two weeks before the blast.

That angle remains the most promising, sources said in recent interviews. But it has not panned out.

George and Tom Marxmiller said in separate phone calls, as they have many times before, that they know nothing about the bombing.

"Like I say, I feel like I've been accused, but I haven't really had the right to defend myself," said George Marxmiller, 49, who flies for an airline based outside the country.

"And I don't think I should have to defend myself," he said. "I know I didn't do it, and I know my brother didn't do it."

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/be/Rogers_Family_Minivan.jpg










http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31004

The American Presidency Project

Jimmy Carter

XXXIX President of the United States: 1977 - 1981

Task Force on Women Business Owners Remarks on Receiving the Report of the Task Force.

June 28, 1978

During one speech while I was campaigning for President, I said that when Amy grows up, I'd like for her to have just as clear a vision of being a medical doctor as a nurse, or a lawyer as a secretary, or to be President as to be a President's wife. I know when I was a child, I was an entrepreneur at a very early age, selling boiled peanuts when I was 5 years old and later graduating to hamburgers and homemade ice cream. [Laughter] Amy has already started in the lemonade business, as you may have noticed during the halcyon days when I was a nominee and before I had any responsibilities as President.

And I think that last year, the testimony that Juanita Kreps gave to the Congress about the problems with women being entrepreneurs and business executives inspired me to call on this Task Force to meet to investigate the present problems and to give me advice on what I might do as President heading the executive branch of Government and having influence in the business community and, perhaps, some limited influence in the higher education institutions to help with the problem.

There is a definite problem. Although women enjoy a major role in the ownership of stock in businesses, sometimes earned by themselves, sometimes inherited after the death of a husband, there's an alarmingly small portion of women ownership of active businesses in the financial structure of our country. Less than one-half of 1 percent—as a matter of fact, I think three-tenths of 1 percent of gross business receipts in this country are derived from businesses owned by women.

This is an alarmingly small percentage. And it certainly is not related to either the need or the inclination or ambition of women who want to be at the management level in the free enterprise system of our country.

Women have the same motivations as men for wanting to own and control and to manage the business life of our country. They desire, obviously, to earn a living, to make money, to take what talents or ability they have and to let that talent be expressed in productive contribution to society and to exercise management, judgments, and to shape the communities within which they live, to set an example for others to enter the competitive world that makes our country a great one.

Women also have the same problems that men do in becoming entrepreneurs, particularly in a small business environment, inadequate capital, the need to build a reputation that would encourage lending institutions to invest in that person. These opportunities and problems are shared. But women suffer from discrimination.

I don't think there's any doubt that a Federal agency or a private lending institution, an institution of higher education has an almost innate feeling that a business investment would best be made through a man than a woman. It's not fair. It's not deserved. There's no reason for it. But it exists.

I've looked over the outline of the recommendations of this Task Force. And I think there have been some very clear delineations of the reasons for this problem, and I have a responsibility along with all of you to correct those problems.

Almost every agency of the Federal Government, from the Internal Revenue Service, the Commerce Department, the Agriculture Department, obviously the Treasury Department, the Small Business Administration, can take administrative actions without the requirement of congressional action or law change to help resolve some of the problems that have been identified.

There's a greatly expanding women's work force; almost half the women in our country now have jobs outside their own homes. But in even middle and upperlevel management positions, only 1 woman in 20 enjoys this opportunity or privilege or responsibility, less than third the rate of that enjoyed by men.

Well, I'll do all I can to help alleviate this problem and to remove the discriminatory aspects of our society both in government and outside of government.

And to close, I might say that I have this motivation not just to please women or to honor women but because of the best interests of our country, because when we lose a tremendous reservoir of talent, innovation, sensitivity, competence that we are presently losing, it hurts our country. And I want to be sure that we don't suffer any further from this deprivation, not just of women but of the American system.

So, I considered myself a partner with the women of America when I asked the Task Force to perform this work. I hope that you will continue to look upon me as a partner as we carry out the recommendations that have been made.

At the next Cabinet meeting, this will be on my agenda. I'll go down the list of recommendations with the Cabinet members, the heads of the major agencies, and perhaps we'll have an immediate indication to you of tangible results. And I would like to be sure that this report does not gather dust on the shelves of those involved, but becomes a working document that would yield benefits not only to you but to Amy and others in whom I have confidence for the future.

Thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at 11:45 a.m. in the Rose Garden at the White House.










http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31010

The American Presidency Project

Jimmy Carter

XXXIX President of the United States: 1977 - 1981

National Security Information Order Designating Certain Officials To Classify Information "Top Secret"

June 28, 1978

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1-201 of Executive Order 12065 of June 28, 1978, entitled "National Security Information", I hereby designate the following officials within the Executive Office of the President to originally classify information as "Top Secret".

The Vice President

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

The Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1-202 of said Order, I designate the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations to originally classify information as "Secret".

Any delegation of this authority shall be in accordance with Section 1-204 of the Order.

This Order shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

JIMMY CARTER

The White House,

June 28, 1978.





http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31009

The American Presidency Project

Jimmy Carter

XXXIX President of the United States: 1977 - 1981

Executive Order 12065 - National Security Information

June 28, 1978

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, in order to balance the public's interest in access to Government information with the need to protect certain national security information from disclosure, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION.

1-1. Classification Designation.

1-101. Except as provided in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, this Order provides the only basis for classifying information. Information may be classified in one of the three designations listed below. If there is reasonable doubt which designation is appropriate, or whether the information should be classified at all, the less restrictive designation should be used, or the information should not be classified.

1-102. "Top Secret" shall be applied only to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

1-103. "Secret" shall be applied only to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

1-104. "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national security.

1-2. Classification Authority.

1-201. Top Secret. Authority for original classification of information as Top Secret may be exercised only by the President, by such officials as the President may designate by publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER, by the agency heads listed below, and by officials to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with Section 1-204:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Attorney General The Secretary of Energy
The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator of General Services (delegable only to the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency and to the Director, Information Security Oversight Office)

1-202. Secret. Authority for original classification of information as Secret may be exercised only by such officials as the President may designate by publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER, by the agency heads listed below, by officials who have Top Secret classification authority, and by officials to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with Section 1-204:

The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, International Communication Agency

1-203. Confidential. Authority for original classification of information as Confidential may be exercised only by such officials as the President may designate by publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER, by the agency heads listed below, by officials who have Top Secret or Secret classification authority, and by officials to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with Section 1- 204:

The President and Chairman, Export Import Bank of the United States
The President and Chief Executive Officer, Overseas Private investment Corporation

1-204. Limitations on Delegation of Classification Authority.

(a) Authority for original classification of information as Top Secret may be delegated only to principal subordinate officials who have a frequent need to exercise such authority as determined by the President or by agency heads listed in Section 1-201.

(b) Authority for original classification of information as Secret may be delegated only to subordinate officials who have a frequent need to exercise such authority as determined by the President, by agency heads listed in Sections 1-201 and 1-202, and by officials with Top Secret classification authority.

(c) Authority for original classification of information as Confidential may be delegated only to subordinate officials who have a frequent need to exercise such authority as determined by the President, by agency heads listed in Sections 1-201, 1-202, and 1-203, and by officials with Top Secret classification authority.

(d) Delegated original classification authority may not be redelegated.

(e) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing by name or title of position held.

(f) Delegations of original classification authority shall be held to an absolute minimum. Periodic reviews of such delegations shall be made to ensure that the officials so designated have demonstrated a continuing need to exercise such authority.

1-205. Exceptional Cases. When an employee or contractor of an agency that does not have original classification authority originates information believed to require classification, the information shall be protected in the manner prescribed by this Order and implementing directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly under appropriate safeguards to the agency which has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority. That agency shall decide within 30 days whether to classify that information. If it is not clear which agency should get the information, it shall be sent to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office established in Section 5-2 for a determination.

1-3. Classification Requirements.

1-301. Information may not be considered for classification unless it concerns:

(a) military plans, weapons, or operations;

(b) foreign government information;

(c) intelligence activities, sources or methods;

(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;

(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; or

(g) other categories of information which are related to national security and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President, by a person designated by the President pursuant to Section 1- 201, or by an agency head.

1-302. Even though information is determined to concern one or more of the criteria in Section 1-301, it may not be classified unless an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security.

1-303. Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information or the identity of a confidential foreign source is presumed to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security.

1-304. Each determination under the criterion of Section 1-301 (g) shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. 1-4. Duration of Classification.

1-401. Except as permitted in Section 1-402, at the time of the original classification each original classification authority shall set a date or event for automatic declassification no more than six years later.

1-402. Only officials with Top Secret classification authority and agency heads listed in Section 1-2 may classify information for more than six years from the date of the original classification. This authority shall be used sparingly. In such cases, a declassification date or event, or a date for review, shall be set. This date or event shall be as early as national security permits and shall be no more than twenty years after original classification, except that for foreign government information the date or event may be up to thirty years after original classification.

1-5. Identification and Markings.

1-501. At the time of original classification, the following shall be shown on the face of paper copies of all classified documents:

(a) the identity of the original classification authority;

(b) the office of origin;

(c) the date or event for declassification or review; and

(d) one of the three classification designations defined in Section 1-1.

1-502. Documents classified for more than six years shall also be marked with the identity of the official who authorized the prolonged classification. Such documents shall be annotated with the reason the classification is expected to remain necessary, under the requirements of Section 1-3, despite the passage of time. The reason for the prolonged classification may be stated by reference to criteria set forth in agency implementing regulations. These criteria shall explain in narrative form the reason the information needs to be protected beyond six years. If the individual who signs or otherwise authenticates a document also is authorized to classify it, no further annotation of identity is required.

1-503. Only the designations prescribed by this Order may be used to identify classified information. Markings such as "For Official Use Only" and "Limited Official Use" may not be used for that purpose. Terms such as "Conference" or "Agency" may not be used in conjunction with the classification designations prescribed by this Order; e.g., "Agency Confidential" or "Conference Confidential."

1-504. In order to facilitate excerpting and other uses, each classified document shall, by marking or other means, indicate clearly which portions are classified, with the applicable classification designation, and which portions are not classified. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of this requirement for specified classes of documents or information.

1-505. Foreign government information shall either retain its original classification designation or be assigned a United States classification designation that shall ensure a degree of protection equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information.

1-506. Classified documents that contain or reveal information that is subject to special dissemination and reproduction limitations authorized by this Order shall be marked clearly so as to place the user on notice of the restrictions.

1-6. Prohibitions.

1-601. Classification may not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency, or to restrain competition.

1-602. Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified.

1-603. A product of non-government research and development that does not incorporate or reveal classified information to which the producer or developer was given prior access may not be classified under this Order until and unless the government acquires a proprietary interest in the product. This Order does not affect the provisions of the Patent Secrecy Act of 1952 (35 U.S.C. 181-188).

1-604. References to classified documents that do not disclose classified information may not be classified or used as a basis for classification.

1-605. Classification may not be used to limit dissemination of information that is not classifiable under the provisions of this Order or to prevent or delay the public release of such information.

1-606. No document originated on or after the effective date of this Order may be classified after an agency has received a request for the document under the Freedom of Information Act or the Mandatory Review provisions of this Order (Section 3-5), unless such classification is consistent with this Order and is authorized by the agency head or deputy agency head. Documents originated before the effective date of this Order and subject to such a request may not be classified unless such classification is consistent with this Order and is authorized by the senior official designated to oversee the agency information security program or by an official with Top Secret classification authority. Classification authority under this provision shall be exercised personally, on a document-by-document basis.

1-607. Classification may not be restored to documents already declassified and released to the public under this Order or prior Orders.

SECTION 2. DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION.

2-1. Use of Derivative Classification.

2-101. Original classification authority shall not be delegated to persons who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide.

2-102. Persons who apply such derivative classification markings shall:

(a) respect original classification decisions;

(b) verify the information's current level of classification so far as practicable before applying the markings; and

(c) carry forward to any newly created documents the assigned dates or events for declassification or review and any additional authorized markings, in accordance with Sections 2-2 and 2-301 below. A single marking may be used for documents based on multiple sources.

2-2. Classification Guides.

2-201. Classification guides used to direct derivative classification shall specifically identify the information to be classified. Each classification guide shall specifically indicate how the designations, time limits, markings, and other requirements of this Order are to be applied to the information.

2-202. Each such guide shall be approved personally and in writing 'by an agency head listed in Section 1-2 or by an official with Top Secret classification authority. Such approval constitutes an original classification decision.

2-3. New Material.

2-301. New material that derives its classification from information classified on or after the effective date of this Order shall be marked with the declassification date or event, or the date for review, assigned to the source information.

2-302. New material that derives its classification from information classified under prior Orders shall be treated as follows:

(a) If the source material bears a declassification date or event twenty years or less from the date of origin, that date or event shall be carried forward on the new material.

(b) If the source material bears no declassification date or event or is marked for declassification beyond twenty years, the new material shall be marked with a date for review for declassification at twenty years from the date of original classification of the source material.

(c) If the source material is foreign government information bearing no date or event for declassification or is marked for declassification beyond thirty years, the new material shall be marked for review for declassification at thirty years from the date of original classification of the source material.

SECTION 3. DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING.

3-1. Declassification Authority.

3-101. The authority to declassify or downgrade information classified under this or prior Orders shall be exercised only as specified in Section 3-1.

3-102. Classified information may be declassified or downgraded by the official who authorized the original classification if that official is still serving in the same position, by a successor, or by a supervisory official of either.

3-103. Agency heads named in Section 1-2 shall designate additional officials at the lowest practicable echelons to exercise declassification and downgrading authority.

3-104. If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that information is classified in violation of this Order, the Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that originated the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The information shall remain classified until the appeal is decided or until one year from the date of the Director's decision, whichever occurs first.

3-105. The provisions of this Order relating to declassification shall also apply to agencies which, under the terms of this Order, do not have original classification authority but which had such authority under prior Orders.

3-2. Transferred Information.

3-201. For classified information transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions--not merely for storage purposes--the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for all purposes under this Order.

3-202. For classified information not transferred in accordance with Section 3201, but originated in an agency which has ceased to exist, each agency in possession shall be deemed to be the originating agency for all purposes under this Order. Such information may be declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession after consulting with any other agency having an interest in the subject matter.

3-203. Classified information transferred to the General Services Administration for accession into the Archives of the United States shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist of the United States in accordance with this Order, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, and the agency guidelines.

3-204. After the termination of a Presidential administration, the Archivist of the United States shall review and declassify or downgrade all information classified by the President, the White House Staff, committees or commissions appointed by the President, or others acting on the President's behalf. Such declassification shall only be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-504.

3-3. Declassification Policy.

3-301. Declassification of classified information shall be given emphasis comparable to that accorded classification. Information classified pursuant to this and prior Orders shall be declassified as early as national security considerations permit. Decisions concerning declassification shall be based on the loss of the information's sensitivity with the passage of time or on the occurrence of a declassification event.

3-302. When information is reviewed for declassification pursuant to this Order or the Freedom of Information Act, it shall be declassified unless the declassification authority established pursuant to Section 3-1 determines that the information continues to meet the classification requirements prescribed in Section 1-3 despite the passage of time.

3-303. It is presumed that information which continues to meet the classification requirements in Section 1-3 requires continued protection. In some cases, however, the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified. When such questions arise, they shall be referred to the agency head, a senior agency official with responsibility for processing Freedom of Information Act requests or Mandatory Review requests under this Order, an official with Top Secret classification authority, or the Archivist of the United States in the case of material covered in Section 3-503. That official will determine whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the damage to national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure.

3-4. Systematic Review for Declassification.

3-401. Classified information constituting permanently valuable records of the Government, as defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103, and information in the possession and control of the Administrator of General Services, pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 2107 or 2107 note, shall be reviewed for declassification as it becomes twenty years old. Agency heads listed in Section 1-2 and officials designated by the President pursuant to Section 1-201 of this Order may extend classification beyond twenty years, but only in accordance with Sections 3-3 and

3-402. This authority may not be delegated. When classification is extended beyond twenty years, a date no more than ten years later shall be set for declassification or for the next review. That date shall be marked on the document. Subsequent reviews for declassification shall be set at no more than ten year intervals. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may extend the period between subsequent reviews for specific categories of documents or information.

3-402. Within 180 days after the effective date of this Order, the agency heads listed in Section 1-2 and the heads of agencies which had original classification authority under prior orders shall, after consultation with the Archivist of the United States and review by the Information Security Oversight Office, issue and maintain guidelines for systematic review covering twenty-year old classified information under their jurisdiction. These guidelines shall state specific, limited categories of information which, because of their national security sensitivity, should not be declassified automatically but should be reviewed item-by-item to determine whether continued protection beyond twenty years is needed. These guidelines shall be authorized for use by the Archivist of the United States and may, upon approval of the issuing authority, be used by any agency having custody of the information. All information not identified in these guidelines as requiring review and for which a prior automatic declassification date has not been established shall be declassified automatically at the end of twenty years from the date of original classification.

3-403. Notwithstanding Sections 3401 and 3-402, the Secretary of Defense may establish special procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence may establish special procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified information concerning the identities of clandestine human agents. These procedures shall be consistent, so far as practicable, with the objectives of Sections 3-401 and 3-402. Prior to implementation, they shall be reviewed and approved by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and, with respect to matters pertaining to intelligence sources and methods, by the Director of Central Intelligence. Disapproval of procedures by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may be appealed to the National Security Council. In such cases, the procedures shall not be implemented until the appeal is decided.

3-404. Foreign government information shall be exempt from automatic declassification and twenty year systematic review. Unless declassified earlier, such information shall be reviewed for declassification thirty years from its date of origin. Such review shall be in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-3 and with guidelines developed by agency heads in consultation with the Archivist of the United States and, where appropriate, with the foreign government or international organization concerned. These guidelines shall be authorized for use by the Archivist of the United States and may, upon approval of the issuing authority, be used by any agency having custody of the information.

3-405. Transition to systematic review at twenty years shall be implemented as rapidly as practicable and shall be completed no more than ten years from the effective date of this Order.

3-5. Mandatory Review for Declassification.

3-501. Agencies shall establish a mandatory review procedure to handle requests by a member of the public, by a government employee, or by an agency, to declassify and release information. This procedure shall apply to information classified under this Order or prior Orders. Except as provided in Section 3- 503, upon such a request the information shall be reviewed for possible declassification, provided the request reasonably describes the information. Requests for declassification under this provision shall be acted upon within 60 days. After review, the information or any reasonably segregable portion thereof that no longer requires protection under this Order shall be declassified and released unless withholding is otherwise warranted under applicable law.

3-502. Requests for declassification which are submitted under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of that Act.

3-503. Information less than ten years old which was originated by the President, by the White House Staff, or by committees or commissions appointed by the President, or by others acting on behalf of the President, including such information in the possession and control of the Administrator of General Services pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 2107 or 2107 note, is exempted from the provisions of Section 3-501. Such information over ten years old shall be subject to mandatory review for declassification. Requests for mandatory review shall be processed in accordance with procedures developed %y the Archivist of the United States. These procedures shall provide for consultation with agencies having primary subject matter interest. Any decision by the Archivist may be appealed to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. Agencies with primary subject matter interest shall be notified promptly of the Director's decision on such appeals and may further appeal to the National Security Council through the process set forth in Section 3-104.

3-504. Requests for declassification of classified documents originated by an agency but in the possession and control of the Administrator of General Services, pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 2107 or 2107 note, shall be referred by the Archivist to the agency of origin for processing in accordance with Section 3- 501 and for direct response to the requestor. The Archivist shall inform requestors of such referrals.

3-505. No agency in possession of a classified document may, in response to a request for the document made under the Freedom of Information Act or this Order's Mandatory Review provision, refuse to confirm the existence or nonexistence of the document, unless the fact of its existence or non-existence would itself be classifiable under this Order.

3-6. Downgrading.

3-601. Classified information that is marked for automatic downgrading is downgraded accordingly without notification to holders.

3-602. Classified information that is not marked for automatic downgrading may be assigned a lower classification designation by the originator or by other authorized officials when such downgrading is appropriate. Notice of downgrading shall be provided to holders of the information to the extent practicable.

SECTION 4. SAFEGUARDING.

4-1. General Restrictions on Access.

4-101. No person may be given access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is necessary for the performance of official duties.

4-102. All classified information shall be marked conspicuously to put users on notice of its current classification status and, if appropriate, to show any special distribution or reproduction restrictions authorized by this Order.

4-103. Controls shall be established by each agency to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, and transmitted only under conditions that will provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons.

4-104. Classified information no longer needed in current working files or for reference or record purposes shall be processed for appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of Chapters 21 and 33 of Title 44 of the United States Code, which governs disposition of Federal records.

4-105. Classified information disseminated outside the Executive branch shall be given protection equivalent to that afforded within the Executive branch.

4-2. Special Access Programs.

4-201. Agency heads listed in Section 1-201 may create special access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information classified pursuant to this Order or prior Orders. Such programs may be created or continued only by written direction and only by those agency heads and, for matters pertaining to intelligence sources and methods, by the Director of Central Intelligence. Classified information in such programs shall be declassified according to the provisions of Section 3.

4-202. Special access programs may be created or continued only on a specific showing that:

(a) normal management and safeguarding procedures are not sufficient to limit need-to-know or access; (b) the number of persons who will need access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing extra protection for the information involved; and

(c) the special access controls balance the need to protect the information against the full spectrum of needs to use the information.

4-203. All special access programs shall be reviewed regularly and, except those required by treaty or international agreement, shall terminate automatically every five years unless renewed in accordance with the procedures in Section 4-2.

4-204. Within 180 days after the effective date of this Order, agency heads shall review all existing special access programs under their jurisdiction and continue them only in accordance with the procedures in Section 4-2. Each of those agency heads shall also establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall have non-delegable access to all such accountings.

4-3. Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees.

4-301. The requirement in Section 4-101 that access to classified information may be granted only as is necessary for the performance of official duties may be waived as provided in Section 4-302 for persons who:

(a) are engaged in historical research projects, or

(b) previously have occupied policymaking positions to which they were appointed by the President.

4-302. Waivers under Section 4-301 may be granted only if the agency with jurisdiction over the information:

(a) makes a written determination that access is consistent with the interests of national security;

(b) takes appropriate steps to ensure that access is limited to specific categories of information over which that agency has classification jurisdiction;

(c) limits the access granted to former Presidential appointees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed or received while serving as a Presidential appointee.

4-4. Reproduction Controls.

4-401. Top Secret documents may not be reproduced without the consent of the originating agency unless otherwise marked by the originating office.

4-402. Reproduction of Secret and Confidential documents may be restricted by the originating agency.

4-403. Reproduced copies of classified documents are subject to the same accountability and controls as the original documents.

4-404. Records shall be maintained by all agencies that reproduce paper copies of classified documents to show the number and distribution of reproduced copies of all Top Secret documents, of all documents covered by special access programs distributed outside the originating agency, and of all Secret and all Confidential documents which are marked with special dissemination and reproduction limitations in accordance with Section 1-506.

4-405. Sections 4-401 and 4-402 shall not restrict the production of documents for the purpose of facilitating review for declassification. However, such reproduced documents that remain classified after review must be destroyed after they are used.

SECTION 5. IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW.

5-1. Oversight.

5-101. The National Security Council may review all matters with respect to the implementation of this Order and shall provide overall policy direction for the information security program.

5-102. The Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for implementing and monitoring the program established pursuant to this Order. This responsibility shall be delegated to an Information Security Oversight Office.

5-2. Information Security Oversight office.

5-201. The Information Security Oversight Office shall have a full-time Director appointed by the Administrator of General Services subject to approval by the President. The Administrator also shall have authority to appoint a staff for the Office.

5-202. The Director shall:

(a) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this Order and implementing directives;

(b) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the information security program, including appeals from decisions on declassification requests pursuant to Section 3-503;

(c) exercise the authority to declassify information provided by Sections 3-104 and 3-503;

(d) develop, in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate, subject to the approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of this Order which shall be binding on the agencies;

(e) report annually to the President through the Administrator of General Services and the National Security Council on the implementation of this Order;

(f) review all agency implementing regulations and agency guidelines for systematic declassification review. The Director shall require any regulation or guideline to be changed if it is not consistent with this Order or implementing directives. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The agency regulation or guideline shall remain in effect until the appeal is decided or until one year from the date of the Director's decision, whichever occurs first.

(g) exercise case-by-case classification authority in accordance with Section 1205 and review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority under Section 1-2 of this Order; and

(h) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of the information security program of each agency that handles classified information and to require of each agency such reports, information, and other cooperation as necessary to fulfill his responsibilities. If such reports, inspection, or access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head may deny access. The Director may appeal denials to the National Security Council. The denial of access shall remain in effect until the appeal is decided or until one year from the date of the denial, whichever occurs first.

5-3. Interagency Information Security Committee.

5-301. There is established an Interagency Information Security Committee which shall be chaired by the Director and shall be comprised of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Energy, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the National Security Council, the Domestic Policy Staff, and the Archivist of the United States.

5-302. Representatives of other agencies may be invited to meet with the Committee on matters of particular interest to those agencies.

5-303. The Committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman or at the request of a member agency and shall advise the Chairman on implementation of this order.

5-4. General Responsibilities.

5-401. A copy of any information security regulation and a copy of any guideline for systematic declassification review which has been adopted pursuant to this Order or implementing directives, shall be submitted to the Information Security Oversight Office. To the extent practicable, such regulations and guidelines should be unclassified.

5-402. Unclassified regulations that establish agency information security policy and unclassified guidelines for systematic declassification review shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

5-403. Agencies with original classification authority shall promulgate guides for security classification that will facilitate the identification and uniform classification of information requiring protection under the provisions of this Order.

5-404. Agencies which originate or handle classified information shall:

(a) designate a senior agency official to conduct an active oversight Program to ensure effective implementation of this Order;

(b) designate a senior agency official to chair an agency committee with authority to act on all suggestions and complaints with respect to the agency's administration of the information security program;

(c) establish a process to decide appeals from denials of declassification requests submitted pursuant to Section 3-5;

(d) establish a program to familiarize agency and other personnel who have access to classified information with the provisions of this Order and implementing directives. This program shall impress upon agency personnel their responsibility to exercise vigilance in complying with this Order. The program shall encourage agency personnel to challenge, through Mandatory Review and other appropriate procedures, those classification decisions they believe to be improper;

(e) promulgate guidelines for systematic review in accordance with Section 3- 402;

(f) establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures which require that a demonstrable need for access to classified information is established before initiating administrative clearance procedures, and which ensures that the number of people granted access to classified information is reduced to and maintained at the minimum number that is consistent with operational requirements and needs; and

(g) ensure that practices for safeguarding information are systematically reviewed and that those which are duplicative or unnecessary are eliminated.

5-405. Agencies shall submit to the Information Security Oversight Office such information or reports as the Director of the Office may find necessary to carry out the Office's responsibilities.

5-5. Administrative Sanctions.

5-501. If the Information Security Oversight Office finds that a violation of this Order or any implementing directives may have occurred, it shall make a report to the head of the agency concerned so that corrective steps may be taken.

5-502. Officers and employees of the United States Government shall be subject to appropriate administrative sanctions if they:

(a) knowingly and willfully classify, or continue the classification of information in violation of this Order or any implementing directives; or

(b) knowingly, willfully and without authorization disclose information properly classified under this Order or prior Orders or compromise properly classified information through negligence; or

(c) knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of this Order or implementing directive.

5-503. Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, or other sanction in accordance with applicable law and agency regulations.

5-504. Agency heads shall ensure that appropriate and prompt corrective action is taken whenever a violation under Section 5-502 occurs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be informed when such violations occur.

5-505. Agency heads shall report to the Attorney General evidence reflected in classified information of possible violations of Federal criminal law by an agency employee and of possible violations by any other. person of those Federal criminal laws specified in guidelines adopted by the Attorney General.

SECTION 6. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

6-1. Definitions.

6-101. "Agency" has the meaning defined in 5 U.S.C. 552 (e).

6-102. "Classified information" means information or material, herein collectively termed information, that is owned by, produced for or by, or under the control of, the United States Government, and that has been determined pursuant to this Order or prior Orders to require protection against unauthorized disclosure, and that is so designated.

6-103. "Foreign government information" means information that has been provided to the United States in confidence by, or produced by the United States pursuant to a written joint arrangement requiring confidentiality with, a foreign government or international organization of governments.

6-104. "National security" means the national defense and foreign relations of the United States.

6-105. "Declassification event" means an event which would eliminate the need for continued classification.

6-2. General.

6-201. Nothing in this Order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. "Restricted Data" and information designated as "Formerly Restricted Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued pursuant thereto.

6-202. The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency, his duly designated representative, or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall personally or through authorized representatives of the Department of Justice render an interpretation of this Order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.

6-203. Executive Order No. 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended by Executive Order No. 11714 of April 24, 1973, and as further amended by Executive Order No. 11862 of June 11, 1975, and the National Security Council Directive of May 17, 1972 (3 CFR 1085 (1971-75 Comp.) ) are revoked.

6-204. This Order shall become effective on December 1, 1978, except that the functions of the Information Security Oversight Office specified in Sections 5202(d) and 5-202(f) shall be effective immediately and shall be performed in the interim by the Interagency Classification Review Committee established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11652.










http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3c3bf66-4751-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22.html

The Financial Times


August 21, 2015 12:02 am

Cedric Belfrage — ‘sixth man’ Soviet spy who hid in plain sight

Sam Jones, Defence and Security Editor

Cedric Belfrage — Hollywood promoter, superstar film critic, newspaper proprietor, philanderer and consummate self-publicist — was the unlikeliest of Soviet spies.

A trove of newly declassified documents, released on Friday by the British security service MI5, reveal him as a “sixth man” to stand alongside the notorious Cambridge Five spy ring that sat at the heart of British intelligence during the second world war and the early years of the atomic age.

Unlike the more famous quintet of his contemporaries, however, Mr Belfrage has been almost lost to history. He never defected to Moscow and he was never prosecuted for his crimes.

Details of his life, contained in nine volumes comprising hundreds of official top-secret documents, shed fresh light on the extent of the Soviet Union’s infiltration of Britain’s wartime spy networks — and the bloody-minded determination of British officials not to believe it.

They also paint a picture of a character even the most fanciful of espionage authors might struggle to invent: a Cambridge dropout who took his own manservant to college; a fixer for the movie mogul Samuel Goldwyn; the highest-paid celebrity journalist in Britain; an award-winning translator of South American fiction; and author of more than half a dozen autobiographies.

Most importantly, though, from 1942 until 1944, Belfrage was employed by the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) as the right-hand man of William Stephenson, who, as head of British Security Co-ordination (BSC) in New York, was the most senior British intelligence officer in the western hemisphere.

It was during this time that Belfrage was active as one of the USSR’s most prized assets. Indeed, for a period, according to Christopher Andrew, MI5’s former official historian, Moscow valued his output more highly than that of his contemporary Kim Philby, who went on to become arguably the most successful Soviet spy yet known.

Such a career is all the more remarkable, given his already colourful and politically active life, for Belfrage was a spy who hid in plain sight.

He was a member of the Communist party in the 1930s, set up a pro-communist newspaper in the 1940s and, during the height of the McCarthyite show trials in the US in the 1950s, was denounced by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).

By his own design, he became a cause célèbre for the leftwing intelligentsia, which was under heavy surveillance. “I am not mysterious. There is absolutely nothing up my sleeve. To [Senator Joseph] McCarthy, [HUAC chairman Harold] Velde and the immigration service, I suppose I appear as a sort of sphinx,” he wrote in an exculpatory pamphlet after he was kicked out of the US in 1955.

It took British counter-intelligence years before they even began to worry about their former employee. “I note Belfrage was employed by your service,” BA Hill, a senior MI5 counter-terrorism official, wrote to his counterparts at MI6 in 1955, shortly after Belfrage was deported from America for communist sympathies, “and therefore almost certainly had access to a wide range of material?”

Hill was correct: US decrypts later revealed that Belfrage had passed highly sensitive information to his Russian handlers, including summaries of briefings with Winston Churchill.

It was only bad luck in the end that disrupted his activities.

In 1943, his handler, the Soviet agent Jacob Golos, known by the cryptonym “Sound”, died suddenly of a heart attack. Belfrage fell out of touch with Moscow. Then, in 1945, Golos’s replacement, Elizabeth Bentley, decided to defect to the US, taking the identities of 30 agents with her.

In 1947, Belfrage was picked up by the FBI for questioning. He freely admitted passing documents to the Soviets, but he had a cunning defence: he told US agents that although genuine, the documents — including a Scotland Yard guide to breaking and entering, with contributions from “prominent burglars of England” — had been meaningless bait. He was working on MI6’s orders, he said, to entice the Russians into giving him back even more valuable information.

When the FBI sought clarification from the British, they hit a brick wall. MI6 insisted it could not give up any information on Belfrage that could be “actionable”, as this was contrary to their intelligence-sharing principles.

Others detected less high-minded motives. “It might be embarrassing even to give a reply [to the FBI] since it would mean that we should have to admit that [MI6] has employed a man with a known communist interest in their organisation in the USA,” noted an official telegram from MI6 to MI5.

As would prove to be the case with Philby, British spymasters feared rupture with their American counterparts more than facing down the truth of their own vulnerabilities.

They had missed plenty of red flags. In 1943, the files reveal, Belfrage pushed his boss hard to employ Samuel Landon Barron at BSC. Barron failed his vetting as he was a suspected Russian agent.

In 1946, Belfrage came across MI5’s path again when he left his wife for a year in order to have an affair with a translator at BSC, Trude Gangadharen. Undercover agents watched him meet her underneath the clock in New York’s Grand Central station for a tryst. Mrs Gangadharen was being watched because she was suspected of being a Russian spy.

After his deportation from the US, nothing ever came of the case against Belfrage. MI6 remained reluctant to reveal what it did and did not know. MI5 kept surveillance tabs on him for years later, but to no avail.










http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0309540/bio

IMDb


Biography for

Bill Gates

Date of Birth

28 October 1955, Seattle, Washington, USA

Birth Name

William Henry Gates III


Spouse

Melinda Gates (1 January 1994 - present) 3 children


Children: Jennifer Katharine (26 April 1996), son Rory John (23 May 1999), Phoebe Adele (14 September 2002)





http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/transvestite

Dictionary.com


transvestite

a person, especially a male, who assumes the dress and manner usually associated with the opposite sex.

a person who seeks sexual pleasure from wearing clothes that are normally associated with the opposite sex










http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077369/releaseinfo

IMDb


Convoy (1978)

Release Info

USA 28 June 1978 (Los Angeles, California)










http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077369/quotes

IMDb


Convoy (1978)

Quotes


Melissa: Well I think I've had just about enough of this, thank you very much. I'll think I'll take my things and GET OUT. If you'll pull over to the side, I'm sure I can hitch a ride very easily... Weren't you listening to me? I said I'm ready to get out!

Rubber Duck: You want out? We're being chased. You want out? Jump.

Melissa: You want to add the Mann Act to your collection?










http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077369/quotes

IMDb


Convoy (1978)

Quotes


Chuck Arnoldi: We'd like to know, is this convoy some sort of protest demonstration? And if it is, what's its purpose?

Rubber Duck: Purpose of a convoy is to keep movin'.

JOURNAL ARCHIVE: - posted by H.V.O.M - Kerry Wayne Burgess 3:25 PM Pacific Time near Seattle Washington State USA Friday 19 July 2013 - http://hvom.blogspot.com/2013/07/alert-1-this-is-eagle-control.html


http://www.usswainwright.org/photoalbum/JLeverton/Persian%20Gulf%201988/

Index of /photoalbum/JLeverton/Persian Gulf 1988


[JOURNAL ARCHIVE 19 July 2013 excerpt ends]

http://www.usswainwright.org/gmm3-hintons-pictures/#iLightbox[gallery-1]/15

FC2 Burgess and FC2 Shepard

http://www.usswainwright.org/gmm3-hintons-pictures/#iLightbox[gallery-1]/8

1988










http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001140/bio

IMDb


Philip K. Dick

Biography


Personal Quotes

Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away.










http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-29/news/mn-5637_1_persian-gulf

Los Angeles Times


The World

May 29, 1988

The most powerful U.S. warship ever seen in the Persian Gulf passed through the Strait of Hormuz on its first mission in the embattled waterway. The guided-missile cruiser Vincennes, with 385 officers and crew, entered the gulf to begin the first deployment in the region by any of the Navy's 10 Aegis cruisers. The 9,400-ton warship was commissioned in 1985 and is equipped with sophisticated radar and weapons systems. Tensions rose during the ship's nighttime run up the narrow strait as it passed a Panamanian-flag tanker, still on fire 20 hours after being attacked by Iranian speedboats. However, the warship made it through without incident.










http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-04/news/mn-3857_1_iranian-speedboats

Los Angeles Times


How It Started: Iran Speedboats Open Fire

July 04, 1988

The following is a chronology of events in the Persian Gulf on Sunday that resulted in the downing of an Iranian civilian airliner by the U.S. Navy :

10:10 a.m. (local Dubai time)--Three Iranian Boghammar speedboats fire on a U.S. Navy helicopter flying reconnaissance patrol from cruiser Vincennes just inside the Persian Gulf.

10:42 a.m.--Vincennes and U.S. frigate Albert B. Montgomery fire on speedboats, sinking two and damaging one.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Mine_(AWM_304925).jpg

http://i1.wp.com/www.iransview.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/655-bodies-under-water.jpg?resize=630%2C452










http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19981207&slug=2787736

The Seattle Times


Monday, December 7, 1998


Gates: Smile Would Have Helped, But He Told Truth

By James V. Grimaldi

Seattle Times Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - Bill Gates said he wished he'd smiled more during his videotaped deposition taken before the Microsoft antitrust trial started


"I answered truthfully every single question that was put forth," Gates said. "You have to understand that Mr. Boies made it clear in the negotiations leading up to the case that he is really out to destroy Microsoft. He is really out to make all the good work we've done - and make us look very bad.



- posted by H.V.O.M - Kerry Wayne Burgess 11:34 AM Pacific Time Spokane Valley Washington USA Friday 01 January 2016