http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-09-17-iran-hostages-jimmy-carter_N.htm
USA TODAY
Jimmy Carter: Iran hostage rescue should have worked
Posted 9/17/2010 10:46 PM
WASHINGTON (AP) — Former President Jimmy Carter felt his efforts to rescue U.S. diplomats held hostage by Iran should have worked but were thwarted by a "strange series of mishaps,"
In the spring of 1980, Carter ordered a helicopter rescue attempt — one that ended disastrously and left an indelible scar on his presidency. Two of the eight helicopters developed problems on the way to a remote desert landing spot and had to turn back; a third had a hydraulic problem after landing. Carter canceled the mission but during the withdrawal, a helicopter collided with a C-130 transport plane, resulting in eight deaths.
Carter called it "a strange series of mishaps, almost completely unpredictable" and insisted the rescue operation should have worked because the men were well trained, planning was careful and no Iranian alarm was raised until at least two hours after U.S. crews had left Iran.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html
Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission
In military history one can stand out as a splendid example or a disastrous reminder. The brave men who attempted to rescue American hostages in Iran in April of 1980 unfortunately became a disastrous reminder of the need for unity of command, joint training, and good communications, and the dangers of overly complex and needlessly compartmented planning. The failure of their mission, Operation Eagle Claw
Background
In the late 1970s, the regime of the Shah of Iran, long a regional bulwark against the USSR, lost favor with the Iranian people and was overturned by an Islamic theocracy under the leadership of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Shah left the country and was finally allowed to enter the United States for cancer treatment by President Jimmie Carter. Demanding the Shah’s return, the Iranian revolutionary government seized the US Embassy compound in Tehran on 4 November 1979, taking American diplomatic personnel hostage. After selective release of some prisoners, the number of Americans finally being held amounted to some 53 on the Embassy grounds, and a further three, including US Chargé d'Affaires, Bruce Laingen, at the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
President Carter sought a diplomatic solution, but Khomeini would have none of it. He preferred to use the hostage issue as an embarrassment to the Carter administration, which it indeed remained until Carter’s last day in office. As a secondary solution, the President approved planning for a military option, on the proviso that it be kept secret. At the time there was no joint special operations command to take up the mission, leaving Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David Jones little option but to stand up an ad hoc planning cell from within the Joint Staff’s J-3 Special Operations Division. This was done and on 12 November the operational planning group was dubbed “Rice Bowl.”
Major General James B. Vaught (US Army) was appointed Joint Task Force commander, and a team of officers was assembled to lead the various components, including: Colonel Charles A. Beckwith (founder of the Army’s new Delta Force counter-terrorist group) to be the ground assault commander; Colonel James H. Kyle (long-time USAF MC-130 special operator) to command the fixed wing contingent; and Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edward Seiffert (an experienced night-vision flyer) to lead the helicopter force. From the beginning the idea that all the services should have a “piece of the action” plagued the operation and led to bad decisions. This was the first major mistake.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html
Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission
Planning
In the realm of military planning there are plans that might work and plans that won’t work. In the cold light of history it is evident that the plan for Eagle Claw was in the second category, but since the planning process was deliberately kept compartmented and secretive, no outside group could review the finished plan for a “reality check.” This was the second major mistake.
The concept seemed straight forward enough: from the Persian Gulf penetrate to the capital of Iran through a variety of air and ground means; secure the hostages; and exit Iran through another variety of air means. The devil is in the details however, and to say that the plan for accomplishing Eagle Claw was overly complex would be an understatement. It would require the proverbial seven simultaneous miracles for Eagle Claw to work. The only way this can be brought home to the reader with sufficient magnitude is to provide a thumbnail outline of the way the plan was supposed to work:
1. First night: USS Coral Sea decoys Soviet “trawlers” away from USS Nimitz (carrying eight RH-53D Navy minesweeping helicopters to be used for the mission). Mistake: RH-53Ds were used because of operational
security (they looked “right” on a carrier), in spite of having a bad operational readiness rating and no in-flight refueling capability. USAF HH-3E special operations helicopters would have been a better choice, with steps
taken to disguise their appearance.
2. Three USAF MC-130E Combat Talons take off from Masirah Island (Oman) carrying the Delta Force, accompanied by three EC-130E aircraft (usually a command & control platform) which carry fuel bladders to refuel the helicopters at a rendezvous called Desert One. Mistake: Desert One would not have been necessary if USAF helicopters had been used and provisions made for in-flight refueling.
3. One MC-130E lands at Desert One (pre-surveyed by the CIA) and sets up navigation aids for the remaining force. Radio silence is maintained. Mistake: inadequate provision for tactical communications would prove a hindrance during the operation.
4. Remaining fixed wing aircraft arrive and drop off Delta Force. EC-130Es remain to refuel helicopters. Mistake: timing for ground rendezvous was very tight, and could not be met by participants. Possibility of having to continue in daylight.
5. Fixed wing aircraft depart Desert One for Masirah, where MC-130E crews board other aircraft for transport to Wadi Kena, Egypt. There they ready themselves for the second night when they are to transport an Army Ranger force to secure Manzariyeh airfield, Iran, where hostages will be extracted by C-141s. An interesting problem in overtaxing aircrews.
6. Helicopters depart Desert One and drop off Delta Force at a hide site 50 miles southeast of Tehran and then proceed to their own hide site elsewhere. More possibilities to compromise the operation.
7. Delta Force meets with in-country agents providing trucks for overland movement to Tehran on night two.
8. Night two begins with Delta Force driving to a Tehran warehouse in six trucks to stage for the assault.
9. Delta Force moves to the Embassy compound (while a Special Forces team goes to the Foreign Ministry) and has 45 minutes to extract the hostages. Incomplete intelligence makes the extraction process hit-or-miss.
10. Hostages and escorts move a couple of hundred yards to a soccer stadium to meet with the helicopters for lift to Manzariyeh airfield, while being covered by an Air Force AC-130 gunship. The possibility of Iranians gaining a position to hinder the helicopter extraction is an ever-present problem.
11. MC-130Es deliver Rangers to Manzariyeh airfield to hold it and prepare for arrival of C-141s (from Saudi Arabia), and hostages in helicopters from Tehran. Other AC-130s provide covering fire.
12. Hostages arrive at Manzariyeh airfield by helicopter and depart in C-141s with Delta Force. Helicopters are destroyed in place. Provision for helicopter destruction not well thought out, and didn’t work in operation execution.
13. Carrier-based fighters provide suppression of any Iranian Air Force activity during the extraction process.
14. Air-to-air refueling provided as needed on return trip.
Finer pieces of coordination have been left out of the above outline, as well as the multiplicity of backup options which still did not cover many single point failure issues. The main theme here is that there was a lot that could go wrong. In the event, the things which did cause the mission to abort were probably merciful compared to the greater catastrophe which might have taken place if the scenario had progressed further than the Desert One rendezvous.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html
Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission
The Mission
After five months of planning and preparation, the Eagle Claw participants were deployed for mission execution. Just after seven p.m. on the 24th of April, 1980, the eight helicopters (called “Bluebeard”) departed from the Nimitz, nearly 60 miles off the coast of Iran. They had been preceded by the EC-130 refuelers (“Republic”) and the MC-130s (“Dragon”), carrying Delta Force, from Masirah.
Less than two hours into the mission, Bluebeard 6 had an indicator light warn of a main rotor blade spar crack. This was often a false reading on RH-53Ds, but the crew landed (followed by Bluebeard 8) and decided to abandon the helicopter after inspecting the rotor blades. The two crews flew on to Desert One in Bluebeard 8. The mission was now down one helicopter.
Penetrating deep into Iran, the fixed wing contingent ran into a phenomenon called a “haboob” – fine dust particles which obscured vision. A short time later they ran into another haboob which was much more intense than the first one. Kyle attempted to warn the RH-53s, but had no luck with his communications gear. While these presented minor obstacles to the airplanes, they upset the cohesion of the helicopter flight, which had to disperse in order to avoid collision. The helicopter pilots had never even been briefed on the existence of haboob conditions, or their effects on low-flying formations. In the middle of this, Bluebeard 5 had an electrical power problem which convinced the crew to abort back to the Nimitz. Maintaining radio silence, they were unable to alert Kyle or Seiffert that they were pulling out. The mission was now down two helicopters.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html
Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission
The Fallen
By the end the prestigious group of special operations Delta Force had lost 8 of its members, 7 helicopters, a C-130 aircraft, and had not even made contact with the enemy. The mission was a complete disaster.
