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http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php

The American Presidency Project


Search Results : Using keyword(s) [ dracula FROM 1789 to 2015]

Date :: Actor/Type :: Title :: Record(s) found: 2

June 2, 1998 William J. Clinton Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on the 2000 Census in Houston, Texas

April 2, 2008 George W. Bush Remarks in Bucharest, Romania










From 12/20/1994 ( in Bosnia as Kerry Wayne Burgess the United States Marine Corps captain this day is my United States Navy Cross medal date of record ) To 6/2/1998 is 1260 days

From 11/2/1965 ( my birth date in Antlers Oklahoma USA and my birthdate as the known official Deputy United States Marshal Kerry Wayne Burgess and active duty United States Marine Corps officer ) To 4/15/1969 ( the United States Navy Lockheed EC-121M Warning Star reconnaissance aircraft is destroyed inflight by North Korea ) is 1260 days



[ See also: To Be Continued? ]


http://cgi.superstation.com/about_us/milestone.htm

TBS Superstation

About Us

Milestones


June 2, 1998—TBS Superstation announces development deal for a four-hour authorized miniseries entitled The Reagans, about the lives of Ronald and Nancy Reagan. Nancy Reagan will consult on the film, which is slated to premiere on the Superstation in 1999.



http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=56068

The American Presidency Project

William J. Clinton

XLII President of the United States: 1993-2001

Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on the 2000 Census in Houston, Texas

June 2, 1998

The President. Thank you. Thank you for that wonderful welcome, and thank you, Marta, for the wonderful work you're doing here. I enjoyed my tour. I enjoyed shaking hands with all the folks who work here and the people who are taking advantage of all your services. And I'm glad to be here. Mr. Mayor, you can be proud, and I know you are proud of this center and the others like it in this city.

I'd like to thank all the Members of Congress who are here from the Texas delegation, and a special thanks to Representatives Maloney and Sawyer for coming from Washington with me today and for their passionate concern to try to get an accurate census.

I thank the Texas land commissioner, Garry Mauro, for being here; and the members of the legislature, Senator Gallegos, Senator Ellis, Congressman—Representative Torres, and others, if they're here; the other city officials; Mr. Boney, the president of the city council; Mr. Eckels, the county executive judge; Rueben Guerrero, the SBA Regional Administrator. If there are others—I think our Deputy Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Mallett, is here, who is from Houston. I thank you all for being here.

Before I say what I want to say about the census, I think since this is the first time I have been in Texas since the fires began to rage in Mexico that have affected you, if you'll forgive me, I'd like to just say a word about that. The smoke and the haze from these fires has become a matter of serious concern for people in Texas and Louisiana and other Gulf States. It has gotten even further up into our country. And of course, the greatest loss has been suffered by our friends and neighbors across the border in Mexico. Now, we are doing everything we know to do to help, both to help the people of Mexico and to stem the disadvantageous side effects of all the smoke and haze coming up here into the United States.

I had an extended talk with President Zedillo about it. And, of course, here we had the EPA and Health and Human Services and FEMA monitoring the air quality. We're working very hard with the Mexican Government to help them more effectively fight these fires. We provided more than $8 million in emergency assistance to Mexico since January, with 4 firefighting helicopters, an infrared imaging aircraft to detect fire hotspots, safety, communications, and other firefighting equipment for over 3,000 firefighters. Over 50 experts from our Federal agency have provided important technical advice. And tomorrow our Agriculture Secretary, Dan Glickman, and our AID Administrator, Brian Atwood, are going to Mexico to see these fires firsthand and to see what else we can do in consultation with Mexican officials.

I think that we will be successful, but this has been a long and frustrating thing. As you probably know, we've had extended fires over the last year in Southeast Asia as well and in South America. This is a terrific problem that requires change in longstanding habits on the part of many people in rural areas in a lot of these countries, but it also is a function of the unusual weather conditions through which we have been living. And we'll continue to work on it.

Now, let's talk about the census. Since our Nation's founding, the taking of the census has been mandated by the Constitution. How we have met this responsibility has changed and evolved over time as the country has grown in size and population, and as we've learned more about how to count people. Today I want to talk about the newest changes that we propose to make and how important it is to your work and your community. That's why we're here, so that we can put a human face on the census and its consequences.


Let me just ask—and I guess I'd like to start with Dr. Klineberg because he started the Houston area survey—how possible do you think it is to get an accurate survey, and what do you think—what steps need to be taken? And what arguments do you think we could make to the skeptics who say no statistician with a computer can compete with people going around doorto-door and counting heads?

This is a—you know, it's kind of like a— it's not an easy argument to win. You know, the average person, you just come up to somebody and say, "We're here to figure out how many people are in this room. Would you think it would be better to have an expert look in the room and guess or have somebody walk up and down the rows and count?" So we've got to figure out how to—we've got to win this argument with average American people who aren't used to thinking about these sort of things. And we have to prove that we can do it. So maybe we ought to talk about where we go from here. But, Doctor, would you like to say a few things?

[Stephen Klineberg, professor of sociology, Rice University, described how the census was used and why accuracy was important to the work of sociology and political science in understanding America at a time of great demographic change, from an amalgam of European nationalities to an amalgam of worldwide nationalities. Reverend Clemons commended the President for his support of statistical sampling, but urged collecting detailed data in the census.]

The President. Let me ask you another way, because this is where I think—obviously, I'm here in part because I was—because I wanted to come here to illustrate the importance of the census. I'm also here in part, to be candid, because the outcome of this battle is not clear. We all know that. That's why Congressman Sawyer and Congresswoman Maloney came all the way from Washington with me today.

And suppose I got all of you, and I put you in a van. We all got in the van; we drove across town; and we stopped at a little real estate office. The people had never had any contact at all with the census except they always filled out their form—or we stopped in a service station, and we met a couple guys that—they never thought about this issue for 5 minutes. They're not conscious that it affects them at all. How can we convince ordinary citizens in all the congressional districts, whether they're represented by Republicans or Democrats, without regard to party, that statistical sampling will give them a more accurate count than hiring 6 million people to go door to door? What can you say that is consistent with the experience of ordinary working Americans that will make them understand that?

Dr. Mindiola.

Dr. Mindiola. Mr. President, if I were you I would tell them this story. Most Americans, I think the vast majority of Americans, go for medical checkups, and during that process, they do a blood test. But when you go get your blood test, the doctor or the nurse does not draw 100 percent of your blood out of your body. They draw a sample. And based upon that sample—[laughter]—and based upon that sample, they can tell your cholesterol level, whether you have too much acid in your blood, et cetera, et cetera. And I think in those common, everyday terms, the average American citizen should be able to understand the validity of sampling, because that's a common, everyday experience,

The President. That may go down in history as the Dracula theory of the census. [Laughter] That's pretty good, though.










http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6081FF83E5E1B7493C4A8178FD85F4D8685F9

The New York Times

Article Preview

U.S. SCOUT PLANE WITH 31 IS LOST, REPORTED DOWNED BY 2 NORTH KOREAN MIG'S; WIDE HUNT BEGINS Navy Sights Debris -- 2 Soviet Vessels Guided to Area U.S. Plane With 31 Missing, Reported Downed by North Korea

By WILLIAM BEECHERSpecial to The New York Times ();

April 16, 1969,

, Section , Page 1, Column , words

[ DISPLAYING ABSTRACT ]

WASHINGTON, April 15 -North Korea asserted today that it had shot down a United States Navy electronic intelligence plane. The Nixon Administration is said to believe that the plane, with a crew of 31, was attacked by two MIG jets off the Korean coast.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EC-121_shootdown_incident

EC-121 shootdown incident

The EC-121 shootdown incident occurred on 15 April 1969 when a United States Navy Lockheed EC-121M Warning Star on a reconnaissance mission was shot down by North Korean MiG-17 aircraft over the Sea of Japan. The plane crashed 90 nautical miles (167 km) off the North Korean coast and all 31 Americans on board were killed.

The Nixon administration chose not to retaliate against North Korea apart from staging a naval demonstration in the Sea of Japan a few days later. Instead it resumed the reconnaissance flights within a week to demonstrate that it would not be intimidated by the action while at the same time avoiding a confrontation.


Flight of Deep Sea 129

Beggar Shadow mission

At 07:00 local time of Tuesday, 15 April 1969, an EC-121M of the U.S. Navy's Fleet Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) took off from NAS Atsugi, Japan, on an intelligence-gathering reconnaissance mission. The aircraft, Bureau number 135749, c/n 4316, bore the tail code "PR-21" and used the radio call sign Deep Sea 129. Aboard were 8 officers and 23 enlisted men under the command of LCDR James Overstreet. Nine of the crew, including one Marine NCO, were Naval Security Group cryptologic technicians (CTs) and linguists in Russian and Korean.

Deep Sea 129's assigned task was a routine Beggar Shadow signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection mission. Its flight profile northwest over the Sea of Japan took it to an area offshore of Musu Point, where the EC-121M would turn northeast toward the Soviet Union and orbit along a 120-nautical-mile (222 km) long elliptical track. These missions, while nominally under the command of Seventh Fleet and CINCPAC, were actually controlled operationally by the Naval Security Group detachment at NSF Kamiseya, Japan, under the direction of the National Security Agency.

LCDR Overstreet's orders included a prohibition from approaching closer than 50 nautical miles (90 km) to the North Korean coast. VQ-1 had flown the route and orbit for two years, and the mission had been graded as being of "minimal risk." During the first three months of 1969 nearly 200 similar missions had been flown by both Navy and U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast without incident.

The mission was tracked by a series of security agencies within the Department of Defense that were pre-briefed on the mission, including land-based Air Force radars in Japan and South Korea. The USAF 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata Air Station, Japan, USAF 6988th Security Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan,and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base monitored the North Korean reaction by intercepting its air defense search radar transmissions. The Army Security Agency communications interception station at Osan listened to North Korean air defense radio traffic, and the Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, which provided the seven of the nine CTs aboard Deep Sea 129, also intercepted Soviet Air Force search radars.

Interception and shootdown

At 12:34 local time, roughly six hours into the mission, the Army Security Agency and radars in Korea detected the takeoff of two North Korean Air Force MiG-17s and tracked them, assuming that they were responding in some fashion to the mission of Deep Sea 129. In the meantime the EC-121 filed a scheduled activity report by radio on time at 13:00 and did not indicate anything out of the ordinary. 22 minutes later the radars lost the picture of the MiGs and did not reacquire it until 13:37, closing with Deep Sea 129 for a probable intercept.

The communications that this activity generated within the National Security network was monitored by the EC-121's parent unit, VQ-1, which at 13:44 sent Deep Sea 129 a "Condition 3" alert by radio, indicating it might be under attack. LCDR Overstreet acknowledged the warning and complied with procedures to abort the mission and return to base. At 13:47 the radar tracks of the MiGs merged with that of Deep Sea 129, which disappeared from the radar picture two minutes later.

Initial reaction

At first none of the agencies were alarmed, since procedures also dictated that the EC-121 rapidly descend below radar coverage, and Overstreet had not transmitted that he was under attack. However when it did not reappear within ten minutes, VQ-1 requested a scramble of two Air Force Convair F-102A Delta Dart interceptors to provide combat air patrol for the EC-121.

By 14:20 the Army Security Agency post had become increasingly concerned. It first sent a FLASH message (a high priority intelligence message to be sent within six minutes) indicating that Deep Sea 129 had disappeared, and then at 14:44, an hour after the shoot-down, sent a CRITIC ("critical intelligence") message (the highest message priority, to be processed and sent within two minutes) to six addressees within the National Command Authority, including President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.

Search efforts

A search and rescue effort was immediately launched by VQ-1 using aircraft of both the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The first response was by an Air Force Lockheed HC-130 Hercules, with a Boeing KC-135A Stratotanker tanker in support and an escort of fighters, but the search effort rapidly expanded to a total of 26 aircraft. At short notice, two U.S. Navy destroyers, USS Henry W. Tucker and USS Dale, sailed from Sasebo, Japan, on the afternoon of April 15 toward the area of last contact, a position approximately 90 nautical miles (167 km) off the North Korean port of Ch'ongjin.

The first debris sighting occurred at 09:30 the next morning, 16 April, with two destroyers of the Soviet Navy already on scene. The Air Force SAR aircraft dropped the Soviet ships URC-10 survival radios and eventually made voice contact in the afternoon as the Soviet craft were departing. Both Soviet ships indicated they had recovered debris from the aircraft but had not found any indication of survivors. That evening Tucker arrived in the area and after midnight recovered part of the aircraft perforated with shrapnel damage.

At approximately noon of 17 April Tucker recovered the first of two crewmen's bodies, then rendezvoused with the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovenny (D-429) and sent over her whaleboat. The Soviets turned over all of the debris they had collected. The bodies of Lt.j.g. Joseph R. Ribar and AT1 Richard E. Sweeney were taken to Japan but those of the other 29 crewmen were not recovered.










http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128337461

npr


Nixon Considered Nuclear Option Against N. Korea

JULY 06, 2010 4:00 PM ET

Since March, South Korea and the United States have pondered how to respond to North Korea after the torpedo sinking of a South Korean naval ship that left 46 sailors dead.

It was the case, too, in 1969 after North Korean fighter jets shot down an American spy plane. Then, President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, considered a range of military responses, up to the possible use of nuclear weapons, according to newly disclosed documents.

On April 15, 1969, an American EC-121 reconnaissance plane carrying a full crew took off from a base in Japan and did what it had done dozens of times before — it flew over international waters gathering signals, radio communications and other intelligence.

This time, though, fighter jets from North Korea intercepted the American plane and shot it down, killing all 31 Americans on board.

'Prepare To Strike'

But a former U.S. fighter pilot has come forward with a story about a nuclear alert just hours after the attack.

Bruce Charles was on temporary duty that day at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea. He was on standard alert as part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP — the plan for nuclear war with the Soviet Union. His assigned target was an airstrip in North Korea.

Early that afternoon, his commanding officer called him into his office, Charles says.

"When I got to see the colonel, it was very simple. He described the shooting down of the EC-121 about a hundred miles at sea. And that he had a message, which he showed me at that time, saying to prepare to strike my target," Charles says.

Charles then rechecked his F-4 fighter jet and the weapon it was carrying. He says it was a B61 nuclear bomb, with a yield of about 330 kilotons — not the biggest bomb in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but more than 20 times the size of the bomb dropped over Hiroshima.

Then there were several hours of waiting, Charles says, and the order came to stand down.

"The order to stand down was just about dusk, and it was not a certainty. The colonel said, 'It looks like from the messages I'm getting, we will not do this today. I do not know about tomorrow,' " Charles recalls.

Charles' story could not be independently confirmed, but not long after the North Korean attack, The New York Times, citing sources in the Nixon administration, reported that there was discussion of a nuclear attack against North Korea.

Limited 'Menu Of Options'

In the immediate hours after the attack and for the next few months, Nixon and his advisers struggled to come up with a response, according to Robert Wampler, a historian who works for the National Security Archive, a project of George Washington University.

"The U.S. did not have a very good menu of options when this happened, which sort of constrained them in their ability to pick and choose amongst something that would work, and also contain the situation," Wampler says.

Wampler recently posted 16 documents on the website of the National Security Archive, among some 1,700 that he has been studying. They illustrate vividly just how difficult it was for Nixon to respond to the North Korean attack in such a way that would not spark a wider war.

Two months after the attack, the option of using nuclear weapons was presented to the president, the documents show.

"The military produced the options, ratcheting up the level of military force all the way to all-out war and to using nuclear weapons. But constantly you find the military saying, 'But the risks probably still outweigh the potential gains,' " Wampler says.

The documents do not address what Nixon and Kissinger considered doing in the immediate hours after the attack. By the time the nuclear option arose, Nixon was considering what his choices might be in the next provocation from North Korea.

Morton Halperin worked at that time in the National Security Council. He believes Nixon did decide to retaliate against North Korea.

But Halperin says he has no knowledge that a nuclear strike was considered.

"Nixon had made a decision that we would retaliate by bombing the air base from which we believed the planes had come to shoot down the EC-121. And he had ordered an aircraft carrier to move close enough to be able to carry out the bombing," Halperin says.

Two days after the attack, though, Nixon held a press conference. And what he said led many in Congress to conclude he was not opting for retaliation. He was praised widely for this restraint, Halperin recalls, and then decided against a military response.

The documents posted by the National Security Archive suggest that for half a century, American presidents have had the same problem with North Korea, says Dan Sneider of the Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

"The danger of a wide war tends to trump whatever benefit you think might come from punishing your enemy here with a retaliatory strike," Sneider says.



- posted by H.V.O.M - Kerry Wayne Burgess 1:17 PM Pacific Time Spokane Valley Washington USA Tuesday 24 February 2015