This Is What I Think.
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
Pale rider
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35524
The American Presidency Project
Ronald Reagan
XL President of the United States: 1981 - 1989
Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the Army and Navy Club
January 12, 1988
Well, reverend clergy, General Hittle, General Dawson, Charles Graham, and ladies and gentlemen: In the old days, I'm told, the Army and Navy Club often invited their neighbor, the President, to all their parties. I've also heard that Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland walked over for a toddy or two. Oh, for the good old days. [Laughter] If I'd known that the club was this beautiful, Nancy and I would have stopped by long ago, and we would even walk, if the Secret Service would let us.
Well, the word for today is: Congratulations! You've put together a beautiful building and an historic treasure. I'm amazed at your outstanding collection of art, particularly the De Welden sculptures. I've always wondered where old generals and admirals went when they "just faded away." And now I know.
http://www.usswainwright.org/shipInfoCg-28.html
USS WAINWRIGHT
Veterans Association
USS Wainwright CG-28
1975 - 1993
1988: 1/88; Departed Charleston as lead ship of Middle East Force 1-88. 2/88: entered Persian Gulf with Samuel. B. Roberts, Jack Williams, Simpson. Wainwright served as command ship.
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1989-05/operation-praying-mantis-surface-view
USNI
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
Proceedings Magazine - May 1989 Vol. 115/5/1,035
Operation Praying Mantis: The Surface View
By Captain J.B. Perkins III, U.S. Navy
For the escorts of Battle Group Foxtrot, preparations for the 18 April 1988 Operation Praying Mantis began in the southern California operating area ten months earlier. From this first underway period as a unit, the Battle Group Commander, Rear Admiral Guy Zeller (Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three), had insisted on a rigorous set of exercises to prepare for the upcoming tour on station in the North Arabian Sea (NAS). Initially, the ships drilled hard at interpreting rules of engagement (ROE) and at devising means to counter small high-speed surface craft (e.g., Boghammers) and low, slow-flying aircraft—both of which abound in and around the Persian Gulf. We later added exercises stressing anti-Silkworm (an Iranian surface-to-surface missile) tactics, boarding and search, Sledgehammer (a procedure to vector attack aircraft to a surface threat), convoy escort procedures, naval gunfire support (NGFS), and mine detection and destruction exercises.
We practiced in every environment-in the Bering Sea during November, throughout our transit to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and on station in the NAS. During the battle group evolution off Hawaii in January, we executed a 96-hour Persian Gulf scenario, with a three submarine threat overlaid. We conducted live, coordinated Harpoon missile firings in southern California and off Hawaii, dropped Rockeye, Skipper, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) on high-speed targets off Point Mugu and Hawaii and drilled, drilled, drilled. By late March, each ship had completed dozens of these exercises, and we were considering easing the pace and working on ways to make the exercises more interesting, as the day approached when the Forrestal (CV-59) battle group would relieve us. Such philosophic discussions ended abruptly when the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) hit a mine on 14 April.
Four battle group ships en route to a port call in Mombasa were turned around, and the USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) and USS Bagley (FF-I069) raced north, refueled from the USS Wabash (AOR-5) and steamed through the Straight of Hormuz at more than 25 knots to join teammates, the USS Merrill (DD-976) and USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8). They, and their Middle East Force (MEF) counterparts, the USS Simpson (FFG-56), USS O'Brien (DD-975), USS Jack Williams (FFG-24), USS Wainwright (CG-28), USS Gary (FFG-5 I), and USS Trelllon (LPO-14) repositioned at high speed as the plan was developed. In the NAS, the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) closed to within 120 nautical miles of the Strait of Hormuz. Her escorts, the USS Reasoner (FF-1063) and Truxtun (CGN-35), were stationed to counter the potential small combatant threat in the Strait, and the air threat from Chah Bahar.
On 16 April, I flew with Lieutenant Commander Mark "Micro" Kosnik—my one-officer "battle micro staff"—from the Enterprise to Bahrain at the direction of Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (CJTFME), Rear Admiral Anthony Less, to assist in planning and executing the response. We were joined on the flagship, the USS Coronado (AGF-11), by the MEF Destroyer Squadron Commander and began working on the plan with the CJTFME staff and other players. The objectives were clear:
Sink the Iranian Saam-class frigate Sabalan or a suitable substitute.
Neutralize the surveillance posts on the Sassan and Sirri gas/oil separation platforms (GOSPs) and the Rahkish GOSP, if sinking a ship was not practicable.
There were also a number of caveats (avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage, limit adverse environmental effects) to ensure that this was in fact a "proportional response."
It was a long night, but by 0330 on 17 April we had developed a plan. We formed three surface action groups, each containing both battle group and MEF ships, that were to operate independently but still be mutually supportive. Surface Action Group (SAG) Bravo was assigned Sassan (and Rahkish), SAG Charlie, Sirri, and SAG Delta, the Sabalan. The Gary was our free safety, a lone sentinel on the northern flank protecting the barges. Each SAG commander had an objective and a simple communications plan to direct our forces, to coordinate if required, and to report to CJFTME.
Both GOSPs were to be attacked in the same fashion: we would warn the occupants and give them five minutes to leave the platform, take out any remaining Iranians with naval gunfire, insert a raid force (Marine reconnaissance unit at Sassan/SEALs at Sirri) on the platform, plant demolition charges, and destroy the surveillance post. Colonel Bill Rakow, Commander of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 2-88, and I developed a plan to coordinate NGFS and Cobra landing zone preparatory fire and discussed criteria for committing the raid force, which included the possibilities of die-hard defenders, secondary explosions, and booby traps.
At first light, as SAG Bravo approached the Sassan GOSP, the Trenton began launching helos, including the LAMPS-III from the Samuel B. Roberts, which we used for surface surveillance. The GOSP appeared unalerted as we came into view from the southwest and turned to a northerly firing course- our gun target line was limited by a United Arab Emirates oil field three nautical miles south of Sassan and a large hydrogen sulfide tank on the northern end of the GOSP. H-Hour was set at 0800; at 0755, we warned the Sassan GOSP inhabitants in Farsi and English.
"You have five minutes to abandon the platform; I intend to destroy it at 0800."
This transmission stimulated a good deal of interest and activity among a growing group of Iranians, milling about on the roof of the living quarters. Several men manned their 23-mm. gun and trained it on the Merrill about 5,000 yards away, but many more headed for the two tugs tied up alongside the platform. One tug left almost immediately, and the other departed with about 30 men on board soon afterward. The VHF radio blared a cacophony of English and Farsi as the GOSP occupants simultaneously reported to (screamed at) naval headquarters and pleaded with us for more time. At 0804, we told the inhabitants that their time was up and commenced firing at the gun emplacement. This was not a classic NGFS mission; I had decided on airbursts over the GOSP to pin down personnel and destroy command-and-control antennae, but to avoid holing potential helo landing surfaces.
At the first muzzle flash from the Merrill's 5-inch mount 51, the Iranian 23-mm. gun mount opened up, getting the attention of the ship's bridge and topside watchstanders. The Merrill immediately silenced the Iranian gun with a direct hit, and encountered no further opposition. After about 50 rounds had exploded over the southern half of the GOSP, a large crowd of converted martyrs gathered at the northern end. At this point, we checked fire and permitted a tug to return and pick up what appeared to be the rest of the Sassan GOSP occupants. Following this exodus, the Merrill and the Lynde McCormick alternated firing airbursts over the entire GOSP (less the hydrogen sulfide tank), and we watched the platform closely for any sign of activity but saw none. As this preparatory NGFS progressed, Colonel Rakow and I selected 0925 as the time to land his raid force. Ina closely coordinated sequence, the ships checked fire, Cobra gunships delivered covering fire, and the UH-1 and CH-46 helos inserted the Marines via fast rope. It was a textbook assault, and I caught myself stopping to admire it. Despite some tense moments when Iranian ammunition stores cooked off, the platform was fully secured in about 30 minutes, and the demolition and intelligence-gathering teams flew to the GOSP. About two hours later, 1,500 pounds of plastic explosives were detonated by remote control, turning the GOSP into an inferno.
Meanwhile, the fog of war had closed in periodically. First, a United Arab Emirates patrol boat approached at high speed from the northwest. We evaluated it as a possible Boghammer—a popular classification that day. It could be engaged under the ROE, but we just identified it and asked it to remain clear. Later, we reconstituted SAG Bravo and headed north to attack Rahkish GOSP, for no ship had yet been located and sunk. A Cobra helo crew, our closest air asset, evaluated a 25-knot contact closing from the northeast as a warship. This quickly took shape as a "possible Iranian Saam FFG," and the Merrill made preparations to launch a Harpoon attack. We then asked for further descriptive information and ultimately for a hull number. The contact turned out to be a Soviet Sovremennyy- classDDG. The skipper, when asked his intention, replied with a heavy accent, "I vant to take peectures for heestory." We breathed easier. Shortly after that, SAG Bravo was instructed to proceed at full speed to the eastern Gulf, in response to Boghammer attacks in the Mubarek oil field. That ended our participation in the day's fireworks.
At the Sirri GOSP, the sequence of events began essentially the same way they did at Sassano SAG Charlie gave warnings on time, most of the occupants departed on a tug, and the Wainwright, Bagley, and Simpson commenced fire about 0815. Sirri was an active oil-producing platform, however, and one of the initial rounds hit a compressed gas tank, setting the GOSP ablaze and incinerating the gun crew. Thus, it became unnecessary to insert the SEAL platoon.
With the primary mission accomplished, SAG Charlie patrolled the area. About three hours later, they detected the approach of an Iranian Kaman patrol boat, which the Bagley's LAMPS-I identified as the Joshan. As the patrol boat closed, the SAG commander repeatedly warned the Iranian that he was standing into danger and advised him to alter course and depart the area. When his direction was ignored, the U. S. commander requested and was granted "weapons free" by CJTFME. He then advised the Joshan:
"Stop your engines and abandon ship; I intend to sink you."
After thinking this communication over, the Joshan's CO apparently decided to go out firing and launched his only remaining Harpoon. The three SAG Charlie ships, now in a line abreast at 26,000 yards, and the Bagley's LAMPS simultaneously detected the launch and maneuvered and launched chaff. The Harpoon passed down the Wainwright's starboard side close aboard (the seeker may not have activated) and was answered by a volley of SM-1 missiles from the Simpson and the Wainwright. Four missiles fired; four hits. An additional SM-1 (a hit) and a Harpoon (a miss, probably resulting from the sinking Joshan's sudden lack of freeboard) were fired, and the patrol boat was eventually sunk with gunfire.
SAG Charlie had still more opportunities to modify the Iranian naval order of battle when an F-4 made a high-speed approach just prior to the sinking of the Joshan hulk (SAG Bravo also detected approaching F-4s, but those dove to the deck and departed as they reached SM-1 range). The Wainwright is SM-2 equipped. As the F-4 continued to close, ignoring warnings on both military and internal air defense circuits, the SAG Commander fired two missiles and hit the Iranian aircraft. Only the pilot's heroic efforts enabled the Iranians to recover the badly damaged aircraft at Bandar Abbas. At this point, SAG Charlie was through for the day, as well.
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/U-S-Forces-Preplanned-Attack-on-Iranian-Frigate/id-b15f81272b81bde85fa9a2abd77ea1cd?SearchText=%22uss%20wainwright%22;Display_
AP News Archive
U.S. FORCES PREPLANNED ATTACK ON IRANIAN FRIGATE
NORMAN BLACK , Associated Press
Apr. 21, 1988 6:46 PM ET
WASHINGTON (AP) _ The United States began its military operation in the Persian Gulf last Monday with the specific goal of sinking a particular Iranian frigate that was known for its vicious attacks on merchant ships, the Pentagon said Thursday.
Ironically, that goal was abandoned at one point during the fighting because another Iranian ship had been sunk. The frigate that had been targeted, however, ultimately came under attack after firing on U.S. forces, only to be spared from sinking by Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci.
Those and other details of the most extensive military clash ever between Iran and the United States were released Thursday by Dan Howard, the Defense Department's chief spokesman.
Beyond discussing the original attack plans, Howard disclosed President Reagan had been asked to make only one command decision during the course of the actual fighting, giving an OK for U.S. jets to bomb some small Iranian gunboats that had been spotted attacking ships and rigs in an oil field.
U.S. forces sank or seriously damaged two Iranian naval frigates and four smaller gunboats and fired on two Iranian jets Monday in fighting that erupted after the United States destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms.
Reagan ordered the destruction of the platforms in retaliation for the mining on April 14 of the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts. Ten sailors were injured in that incident.
Howard and Carlucci, in previous briefings, had disclosed the Navy originally planned to hit three platforms instead of two. One target was dropped, they said, when fighting erupted elsewhere in the gulf.
Howard acknowledged on Thursday that the United States also had included among its original targets an Iranian warship and that was why three Navy ships were steaming near the Strait of Hormuz when the attacks began.
The ship selected for sinking was the Sabalan, a frigate that has earned the special enmity of all merchant seamen in the gulf because it makes a point of shooting at the crew quarters on tankers it attacks.
Howard agreed Thursday the decision to include an Iranian ship as a target was a first, but denied the United States was changing its policies or immersing itself directly in the Iran-Iraq war.
The United States, he said, had given assurances to Iran ''that we considered their mining of international waterways to be a hostile act and if any U.S. flag vessels were damaged by those Iranian mines, that we would certainly respond.''
''Now, we decided that as part of that response, we were going to sink an Iranian naval vessel,'' he continued.
''The Sabalan was a target of availability. We knew where it was. That was the first criteria. The fact that this ship had perpetrated any number of vicious attacks on merchant vessels in the gulf certainly did nothing to lessen our desire to use it as a target of availability.''
According to Howard, the attacks on the platforms were scheduled to occur first, and when they did, the Iranians apparently warned the Sabalan by radio. It ran at high speed for the naval port at Bandar Abbas, where the Iranian frigate anchored between two tankers, making it impossible for U.S. ships to fire Harpoon missiles at it, he continued.
Shortly after one of the platforms was attacked, an Iranian missile boat, the Joshan, attacked the cruiser USS Wainwright and was in turn sunk.
http://www.divxmoviesenglishsubtitles.com/P/Pale_Rider_CD2.html
Pale Rider
Long walk.
- Where is he?|- He's gone, Megan.
Child, he's gone.
You can't drive these horses any more.|You'll kill them!
Preacher!
We all love you, Preacher!
I love you!
Thank you.
Goodbye.
- posted by H.V.O.M - Kerry Wayne Burgess 6:42 PM Pacific Time Seattle USA Wednesday 20 March 2013